ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
 

DIVISION I

MELINDA WYRICK

APPELLANT

v.

ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF

HUMAN SERVICES

APPELLEE

CA03-442

January 14, 2004

APPEAL FROM BENTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. J-01-349]

HONORABLE JAY FINCH,

CIRCUIT JUDGE

AFFIRMED

Andree Layton Roaf, Judge

Appellant Melinda Wyrick appeals from the order of the Benton County Circuit Court terminating her parental rights as to two of her children, Kimberly and Tiffany Wyrick. On appeal, Wyrick argues that the trial court erred in finding by clear and convincing evidence: (1) that it was in the best interest of the children to terminate her parental rights; and (2) that there were grounds justifying termination of her parental rights. We affirm.

On July 26, 2001, the Arkansas Department of Human Services ("DHS") filed a petition for emergency custody of Melinda Wyrick's two minor children, Kimberly and Tiffany Wyrick, alleging that the children were dependent-neglected. The affidavit attached to the petition indicated that the children were at risk due to severe environmental neglect. According to the affidavit, DHS investigator Candace Gonzales went to appellant's home on July 23, 2001, after receiving a call to the Arkansas Child Abuse Hotline. Gonzales stated that a police officer accompanied her to the home and that they were met on the porch by Mary Wyrick, Melinda's mother who, after initially refusing, allowed them inside the house.

According to Gonzales, the first thing that she noticed was the smell of rotting food and feces. Mary's bedroom, which she shared with one of the children, was filthy and completely covered with dirty clothing, trash, and toys. There was a portable toilet beside the bed that was full of urine and feces and "looked and smelled as though it had not been dumped for many days." In the dining room, Gonzales stated that she found an empty glass dish containing an unknown substance, which had numerous dead flies in it. There was mold and trash everywhere on the floor, and the washing machine was filled with moldy clothes. The kitchen table was covered with old and rotting food, and Gonzales stated that the stench in the kitchen was so overwhelming that her eyes were watering. The kitchen floor was moldy and rotting, the counters had mold and bugs on them, and the stove was covered with old grease, old food, and dried cat feces. Gonzales indicated that she could not identify items in the refrigerator, as most of the food inside was rotting and "oozing" out onto the floor. The refrigerator door was also filthy, with black and brown chunks of old food. In the bathroom, the floor and walls were covered with wet mold, the toilet was broken and filled with feces, there was a hole in the wall behind the toilet, and the sink "looked as though it had not been cleaned in weeks." Gonzales stated that the smell in this area of the house literally made her "gag and almost vomit."

After seeing the inside of the home, Gonzales returned to the front porch and asked Mary where the children were. Although Mary initially claimed to not know where the children were; she eventually sent her boyfriend, Wesley Vierra, who also resided in the house, to find Melinda and the children. Vierra returned a few minutes later with Melinda and the two children, and Gonzales then informed Melinda that she was removing the children from the home.

The probable cause hearing was held on August 2, 2001, and Melinda stipulated that there was probable cause for DHS to have taken emergency custody of the children. Mary Wyrick testified that she lived with Melinda and her two grandchildren. She admitted that the home was in a "nasty" condition, but stated that she had a chemical imbalance, which makes her incapable of throwing anything away, including trash. Mary testified that she had started counseling to address her condition. She further stated that she and Melinda had cleaned up and fixed the home, and she introduced pictures showing the home's much improved condition. Mary admitted that DHS had come to her and Melinda's home in Oklahoma in 1999 because the house "was not fit for any type of human habitation." She testified that they moved from that house to their home in Arkansas and that DHS had been to the home once before because it was in bad condition. Although DHS had offered their services at that time, Mary stated that she refused the services because she did not think that she needed them. She testified that she was now willing to cooperate with DHS and to continue to keep the home in good condition.

Maria Upshaw, a caseworker for DHS, testified that she had been to the home since the children were removed and that it was relatively clean. She also confirmed that there had been a previous investigation on the family eight months earlier due to the home being in a similarly bad condition, and that the family had cleaned it up at that time and refused supportive services. In addition to the issues with the condition of the home, Upshaw testified that she had concerns about the children's physical condition. She stated that Tiffany had abscesses in her gums and that she would need extensive dental work. Upshaw further stated that Tiffany was almost four years old and that she was still being bottle-fed, which may have caused the abscesses in her mouth. Kimberly, who was seven years old at the time of the hearing, had not yet gone to school, although she should have been in the first grade. According to Upshaw, Melinda had indicated that she was home- schooling Kimberly. Upshaw also testified that Kimberly had impetitis on her face and that she had failed her hearing tests at her initial physical examination.

