ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
 

DIVISION IV

SLC INCORPORATED and STEVEN

CONLEY

APPELLANTS

V.

NATIONAL BANK OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

CA 03-358

JANUARY 7, 2004

APPEAL FROM THE FAULKNER

COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. E-2001-493]

HONORABLE MICHAEL A.

MAGGIO, JUDGE

AFFIRMED

John B. Robbins, Judge

On May 30, 2001, appellee National Bank of Arkansas filed a complaint to foreclose on loans against appellants SLC, Inc., d/b/a Conrad's Fish & Ribs and Steven Conley. After a hearing on the merits, the trial court announced from the bench that it was ordering a foreclosure, and found for the appellee in the amount of $24,445.19. Thereafter, a written foreclosure decree was prepared, and the appellants filed a written objection to entry of the order. Notwithstanding appellants' objection, the trial court entered its written order on December 3, 2002. On appeal, the appellants argue that the foreclosure decree should be reversed because it contains additional provisions that were not ordered from the bench. We find no error and affirm.

In its complaint, National Bank of Arkansas alleged that it made loans of $27,000.00 and $3,000.00 to the appellants, which were consolidated into a promissory note in the amount of $30,000.00, dated November 2, 1998. The indebtedness was secured by a real estate mortgage and a lien on personal property. The complaint further alleged that appellants had defaulted

on the loan and were indebted in the amount of $21,499.71, plus interest, until paid. National Bank of Arkansas requested foreclosure on its mortgage, as well as immediate possession of the personal property described in the security agreement.

A hearing was held on the matter, and there was testimony that the loan was past due and in default and had an unpaid balance of $24,445.19. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court announced:

I do find that there is ample evidence that there was a loan made from National Bank of Arkansas to SLC, Incorporated, and Steven Conley, individually. I am going to find for the bank on that. I'm going to find for their foreclosure in the amount I stated of [24,445.19].

The foreclosure decree awarded judgment against appellants in the amount of $24,445.19 plus interest. The decree contained additional provisions, which appellants assert were in excess of what was orally ordered by the trial court, and therefore erroneous. These provisions included: (1) a judgment in rem against real and personal property; (2) a first lien on the real property at issue; (3) a first lien on the personal property at issue; (4) instructions to the commissioner of the circuit clerk to advertise and sell the real and personal property if the judgment is not satisfied within ten days; and (5) an order of delivery of the personal property to the bank.

In support of their argument on appeal, appellants cite BPS, Inc. & Micro Flo Co. v. Jason Parker and Linda Winston, et al., 345 Ark. 381, 47 S.W.3d 858 (2001), Young v. Staude, 280 Ark. 298, 657 S.W.2d 541 (1983), and Danco Constr. Co., Inc. v. City of Fort Smith, 268 Ark. 1053, 598 S.W.2d 437 (Ark. App. 1980). However, these cases are inapposite. The cases cited by appellants stand for the proposition that a trial court cannot grant relief beyond that prayed for in ruling on a motion for summary judgment; none of the cases address the issue being raised in this appeal.

In affirming this appeal, we rely in part on Rule 58 of the Arkansas Rules of Procedure, which provides:

Subject to the provisions of Rule 54(b), upon a general or special verdict, or upon a decision by the court granting or denying the relief sought, the court may direct the prevailing party to promptly prepare and submit, for approval by the court and opposing counsel, a form of judgment or decree which shall then be entered as the judgment or decree of the court. The court may enter its own form of judgment or decree or may enter the form prepared by the prevailing party without the consent of opposing counsel.

Every judgment or decree shall be set forth on a separate document. A judgment or decree is effective only when so set forth and entered as provided in Administrative Order No. 2. Entry of judgment or decree shall not be delayed for the taxing costs.

Administrative Order No. 2, section (b)(2), provides:

The clerk shall denote the date and time that a judgment, decree or order is filed by stamping or otherwise marking it with the date and time and the word "filed." A judgment, decree or order is entered when so stamped or marked by the clerk, irrespective of when it is recorded in the judgment record book.

Clearly, pursuant to Administrative Order 2(b)(2), an oral order announced from the bench does not become effective until reduced to writing and filed. Judkins v. Hoover, 351 Ark. 552, 95 S.W.3d 768 (2003). This rule eliminates or reduces disputes between litigants over what a trial court's oral decision in open court entailed. See Price v. Price, 341 Ark. 311, 16 S.W.3d 248 (2000). If a trial court's ruling from the bench is not reduced to writing and filed of record, it is free to alter its decision upon further consideration of the matter. See Morrell v. Morrell, 48 Ark. App. 54, 889 S.W.2d 772 (1994).

The appellants do not contend that the written order entered by the trial court was inconsistent with the proof presented or relief requested by the appellee. The only argument on appeal is that the trial court was without authority to include in its written order what was not pronounced from the bench. With this we cannot agree. The order being appealed from was not effective until filed, and it was within the authority of the trial court to enter a written order conforming to the proof, irrespective of whether the provisions contained in the order had been announced from the bench.

Affirmed.

Vaught and Crabtree, JJ., agree.