ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

DIVISION IV

JANIE McKINNEY

APPELLANT

V.

AREA AGENCY ON AGING

WESTERN ARKANSAS and RISK

MANAGEMENT RESOURCES APPELLEES

CA 03-1204

June 23, 2004

APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

COMMISSION [F003588]

AFFIRMED

John F. Stroud, Jr., Chief Judge

Appellant, Janie McKinney, appeals the Workers' Compensation Commission's denial of workers' compensation benefits. On appeal, she contends that the Commission erred in its determination that she failed to prove that the recommended IDET procedure was reasonable and necessary treatment for her compensable injury and in determining that she failed to prove that she was entitled to temporary total disability benefits from June 10, 2001, to a date yet to be determined. We affirm.

The standard of review in workers' compensation cases is well-settled. We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commission's findings and affirm the decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. Geo Specialty Chem. v. Clingan, 69 Ark. App. 369, 13 S.W.3d 218 (2000). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Air Compressor Equip. v. Sword, 69 Ark. App. 162, 11 S.W.3d 1 (2000). The issue is not whether we might have reached a different result or whether the evidence would have supported a contrary finding; if reasonable minds could reach the Commission's conclusion, we must affirm its decision. Geo Specialty, supra. It is the Commission's province to determine witness credibility and the weight to be given to each witness's testimony. Johnson v. Riceland Foods, 47 Ark. App. 71, 884 S.W.2d 626 (1994). Any contradictions in the evidence are for the Commission to reconcile. Ark. Dep't of Health v. Williams, 43 Ark. App. 169, 863 S.W.2d 583 (1993).

In the present case, appellant was a home-health aide who suffered a compensable low-back injury on March 13, 2000, while she was moving a patient. Appellant notified her supervisor of the injury, and she was seen by Dr. Fareed Kannout, who performed diagnostic tests and ordered conservative treatment. A CT scan performed on April 5, 2000, showed a bulge at L5-S1. Dr. Kannout referred appellant to Dr. Joseph Queeney for a neurosurgery evaluation and further review of the CT scan. Dr. Queeney noted that the CT scan showed very minimal disc bulging at L5-S1, but he did not see anything to the right side that explained her symptoms. He found no evidence of nerve-root compression based upon his examination or upon review of appellant's CT scan, but he ordered an MRI. The MRI was performed on May 30, 2000, and although he saw a small disc protrusion at L5-S1, Dr. Queeney saw nothing to explain appellant's right lower extremity problems; he stated that he would not recommend surgery but would recommend conservative treatment, and he referred her back to Dr. Kannout.

Dr. Kannout referred appellant to Dr. Terry Gile, a pain-management specialist, who performed a series of injections and a diskogram. Dr. Gile recommended either that an IDET procedure be performed or that appellant be placed on a morphine pump; however, neither of these recommendations was followed.

Appellant was seen for independent medical examinations (IMEs) by Dr. Gary Moffitt of the Arkansas Occupational Health Clinic in January 2001 and Dr. Jim Moore of The Pain Care and Neurology Center in March 2001. Both Dr. Moffitt and Dr. Moore found that appellant was not a candidate for the IDET procedure or a morphine pump, and both expressed concern regarding the amount of narcotic medication she was receiving.

Over one year after the injury, on March 22, 2001, appellant was seen by Dr. Bradley Short, an orthopaedic surgeon. At that time, Dr. Short agreed that surgery was not indicated and would not recommend any invasive procedure. Dr. Short continued to treat appellant with injections and pain medication and recommended a work-hardening program. Appellant refused to attend the work-hardening program because she was concerned that she would further injure herself. In a June 10, 2001 report, Dr. Short opined that appellant had reached maximum medical improvement and assessed appellant's permanent-partial-impairment rating at five percent. Appellant did not see Dr. Short again until more than one year later, on June 4, 2002, when he noted that her exam on that date was unchanged from when he last saw her on June 10, 2001. Notwithstanding that finding, he recommended that appellant be referred to a Dr. Boxsell in Tulsa, Oklahoma, for evaluation for an IDET procedure, but that referral was not approved by the employer.

Appellant first contends that the Commission erred in finding that an IDET was not reasonable and necessary treatment for her compensable injury. Whether a medical procedure is reasonable and necessary is a question of fact for the Commission. Air Compressor Equip. v. Sword, 69 Ark. App. 162, 11 S.W.3d 1 (2000). Appellant argues that the opinions of her pain-management specialist and orthopaedic surgeon, Dr. Gile and Dr.Short, who both had recommended that the IDET procedure be performed,1 were more credible because they had seen her many times over a period of months, while the two physicians who performed the IMEs, Dr. Moffitt and Dr. Moore, and who had both recommended that she was not a candidate for either the IDET procedure or a morphine pump, had only seen her one time. While it is true that both physicians who performed the IMEs only saw appellant one time, each physician had the opportunity to review appellant's medical records in full; therefore, each physician was apprised of the treatments appellant had undergone. In fact, both IME physicians expressed concern about the amount of narcotic medication being taken by appellant. It is the Commission's function to determine witness credibility and the weight to be afforded to any testimony; the Commission must weigh the medical evidence and, if such evidence is conflicting, its resolution is a question of fact for the Commission. Searcy Indus. Laundry, Inc. v. Ferren, 82 Ark. App. 69, 110 S.W.3d 306 (2003). The Commission's resolution of the medical evidence has the force and effect of a jury verdict. Jim Walters Homes v. Beard, ___ Ark. App. ___, 120 S.W.3d 160 (2003). In the present case, the Commission elected to accept the evidence from the IME physicians that appellant was not a candidate for an IDET procedure. We hold that there is substantial evidence to support the denial of the IDET procedure on the basis that it was not reasonable and necessary.

Appellant also argues that she is entitled to temporary total disability benefits from June 10, 2001, to a date yet to be determined, and that the Commission erred in denying these benefits. We disagree. In Farmers Cooperative v. Biles, 77 Ark. App. 1, 5, 69 S.W.3d 899, 902 (2002) (citations omitted), this court held:

Temporary total disability is that period within the healing period in which an employee suffers a total incapacity to earn wages; the healing period is that period for healing of an accidental injury that continues until the employee is as far restored as the permanent character of his injury will permit, and that ends when the underlying condition causing the disability has become stable and nothing in the way of treatment will improve that condition. The determination of when the healing period had ended is a factual determination for the Commission and will be affirmed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence.

In the present case, Dr. Short's June 10, 2001 report states that as of that date, it was his opinion that appellant had reached maximum medical improvement, and he gave her a five-percent permanent-partial-impairment rating. From this report, the ALJ, and the Commission by the adoption of the ALJ's opinion, determined that appellant no longer remained in her healing period. This factual determination was certainly within the Commission's province as fact finder. Appellant's citation to Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-521(a) (Repl. 2002) is misplaced; this section refers to compensation for scheduled permanent injuries, which is inapplicable to appellant. We hold that the Commission's opinion displayed a substantial basis for the denial of additional temporary-total-disability benefits to appellant from June 10, 2001, to a date yet to be determined.

Affirmed.

Neal and Crabtree, JJ., agree.

1 Although appellant contends that Dr. Short recommended her for the IDET procedure, his letter of August 20, 2002, only stated that he recommended that appellant be evaluated by Dr. Boxsell or any other physician familiar with the IDET procedure to see if she "would be a candidate to benefit from this procedure."