ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

DECEMBER 18, 2003

STEVEN EVANS

Petitioner

v.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

Respondent

CR 03-1145

PRO SE MOTION FOR BELATED APPEAL OF JUDGMENT [CIRCUIT COURT OF JEFFERSON COUNTY, NO. CR 2002-381-2, CR 2003-387-2, HON. RANDALL WILLIAMS, JUDGE]

MOTION DENIED

Per Curiam

On May 5, 2003, judgment was entered reflecting that Steven Evans had been found guilty by a jury of murder in the second degree and sentenced to 180 months' imprisonment. Evans also entered a plea of guilty to the offense of failure to appear and was sentenced by a jury to thirty-six months' imprisonment to be served consecutively to the 180-month term.

Counsel for Evans filed a timely motion for new trial which was denied on May 23, 2003. On June 6, 2003, an order was entered by the court relieving Evans's attorney.

On July 3, 2003, Evans filed an untimely pro se notice of appeal from the judgment. He now seeks to proceed with a belated appeal pursuant to Rule 2(e) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure--Criminal, which permits a belated appeal in a criminal case in some instances.

Petitioner Evans contends that he assumed that the court would appoint new counsel to perfect an appeal of the judgment after it relieved his trial attorney. He further contends that he should be appointed counsel by this court "for postconviction relief" and to represent him on appeal of the judgment.

While a direct appeal is a matter of right, a convicted defendant who is proceeding pro se may waive his right to appeal by his failure to file a timely notice of appeal. Here, petitioner does not contend that he was unaware that his trial attorney had been relieved. In fact, the order relieving counsel bears the notation that a copy of the order was mailed directly to him. Just as a defendant may waive the right to appeal by failure to inform counsel of his desire to appeal within the thirty-day period to file a timely notice of appeal, a defendant may waive an appeal by the failure to take any action to perfect the appeal. See Sanders v. State, 330 Ark. 851, 956 S.W.2d 868 (1997; see also Jones v. State, 294 Ark. 659, 748 S.W.2d 117 (1988).

This court has consistently held that all litigants, including those who proceed pro se, must bear responsibility for conforming to the rules of procedure or demonstrating a good cause for not doing so. Bragg v. State, 297 Ark. 348, 760 S.W.2d 878 (1988); Peterson v. State, 289 Ark. 452, 711 S.W.2d 830 (1986); Walker v. State, 283 Ark. 339, 676 S.W.2d 460 (1984); Thompson v. State, 280 Ark. 163, 655 S.W.2d 424 (1983). The pro se appellant receives no special consideration on appeal. See Gibson v. State, 298 Ark. 43, 764 S.W.2d 617 (1989). It is not the responsibility of the circuit judge, the circuit clerk, the court reporter, or anyone other than the pro se party desiring to appeal to perfect the appeal. See Sullivan v. State, 301 Ark. 352, 784 S.W.2d 155 (1990); Bragg, supra. Petitioner Evans has not met his burden of demonstrating that there is good cause to grant the motion to proceed with a belated appeal.

Petitioner's request that counsel be appointed to represent him is moot as it applies to a belated appeal of the judgment. The request is denied if it can be considered a request for

appointment of an attorney to represent him in a proceeding under our postconviction rule, Criminal Procedure Rule 37.1. Any request for relief pursuant to Rule 37.1 must be made to the trial court.

Motion denied.