The trial court found that there was probable cause for the children to remain out of the home pending the adjudication hearing. Although the court noted that the home had been cleaned, it found that there were more fundamental problems in the case and that several issues were of more concern than the dirty house, such as the fact that the children were primarily in the grandmother's custody and that Melinda had not taken the lead in the children's care. The court noted that Tiffany had abscesses in her mouth, possibly due to bottle-feeding, and stated that there were developmental and neglect issues with the children. In addition, the trial court noted the evidence that there had been previous situations where the home had been found in a filthy condition and where Melinda and her mother had refused the offer of supportive services by DHS.

On August 28, 2001, the adjudication hearing was held. Melanie Chambers, a family service worker with DHS, testified that she had been assigned the investigation of the Wyrick family in October 2000, and she described the filthy conditions of the home at that time, which were very similar to the home's conditions in July 2001. Chambers stated that she had given Melinda one day to clean up the home and that when she returned the next day, it was clean, so she did not remove the children. Candace Gonzales then testified as to the condition of the home on July 23, 2001, and stated that she had removed the children because it was not a healthy or safe environment. When she spoke with Melinda and her mother about the condition of the home, they stated that they were getting ready to move to Oklahoma and that was why the house was so cluttered. However, Gonzales testified that it looked like the house had not been cleaned for a very long time.

Both Gonzales and Upshaw testified that the home was now clean and that it had been clean since the children had been removed in July. Upshaw testified, however, that there were still health concerns with the children and that they were also behind on their immunizations. According to Upshaw, Tiffany had serious dental issues due to a lack of proper dental care and that she would need oral surgery. Upshaw testified that the children's health needs were severe and could have been prevented. She further testified that, given the history of the case, she did not believe that the family would continue to keep the house clean without prompting, and she recommended that the children remain in DHS custody. Upshaw also stated that Melinda's mother, Mary, was present every time she visited and that it was her impression that Mary controlled the family. Upshaw testified, however, that since the home was clean, the children could begin unsupervised weekend visitations with their mother.

Melinda admitted that the house was dirty when the children were removed. She stated that her mother was compulsive, as well as physically disabled, and that she would scream at her when she would start to clean. Melinda testified that she had lived with her mother for the past two years, but that she was saving money to get her own home. She stated that she had been employed for the past several weeks. Melinda also testified that she did not have a high school diploma or a driver's license, although DHS had given her the book to study for her driver's license test.

The trial court found that Melinda had a dependent relationship upon her mother, whom the court noted was physically disabled and has a compulsive personality. The court found that Melinda continued to live with her mother even when the home was unsafe to live in and that the children were dependent-neglected in the mother's care due to environmental and medical neglect. The court ordered that Melinda establish a residence separate from her mother within the next six months, complete parenting classes, maintain a clean home, maintain employment, attend the children's medical and dental appointments, and cooperate with DHS in their case plan goals and referrals. In addition, the court noted that Melinda is not well educated and that the unsanitary condition of the home, along with the children's health problems, demonstrated that she lacks an understanding of very basic issues and that she would need a lot of assistance to establish a home independent from her mother.

At the review hearing on November 27, 2001, Angela Arnold, a DHS caseworker, testified that Melinda had moved into a new home across the street from her mother in October. Arnold stated that Melinda's application for HUD housing had been accepted; however, Melinda had declined the offer because she had been remodeling her new home. Arnold stated that there were no health and safety issues with the new home when she had visited. Although Arnold testified that she had not been to Mary Wyrick's home since Melinda moved out, she stated that the front yard was getting cluttered again and that she had told Melinda that the children would not be able to go over there if the grandmother was not keeping it clean. According to Arnold, she had been to Melinda's home on only one occasion when her mother was not present. Arnold stated that Melinda had completed her parenting classes; however, she had still not started GED classes or gotten her driver's license. Arnold also testified that Melinda was pregnant again.

