ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

DIVISION IV

DANIEL DORSEY

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

CACR03-1209

October 6, 2004

APPEAL FROM THE CRITTENDEN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NOS. CR98-362, CR98-363, CR98-364]

HON. DAVID N. LASER,

JUDGE

AFFIRMED

John Mauzy Pittman, Judge

The appellant in this criminal case pled guilty to several felonies in 1998. He was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment on one charge and six years' suspended imposition of sentence on the remaining charges. Subsequently paroled, appellant was arrested for new crimes on June 17, 2002. His parole was revoked based on the conduct that led to his arrest, and he was reincarcerated. The conduct that led to appellant's arrest likewise was the basis for a petition to revoke appellant's suspended imposition of sentence. Insomuch as appellant was already incarcerated, the State did not move for a revocation hearing until appellant was released from prison. At the revocation hearing held on June 8, 2003, appellant moved to dismiss the revocation petition, arguing that the hearing had been delayed so long as to constitute a denial of due process. The trial court denied the motion, revoked appellant's suspension after hearing evidence, and sentenced appellant to concurrent terms of six years' imprisonment on the underlying charges.

For reversal, appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss because the hearing was not held within a reasonable time. We affirm.

Initially, we note that the one-year speedy trial rule applicable to criminal prosecutions has been held not to apply to revocations. Dority v. State, 329 Ark. 631, 951 S.W.2d 559 (1997). Furthermore, the Sixth-Amendment right to a speedy trial does not apply to revocation proceedings. Id. Therefore, the only issue in this case is whether the hearing was so long delayed as to constitute a denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. To satisfy the requirements of due process, all that is required is that the hearing be held within a reasonable time, and what constitutes a reasonable time must be determined upon the facts of the particular case. Id., (citing Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78 (1976)).

We recognize that there is a statutory requirement that a revocation period be held within a "reasonable period of time, not to exceed sixty (60) days, after the defendant's arrest." Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-310(b)(2) (Repl. 1997). However, the purpose of this limitation is to ensure that a defendant is not detained in jail for an unreasonable time awaiting his revocation hearing, and the limitation therefore loses its meaning when he is already serving time on another charge. Boone v. State, 270 Ark. 83, 603 S.W.2d 410 (1980). In the present case, where the appellant was incarcerated on other charges while awaiting his revocation hearing, a delay in excess of sixty days was not ipso facto unreasonable.

In order for us to conclude that appellant was denied due process because of the delay, it must appear "that the procedures below contravened principles of fundamental fairness." See Gordon v. State, 269 Ark. 946, 601 S.W.2d 598 (Ark. App. 1980). Here, appellant was tried less than one year from the filing of the petition to revoke, even though Dority v. State,supra, holds that the one-year speedy trial rule does not apply to revocations. In the absence of any demand for an earlier hearing by appellant, or any convincing argument or authority to show why a delay of less than one year is reasonable with respect to criminal trials but violates due process with respect to revocation proceedings, we cannot say that the delay in the case at bar was so fundamentally unfair as to constitute a denial of due process.

Affirmed.

Gladwin and Neal, JJ., agree.