ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
 

DIVISION I

CACR03-464

January 7, 2004

KEITH ALLEN GREER AN APPEAL FROM GARLAND

APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[CR01-460-I]

V. HON. JOHN HOMER WRIGHT, JUDGE

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE AFFIRMED

Wendell L. Griffen, Judge

This case arose from the revocation of appellant's probation. Appellant, Keith Allen Greer, contends that (1) the police lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him and the trial court erred in failing to suppress the evidence seized from the vehicle; (2) the police lacked probable cause to arrest him and the trial court erred in failing to suppress the evidence seized from appellant's person; (3) appellant's statement was the product of an illegal arrest and the trial court erred in failing to suppress appellant's statement; and (4) the remaining evidence failed to support a finding that appellant violated the terms and conditions of his probation and the trial court erred in finding sufficient grounds to revoke appellant's probation. We affirm because the trial court had sufficient evidence to revoke appellant's probation.

On August 18, 2002, appellant pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by certain persons in Garland County Circuit Court. In return, he received a sentence of four years' supervised probation. The State filed a petition to revoke appellant's probation on November 27, 2002, alleging that he had violated the terms and conditions of his probation by being arrested and charged with possession of ephedrine with intent to manufacture methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver on October 20, 2002.

In response, appellant filed a motion to suppress, alleging a lack of reasonable suspicion to stop, detain, and search the automobile he was in, as well as his person. During the hearing on the petition for revocation, the following testimony developed. On October 20, 2002, Detective Chris Chapmond of the Hot Springs Police Department was working off-duty security at a grocery store. He testified that he saw Teresa Tillery enter the store and approach the medicine cabinet where antihistamines were sold. Chapmond thought that Tillery appeared intoxicated. He observed dark stains on her hands and he suspected that the stains stemmed from iodine, a substance used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. According to Chapmond, Tillery also acted very nervous and she had an odor coming from her that might have been ether, another substance used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. Tillery purchased two boxes of antihistamines and left the store. Chapmond saw her leaving and getting into a car, where she sat for about five minutes, until appellant got out of the car and came into the store.

Chapmond also thought that appellant appeared intoxicated. Appellant's hands, too, were dark. Chapmond saw appellant heading for the cabinet containing antihistamines. At that point, Chapmond called the Hot Springs Police Department. Officer Mike Goss responded and made contact with Tillery in the parking lot. Meanwhile, Chapmond lost sight of appellant in the store, but noticed him exiting later. Chapmond followed him and made contact with appellant in the parking lot.

At the car from which both Tillery and appellant had emerged, Chapmond noticed two semi-transparent bags on the passenger-side floorboard containing ten boxes of antihistamine. It was then that Chapmond asked for permission to search the car. According to Chapmond, Tillery consented. He found 12.24 grams of pseudoephedrine and several used syringes. Chapmond arrested Tillery and appellant for possession of ephedrine over the legal amount.

Incident to the arrest, Officer Goss searched appellant and found a lip-balm container in appellant's pocket containing three baggies of methamphetamine and one baggie of marijuana. Another baggie of marijuana was found in appellant's front jacket pocket. At the police department, appellant was read his Miranda rights and told Chapmond that "the dope I had in my pocket was for personnel [sic] use," and that he and Tillery "were trying to buy enough pills to get [Tillery] her some money to go back to Texas . . . I was trying to help [Tillery] get enough money to get home."

The trial court denied appellant's motion to suppress and revoked probation, following a hearing. The trial court specifically found that appellant breached conditions "One and Three." Condition One stated:

You must not commit a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment. If arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer, you will notify your supervising officer within 24 hours, unless such arrest or questioning occurs on a weekend, in which case you will notify your supervising officer the next working day.

Condition Three stated, in relevant part:

You must not use, sell, distribute, or possess any controlled substance, or associate with any person who is participating in or is known to participate in the illegal use, sale, distribution or possession of controlled substances, or be present in places where such persons congregate. ...

As a consequence of the revocation, appellant received a sentence of four years' imprisonment. This appeal followed.

Analysis

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized in a vehicle as well as on his person. He argues that, absent the allegedly suppressible evidence, there was insufficient evidence to support the revocation of his probation. We disagree.

The State needs to prove only one violation of the probation conditions for the trial court to revoke a probation. Brock v. State, 70 Ark. App. 107, 14 S.W.3d 908 (2000). Upon appellate review, we uphold the trial court's findings unless they are clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Thompson v. State, 342 Ark. 365, 28 S.W.3d 290 (2000). Evidence that is insufficient to support a criminal conviction may be sufficient to support a revocation. Id. Since the determination of a preponderance of the evidence turns on questions of credibility and weight to be accorded to the testimony, we defer to the trial judge's superior position on review of a revocation of probation or a suspended sentence. Bradley v. State, 347 Ark. 518, 65 S.W.3d 874 (2002). Concerning appellant's suppression argument, we are mindful that the exclusionary rule ordinarily does not apply in revocation hearings. McGhee v. State, 25 Ark. App. 132, 752 S.W.2d 303 (1988). The exclusionary rule may, however, apply if one of the following circumstances exist: (1) a lack of good faith by the law enforcement officers, (2) searches conducted solely to harass, (3) searches conducted solely in order to seek revocation, or (4) the official misconduct shocks the conscience of the court. Id. Uncoerced admissions after receiving valid Miranda warnings are admissible in court. See Landrum v. State, 326 Ark. 994, 936 S.W.2d 505 (1996).

Appellant failed to show any exceptions that would tend to make the exclusionary rule applicable to his probation revocation case. He did not show that Chapmond or Goss acted with a lack of good faith, that they searched him solely to harass him, or that they searched him in order to obtain a reason to effect a revocation of appellant's probationary status. Rather, the record suggests that the officers involved in the incident that led to appellant's arrest reacted to what they thought was suspicious behavior on the part of appellant and his associate, Tillery. There is nothing in the record showing that the officers actually knew appellant or that they knew of his probationary status. Appellant also lacks proof tending to show that the official misconduct, if any, should shock this court's conscience. Therefore, we do not need to discuss whether or not the trial court ought to have suppressed any or all of the evidence, because that issue is not germane to the resolution of the case before us.

Rather, the remaining question centers on whether the trial court's decision to revoke appellant's probation was against the preponderance of the evidence. Here, the trial court had before it appellant's post-Miranda, in-custody admission that he indeed possessed controlled substances-a fact clearly contrary to his probationary conditions. This alone is sufficient reason to revoke probation. Precisely because appellant failed to show that the exclusionary rule applies, he cannot now complain that the trial court had available evidence tending to show that he had breached his probationary conditions. He admitted possession of controlled substances. There is nothing in the record that would suggest a failure of the Miranda warning or coercive conduct by the police. Rather, it appears that appellant simply decided to talk. Thus, we are unable to find that the trial court erred in finding that appellant had violated his conditions of probation because he admitted the possession of controlled substances and because that possession, under the given circumstances, is a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment.

Affirmed.

Gladwin and Roaf, JJ., agree.