ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

DIVISION I

H. G. DAVIS

APPELLANT

V.

SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE, L.P.

APPELLEE

CA03-1420

September 15, 2004

APPEAL FROM THE FAULKNER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. CIV 01-482]

HON. CHARLES E. CLAWSON, JR.,

JUDGE

AFFIRMED

Robert J. Gladwin, Judge

Appellant H.G. Davis appeals from an order of the Faulkner County Circuit Court that granted summary judgment in favor of appellee Southwestern Bell Telephone. Appellant raises seven points on appeal. We note at the outset that appellant's brief is not in compliance with the format required by Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4-2. The jurisdictional statement is argumentative and contains information irrelevant to jurisdictional matters; the abstract is argumentative and fails to include an impartial condensation of the testimony as required by the rule; and the statement of the case is argumentative, fails to present a concise statement of the case sufficient to enable the court to understand the nature of the case, and does not include page references to the abstract and addendum as required by the rule. Conversely, there is no argument or discussion supporting appellant's points on appeal, save those arguments inappropriately made in other sections of the brief. The addendum is flagrantly deficient, most notably in that it fails to include the trial court's order granting summary judgment.

Appellee, however, was diligent in supplementing the addendum, which allowed us to reach the merits of the case. See Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-2; Baldwin v. Baldwin, 349 Ark. 45, 76 S.W.3d 267 (2002). We affirm.

Appellant's points on appeal list a number of complaints against various parties, most of which have no relevance to this appeal. The instant case originated with appellant filing a complaint against appellee on July 6, 2001, contending that appellee had trespassed on his property by installing telephone cables and service lines. Appellee answered and raised as an affirmative defense, among other things, that appellant's complaint should be dismissed because it was barred by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in Ark. Code Ann. § 23-17-237 (Supp. 1999).

Appellant filed a motion for summary judgment on April 17, 2003. On May 5, 2003, appellee responded to this motion and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. Appellee attached a letter that was written by appellant in 1993 in which he complained to appellee and to the Arkansas Public Service Commission regarding appellee's facilities located on what he deemed his property. Appellee contended that this letter established that the installation of the cable terminal, the cable, and the service lines from the cable were known to appellant more than two years prior to the filing of the case. Appellee also attached an affidavit of Sherry Glenn, appellee's area manager for installation and repair, in which she stated that the terminal complained of by appellant was installed in 1989, that the facilities were located within a road and utility easement, that no service lines had been installed since July 5, 1999, and that the only service line that presently connected to the cable terminal was the service line through which appellant received his telephone service. Ms. Glenn stated that all service through the cable terminal complained of had been rerouted through other facilities prior to July 5, 1999, due to protests from appellant.

On September 2, 2003, the trial court entered an order granting appellee's cross-motion for summary judgment, finding that the claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, Ark. Code Ann. § 23-17-237. The trial court also found that, because appellant failed to establish his ownership of the property in question, appellee had committed no trespass against appellant.

As we understand them, appellant's arguments on appeal are essentially as follows: 1) whether application of the statute of limitations deprived appellant of his constitutional right to "life, liberty, and property"; 2) whether the granting of a summary judgment deprived appellant of his civil rights; 3) whether the proof offered by appellee in support of its motion for summary judgment constituted hearsay; 4) whether the United States District Court has jurisdiction over the Supreme Court of Arkansas to interpret Arkansas's criminal and civil statutory law; 5) whether the United States District Court has jurisdiction over the Supreme Court of Arkansas to interpret the Arkansas constitution as it defines the jobs of elected officials; 6) whether the Faulkner County Circuit Court has the authority to refer criminal allegations along with supporting documentation to the proper criminal authorities; and 7)whether there is a specific party who is responsible for the constitutional guarantees of equal protection where public officials fail to perform their defined duties.

Even if appellant's imprecise recitations of perceived grievances can be elevated to "points on appeal," he is procedurally barred from raising them on appeal because they were either not raised below or not ruled upon by the trial court. See Barclay v. First Paris Holding Co., 344 Ark. 711, 42 S.W.3d 496 (2001). It is well settled that to preserve arguments for appeal, even constitutional ones, the appellant must obtain a ruling below. Id. The burden of obtaining a ruling on these issues was on appellant, and his failure to do so, leaving the issue unresolved, operated as a waiver of the argument on appeal. Brumley v. Naples, 320 Ark. 310, 896 S.W.2d 860 (1995).

The only issue properly before this court is whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of appellees. In Oxford v. Perry, 340 Ark. 577, 13 S.W.3d 567 (2000), our supreme court set forth the standard of review that we apply to cases in which summary judgment has been granted:

340 Ark. at 581-582, 13 S.W.3d at 569-570. (Internal citations omitted.)

In response to appellant's complaint, appellee raised the affirmative defense that the statute of limitations had run on any cause of action appellant might have had. The applicable statute of limitations in this case is found at Ark. Code Ann. § 23-17-237:

Appellee introduced into evidence a letter written by appellant that showed appellant had complained to Southwestern Bell and the Public Service Commission regarding telecommunications lines on his property as early as October 6, 1993. Appellee also introduced the aforementioned affidavit of Sherrie Glenn in which she stated that appellee had not installed any facilities within the boundaries of the property in question since July 5, 1999. This evidence established that any cause of action appellant might have had against appellee for the actions he complained of accrued more than two years prior to the filing of his complaint. Appellee therefore made a prima facie showing that it was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Appellant failed to meet proof with proof and show a material issue of fact, and appellee was therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Because we affirm the order of summary judgment entered by the trial court on the basis of the statute of limitations, it is unnecessary for us to address the trespass issue.

Affirmed.

Bird and Griffen, JJ., agree.