ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

January 29, 2004

MICHAEL D. LENZ

Petitioner

v.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

Respondent

CR 03-1270

PRO SE MOTION FOR BELATED APPEAL OF ORDER AND MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL [CIRCUIT COURT OF FAULKNER COUNTY, CR 96-1122, CR 96-1195, CR 96-1268, DAVID L. REYNOLDS, JUDGE]

MOTION FOR BELATED APPEAL DENIED; MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL MOOT

Per Curiam

In 1997, Michael D. Lenz entered a plea of guilty to multiple felony and misdemeanor charges and was sentenced to serve an aggregate term of 360 months' imprisonment. He was also ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $16,509.18.

In 2002, Lenz filed in the trial court a petition for writ of error coram nobis, challenging the judgments. The petition was denied by order entered August 7, 2003. On August 25, 2003, Lenz filed a "motion in response to trial court's ruling." On October 6, 2003, he filed a "notice of intent to appeal." On November 7, 2003, petitioner Lenz tendered the record pertaining to the order of August 7, 2003, to this court. Our clerk correctly declined to lodge the record because petitioner did not file a notice of appeal within the thirty-day period allowed for filing a notice of appeal under Ark. R. App. P.--Crim. 2(a)(4).

As grounds for a belated appeal, petitioner contends that the motion he filed on August 25, 2003, should have been considered a notice of appeal. He further contends that as a pro se litigant he should not be held to the "technical procedures" inherent in perfecting an appeal.

A petitioner has the right to appeal a ruling on a petition for postconviction relief. Scott v. State, 281 Ark. 436, 664 S.W.2d 475 (1984). With that right, however, goes the responsibility to file a timely notice of appeal within thirty days of the date the order was entered in accordance with Ark. R. App. P.--Crim. 2(a)(4). If the petitioner fails to file a timely notice of appeal, a belated appeal will not be allowed absent a showing by the petitioner of good cause for the failure to comply with proper procedure. Garner v. State, 293 Ark. 309, 737 S.W.2d 637 (1987). This court has specifically held that it is not the responsibility of anyone other than the appellant to perfect an appeal. See Sullivan v. State, 301 Ark. 352, 784 S.W.2d 155 (1990). Neither the motion petitioner filed on August 25, 2003, nor the "notice of intent to appeal" filed October 6, 2003, was in the form of a notice of appeal. Neither conformed to Ark. R. App. P.--Civ. 3(e) (1998) in that there was no clear designation of the order or part of the order appealed from, no designation of the contents of the record on appeal, and no statement that the appellant had ordered the record. In short, there was no definitive notice given that an appeal was being taken.

Petitioner's argument that he should not be held to procedural rules because he was acting pro se must fail because this court has consistently held that all litigants, including those who proceed pro se, must bear responsibility for conforming to the rules of procedure or demonstrating a good cause for not doing so. Bragg v. State, 297 Ark. 348, 760 S.W.2d 878 (1988); Peterson v. State, 289 Ark. 452, 711 S.W.2d 830 (1986); Walker v. State, 283 Ark. 339, 676 S.W.2d 460 (1984); Thompson v. State, 280 Ark. 163, 655 S.W.2d 424 (1983). The pro se appellant receives no special consideration on appeal. See Gibson v. State, 298 Ark. 43, 764 S.W.2d 617 (1989). It is entirely the responsibility of the pro se party desiring to appeal to file a proper notice of appeal and perfect the appeal. See Sullivan, supra; Bragg, supra.

The purpose of the rule setting time limitations on filing a notice or lodging a record is to eliminate unnecessary delay in the docketing of appeals. We have made it abundantly clear that we expect compliance with the rule so that appeals will proceed as expeditiously as possible. Jacobs v. State, 321 Ark. 561, 906 S.W.2d 670 (1995), citing Alexander v. Beaumont, 275 Ark. 357, 629 S.W.2d 300 (1982). It was the duty of the petitioner to file a notice of appeal in a timely manner. As he did not do so and has not demonstrated good cause for the failure to do so, the motion for belated appeal is denied. The motion for appointment of counsel is moot.

Motion denied; motion for appointment of counsel moot.