The trial court found that Melinda was not yet ready to have the children in her home due to her continued dependence on her mother, who the court noted was not a stable person. The court ordered that Melinda begin GED courses, obtain a driver's license, attend individual counseling with an emphasis on working toward independence, maintain stable and appropriate housing, and maintain stable employment.

At the next review hearing held three months later on February 26, 2002, the evidence established that Melinda had lost her job a month earlier due to a lack of transportation. Melinda testified that she had still not taken the test to get her driver's license and that she was not enrolled in a GED course, but was studying at home. She also had not started counseling as previously ordered by the court. The CASA report indicated that the children were at the grandmother's home on several visits even though Melinda had been advised not to leave the children in her mother's care. The report also stated that Kimberly, who was home-schooled when she lived with Melinda, was in the first grade and that she was "one whole year" behind her peers. Noting that Melinda did not have a job or other income and that she still did not have a driver's license, the trial court stated that she had failed to demonstrate that she was capable of living independently and providing for her children. The court ordered that the children remain in foster care, and that the children not be left under the supervision of Melinda's mother at any time or be allowed in her home if it returned to its earlier condition. In addition, the court ordered that Melinda maintain stable employment, that she engage in life-skills training and individual counseling to deal with her dependency issues, and again ordered that she obtain her driver's license, and complete GED courses.

At the permanency planning hearing on June 25, 2002, Arnold, the DHS caseworker, testified that Melinda had been employed since February, except for six weeks during which she had a new baby. Arnold stated that Melinda had also completed life-skills training and that she had maintained a suitable home. Arnold further testified, however, that Melinda had not been attending GED courses and that she did not have a driver's license, although she had obtained a vehicle. According to Arnold, Tiffany recently had oral surgery to fix her dental problems, and there were no other medical issues with either child. Arnold also testified that Melinda had been to two counseling sessions prior to having her baby and that she had resumed her counseling the day before the hearing. Arnold stated that she had made all of the counseling appointments and that without DHS's involvement, she did not believe that Melinda would continue her counseling. However, Arnold testified that Melinda had made substantial progress throughout the case and that she was recommending that the goal of the case remain reunification.

CASA reports entered into evidence at the hearing indicated that Melinda's home had been dirty on one occasion and that Tiffany had been seen walking on the railroad tracks unsupervised during one weekend visitation. In addition, the report stated that Kimberly had to rescue Tiffany from the bottom of a neighbor's pool. There was also evidence that Melinda's mother had taken the children for a ride in her van without Melinda being present and received a ticket for driving without a license. The report also stated that Mary Wyrick had been present during every visit by CASA and that she often became belligerent, yelling and cursing at Melinda while giving her instructions. There was evidence that the foster mother had trouble controlling Tiffany's cursing following a visit with Melinda. Also, the foster mother reported that the children always had extremely offensive body odors and lice after visits with Melinda.

The trial court determined that it was in the best interest of the children to change the goal of the case to termination of Melinda's parental rights, finding that she had not made substantial progress and that she was unlikely to comply with the court's orders and case plan goals in a reasonable amount of time. The court stated that Melinda must demonstrate a separation from her dependence on her mother and the ability to care for her children independently in the months before the termination hearing. The court ordered Melinda to maintain stable employment, maintain appropriate housing and obtain HUD assistance, attend counseling on a consistent basis, obtain a learner's permit and begin GED courses by July 25, 2002, and ensure that her mother visit with the children no more than eight hours per week and only while she is present.

The termination hearing was held on November 5, 2002. At the hearing, Melinda testified that she had moved into a two-bedroom mobile home. She stated that her mother had also moved a couple of blocks away. Melinda further testified that she had told her mother that she could only visit once a month and that she had not been to her mother's home in approximately one month. Melinda admitted that her mother's home was in the same "nasty" condition that it was in when the children were taken away, but she stated that she did not take her children there. Melinda denied that she allowed her mother unsupervised contact with her children or let her mother drive the children. She admitted that the vehicle she had previously claimed to have obtained was really her mother's vehicle. Melinda testified that she began trying to get her driver's license approximately a month or two before the termination hearing and that she had taken the test five or six times, but had failed each time. She stated that she had started GED courses in September, but that she did not have an expected date of completion. Melinda also testified that she had been attending counseling sessions, except when she did not have transportation. According to Melinda, she was currently on the HUD waiting list, and she was able to pay her rent and her bills without assistance from her mother.

