ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

DIVISION I

DEMETRIUS LEKI WOODS

APPELLANT

v.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

CACR03-1000

MARCH 24, 2004

APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[CR-2002-1854]

HONORABLE BARRY ALAN SMITH, CIRCUIT JUDGE

AFFIRMED

Karen R. Baker, Judge

Appellant, Demetrius Woods, appeals his convictions, alleging that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction and that the previous acquittal of his co-defendant and principal actor precluded prosecution of appellant. We find no error and affirm.

Following a bench trial, the Pulaski County Circuit Court convicted appellant of aggravated robbery, first-degree battery, and misdemeanor theft of property and sentenced him to an aggregate term of twenty years' incarceration in the Arkansas Department of Correction. Marcus Harris, the victim, testified at trial. He knew appellant personally because he and appellant had grown up together in the neighborhood. On the night of the incident, he was in his aunt's yard working on his car. Mr. Harris was talking with his boss, Anthony King, at King's car where King had pulled up. Another car pulled up and Scott Ward got out of the second car. Ward started an argument with King, and Mr. Harris asked them both to leave. At Mr. Harris's request, King left; however, Ward stayed, complained about Mr. Harris's attitude and then shot Mr. Harris. After Ward shot Mr. Harris, appellant and another man, Bens, got out of the second car and grabbed Mr. Harris. A fourth man got out of the car and walked away. Appellant and Bens went through Mr. Harris's pockets. The pocket appellant searched was empty, but the one that Bens searched contained $600 that Bens

took. The three men attempted unsuccessfully to put Mr. Harris in the trunk of his own car, but the stereo speaker box left them no room. They then dragged Mr. Harris to another vehicle behind his aunt's house and put him in that vehicle's trunk. Mr. Harris managed to put his foot up against the trunk and free one arm which allowed him to escape from the trunk. Throughout this sequence of events, Mr. Harris continually asked appellant why he was doing this to him. The three men left when they heard a police siren.

Officer Rolette Williams of the Little Rock Police Department also testified. He lived in the neighborhood where the incident occurred. He was off-duty and was coming home when a man came up to him and said someone had just been shot across the street. He looked over and could see the commotion in Mr. Harris's aunt's yard. Officer Williams went into his own house, retrieved his service weapon, got back into his car and drove closer to evaluate the situation. He could see three men attacking Mr. Harris and attempting to put him in a trunk. Officer Williams called for back-up. Sergeant Hibbs responded to the call for assistance and testified at trial that, when he arrived, he saw the bullet wound in Mr. Harris's leg.

Appellant moved for a directed verdict at the close of the state's case and the trial court denied his motion. Appellant then testified. He explained that he had no intention of robbing Mr. Harris. He stated that he heard the shot, then Ward asked him to help get the gun, and the scuffling in the yard was over the gun.

Sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction is a question of law. E.g., State v. Stephenson, 330 Ark. 594, 955 S.W.2d 518 (1997). The testimony of one eyewitness alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction. See Lenoir v. State, 77 Ark. App. 250, 72 S.W.3d 899 (2002). The weighing of evidence lies within the province of the trier of fact, and the appellate court by its determination regarding the credibility of witnesses. See Williams v. State, 351 Ark. 215, 91 S.W.3d 54 (2002).

Appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery, first-degree battery, and misdemeanor theft of property. A person is criminally liable for the conduct of another person if he or she is the otherperson's accomplice in the commission of a crime. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-402(2) (Repl. 1997). An accomplice is one who, "with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of an offense . . . solicits, advises, encourages, . . . coerces . . . aids, agrees to aid, or attempts to aid the other person in planning or committing it[.]" Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-403(a) (Repl. 1997).

The court in Andrews v. State, 344 Ark. 606, 613-14, 42 S.W.3d 484, 489 (2001) provided further insight into the analysis of accomplice liability:

The presence of an accused in the proximity of a crime, opportunity, and association with a person involved in a crime in a manner suggestive of joint participation, are relevant factors in determining the connection of an accomplice with the crime. Ashley v. State, 22 Ark. App. 73, 732 S.W.2d 872 (1987). When two or more persons assist each other in the commission of a crime, each is an accomplice and criminally liable, ultimately, for his own conduct, but he cannot disclaim responsibility because he did not personally take part in every act that went to make up the crime as a whole. Phillips v. State, 17 Ark. App. 86, 703 S.W.2d 471 (1986).

We hold that the State's evidence sufficiently supports appellant's convictions. The victim and Officer Williams testified that the three attacked Mr. Harris, struggled in the yard, and that the three men attempted to place Mr. Harris in the trunk of a car. Mr. Harris specifically identified appellant, whom he knew from growing up in the same neighborhood. Mr. Harris also testified to the search of his person by both appellant and Bens, and that Bens found and took the cash from his pocket. Mr. Harris and Sergeant Hibbs testified that Mr. Harris sustained the gunshot wound to his leg during the incident. Therefore, we find no merit to appellant's first argument.

Neither can appellant prevail on his second argument that acquittal of his co-defendant precluded appellant's prosecution. "In any prosecution for an offense in which the liability of that defendant is based on conduct of another person, it is no defense that . . . [t]he other person . . . has been acquitted of any offense . . . even if the defendant and the other person were tried jointly. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-405(2) (Repl. 1997). This provision was enacted precisely for the purpose of changing the common-law rule that the acquittal of a principal operated as a bar to prosecution of an accomplice. See Roleson v. State, 277 Ark. 148, 640 S.W.2d 113 (1982) (considering the former version of the statute with identical wording).

Accordingly, we find no error and affirm.

Stroud, C.J., and Crabtree, J., agree.