Kathleen Housley, Melinda's counselor, testified that she had met with Melinda on six occasions since April 2002. Housley stated that DHS would make the appointments and transport Melinda to the counseling sessions. She testified that Melinda did not make any effort to attend counseling without DHS's assistance. Housley also stated that Melinda had indicated to her that she did not feel that she was too dependent on her mother. According to Housley, Melinda had been making more effort to comply with the goals set by the court in the few months prior to the hearing.

Angie Goff, a social service aide assigned to Melinda's family, testified that she had provided homemaker skills, parenting classes, and transportation to Melinda. Goff stated that Melinda's mother was present during the majority of her visits to the home. She testified that Mary Wryrick had told her that she had driven the children in her van. Goff also stated that Melinda had indicated that she had difficulty in paying her rent and that her mother helps her when she needs assistance. As far as the condition of the home, Goff testified that it had been clean except for on one occasion when she picked up the children from a weekend visit. According to Goff, Melinda had demonstrated some progress in pushing her mother away. She further testified that she had not seen consistent motivation by Melinda.

Lisa Hawthorne, area manager for the Division of Children and Family Services, testified that she had received a phone call from Melinda on June 26, 2002, and that Melinda was angry with what the court had ordered her to do. According to Hawthorne, Melinda did not understand why she had to keep her mother away from the children, and she felt that there were some things that she was doing in her life that were more important than following the court's orders. When Hawthorne indicated that Melinda had to comply with the court's orders to have her children returned, Melinda told her that she would only comply with the orders until she got her children back and that, as soon as her children were returned, she "would go back to doing things the way she had been" because she did not see that there had been a problem.

Jennifer Graham, the family's DHS caseworker since August 2002, testified that weekend visitation with the children had ended in August because the children had stated that they were being transported by Mary Wyrick and were staying at Mary's home on weekend visits. Graham testified that the visitation was now weekly, supervised visits at the DHS office. Graham also stated that Mary was present at Melinda's new home when she visited the week prior to the hearing. Graham testified that she had asked Melinda to take over the responsibility of making her own counseling appointments, but she stated that Melinda apparently did not do so. Graham testified that termination of Melinda's parental rights was appropriate. Although she testified that Melinda had recently been making a last-minute effort to comply with the court's orders, she stated that she still had not complied with the court orders or case plan goals. Graham further testified that she did "not see [Melinda] completing any of the case plan goals on her own without some type of intervention."

According to Graham, Melinda's dependence had switched from her mother to DHS, and she stated that Melinda had not made any progress when she had tried to get her to do things on her own.

Graham testified that termination was in the children's best interest and that she believed the children could be adopted fairly quickly. She stated that the children were doing very well in foster care and that there had been much improvement in the girls' outlook and appearance. She also stated that the children's performance in school had improved. Graham testified that she was concerned that the situation would revert back to what it was when the children were removed from the home and that the children would regress. According to Graham, the main issues in the case had been not only the cleanliness of Melinda's home, but her ability to live independently and maintain a job, housing, and transportation, which had not been remedied.

The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the children's best interest to terminate Melinda's parental rights and that there were statutory grounds justifying termination. The court specifically stated that it found Melinda's testimony not to be credible and noted that she had been caught sleeping on two separate occasions during the termination hearing. The court also stated that Melinda had failed to cooperate in a timely manner with court orders and had made little progress while the children remained out of the home. The court further found that the children had made substantial progress while out of Melinda's home.

Melinda argues that the trial court erred in finding by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the best interest of the juveniles to terminate her parental rights. The rights of natural parents are not to be passed over lightly; however, parental rights will not be enforced to the detriment or destruction of the health and well-being of the child. J.T. v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs., 329 Ark. 243, 947 S.W.2d 761 (1997). A trial court's order terminating parental rights must be based upon findings proven by clear and convincing evidence. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3); Dinkins v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs., 344 Ark. 207, 40 S.W.3d 286 (2001). Clear and convincing evidence is defined as that degree of proof that will produce in the fact finder a firm conviction as to the allegation sought to be established. Id. On appeal, the appellate court will not reverse the trial court's ruling unless its findings are clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. In determining whether a finding is clearly erroneous, an appellate court gives due deference to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses.

Melinda's parental rights were terminated pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3) (Repl. 2002), which states that an order terminating parental rights shall be based upon a finding by clear and convincing evidence that is in the best interest of the juvenile, including consideration of the likelihood of adoption and the potential harm, specifically addressing the effect on the health and safety of the child, caused by continuing contact with the parent. The intent of the statute is to provide permanency in a juvenile's life in all instances where the return of the juvenile to the family home is contrary to the juvenile's health, safety, or welfare and it appears from the evidence that a return to the home cannot be accomplished in a reasonable period of time as viewed from the juvenile's perspective. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(a)(3).

Melinda argues that there was no evidence presented to show that there was any potential harm to the health or safety of the children caused by continued contact with her. She contends that the DHS caseworkers consistently testified during the proceedings that there were no longer any health and safety issues in her home. However, while the condition of the home had improved significantly after the children were removed, there was evidence that the children returned from visits with their mother with severely offensive body odors and lice. There was also evidence that the children were left alone with Melinda's mother during visitations, despite the fact that her mother was not mentally and emotionally stable and despite court orders to not allow her mother to have unsupervised contact with the children. In fact, DHS stopped unsupervised visitation with Melinda several months prior to the hearing due to the children's continued contact with the grandmother. Also, while there were no remaining medical issues with the children at the time of the termination hearing, this was due solely to the corrective steps taken while the children were in foster care, and there was evidence introduced in CASA reports that Tiffany, age four, was seen walking on railroad tracks while her mother was walking far ahead of her on the road and that Tiffany also had to be rescued from the bottom of a neighbor's pool by her sister.

The evidence also showed that the children improved drastically while in foster care, which is an appropriate factor for the trial court to consider when determining whether parental rights should be terminated. Malone v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs., 71 Ark. App. 441, 30 S.W.3d 758 (2000). While Kimberly was initially one year behind in school, at the time of the hearing, she was making "A's" and "B's" and enjoying school. When Tiffany first started attending Head Start, she screamed continually, but at the time of the termination hearing was behaving properly. However, the foster mother reported increased behavior problems after visits with their mother. The foster mother also reported problems with Tiffany cursing after weekend visits. Jennifer Graham, the DHS caseworker, testified that she was worried that the children would "regress" if returned to their mother and that termination of Melinda's parental rights was in their best interest. Thus, the trial court's finding that termination was in the children's best interest was not clearly erroneous.

Melinda also argues that the trial court erred in finding by clear and convincing evidence grounds justifying termination of the mother's parental rights. The order terminating parental rights also must be based on a showing of clear and convincing evidence as to one or more of the grounds for termination listed in Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B). The applicable grounds relied upon by the trial court in this case are as follows:

(i)(a) That a juvenile has been adjudicated by the court to be dependent-neglected and has continued out of the home for twelve (12) months and, despite a meaningful effort by the department to rehabilitate the home and correct the conditions which caused removal, those conditions have not been remedied by the parent.

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(vii)(a) That, subsequent to the filing of the original petition for dependency-neglect, other factors or issues arose which demonstrate that return of the juvenile to the family home is contrary to the juvenile's health, safety, or welfare and that, despite the offer of appropriate family services, the parent has manifested the incapacity or indifference to remedy the subsequent issues or factors or rehabilitate the parent's circumstances which prevent return of the juvenile to the family home.

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(ix)(a) The parent is found by a court of competent jurisdiction, including the juvenile division of circuit court, to:

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(3) Have subjected the child to aggravated circumstances.

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(b) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to require reunification of a surviving child with a parent who has been found guilty of any of the offenses listed in subdivision (b)(3)(B)(ix)(a) of this section.

Melinda first contends that it was error for the trial court to terminate her parental rights under section 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(i)(a) because she remedied the environmental neglect that caused the children's removal and moved out of her mother's home and into her own home as ordered by the court. However, the children were also declared dependent-neglected due to medical neglect, as both children had problems with their hearing, Tiffany had severe dental problems caused by infected gums and being bottle-fed, and Kimberly had impetitis on her face and was one year behind in school because she had been home-schooled by her mother. While the children's medical problems were treated while in foster care, evidence established that the children continued to be neglected during visitation. Tiffany was allowed to walk on railroad tracks and to swim without adequate supervision. In addition, both children always returned from visits with offensive body odor and lice. A CASA report from June 2002 further stated that Melinda's home was found in a dirty condition, with leftover food on the table and a dead mouse in the girls' room.

Also, as argued by DHS, the underlying problem that caused the environmental neglect and the subsequent removal of the children from Melinda was her dependence on her mother. The court recognized this and ordered Melinda to obtain and maintain a residence separate and apart from her mother. While she did comply with the court's order to obtain separate housing, she moved directly across the street from her mother. DHS caseworkers and CASA volunteers reported that her mother was consistently present at Melinda's new house. Melinda initially refused HUD assistance so that she could remain in her new house. When she finally moved further away from her mother several months prior to the termination hearing, her mother then moved into a new home nearby. Despite court orders that her mother not be allowed to have unsupervised contact with the children or that the children not be allowed in her mother's home, evidence showed that Melinda continued to allow the children to stay with her mother.

Melinda also failed to substantially comply with court orders that sought to help her become independent, such as attending counseling, obtaining her driver's license, and obtaining her GED. The court found that Melinda had only attended six out of nineteen possible counseling sessions. Also, despite court orders beginning in November 2001 to obtain a driver's license and GED, Melinda did not attempt to comply with these orders until September 2002. This was the case even though the court ordered during the permanency planning hearing that Melinda comply with these orders by July 25, 2002. Because the children were adjudicated dependent-neglected, remained out of the home for more than fifteen months, and despite a meaningful effort by DHS to correct the conditions that caused removal, Melinda has not corrected those conditions, the trial court's finding that clear and convincing evidence supported termination on this ground is not clearly erroneous.

Even if, as Melinda argues, she corrected the environmental neglect that was the sole cause of the children's removal, termination was proper under section 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(vii)(a). Only one ground for termination of parental rights need be proven by clear and convincing evidence. See Wade v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs., 337 Ark. 353, 990 S.W.2d 509 (1999). Assuming that Melinda's dependency issues were subsequent issues that arose in this case after the children's removal, she has still failed to remedy these subsequent issues that prevent return of the children. As stated earlier, she has failed to attend the majority of her counseling sessions, she has failed to obtain her driver's license, and she has failed to complete GED courses. DHS employees, as well as her counselor, testified that Melinda would not have complied with the majority of the case plan goals and court orders, such as counseling, without intervention and assistance by DHS. When Melinda was asked a month before the termination hearing to make counseling appointments on her own, she failed to do it. In fact, Lisa Hawthorne testified that Melinda called her after the permanency planning hearing in June and stated that if she complied with the court orders, she would only do so until her children were returned because she did not see a problem. Her counselor also testified that Melinda did not feel that she was too dependent on her mother, despite her testimony at the hearings that she would attempt to become more independent.

The trial court specifically stated that Melinda has continued her dependent relationship on her mother and that she has made little progress in obtaining the skills to be independent due to her lack of cooperation and lack of motivation in complying with court orders. The court also noted that she has a history of avoiding DHS involvement in another state for similar issues as in this case, such as environmental neglect. Thus, there was clear and convincing evidence presented that Melinda was incapable of or indifferent to remedying the subsequent issues preventing return of the children to the home.

Melinda's rights were also terminated under section 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(3), due to aggravated circumstances. According to Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-303(6)(A), "aggravated circumstances" mean that a child has been abandoned, chronically abused, subjected to extreme or repeated cruelty, sexually abused, or that a determination has been made by a judge that there is little likelihood that services to the family will result in successful reunification. The trial court in this case found that there was little likelihood that continued services to the family would result in successful reunification. Given the evidence as to Melinda's lack of motivation to comply with court orders, along with the evidence that she does not feel there is a problem and that she would stop her compliance if her children were to be returned, the trial court's finding that termination was warranted under this ground is not clearly erroneous. However, only one ground for termination needs to be proven under section 9-27-341 in order to justify the termination of parental rights. Wade, supra. There is sufficient evidence to terminate Melinda's parental rights under the first two grounds discussed above, even if there is insufficient evidence of aggravated circumstances.

Affirmed.

Gladwin and Griffen, JJ., agree.