ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
 

OCTOBER 23, 2003

RICHARD TERRELL

Petitioner

v.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

Respondent

CR 03-907

PRO SE MOTION FOR BELATED APPEAL [CIRCUIT COURT OF SALINE COUNTY, NO. CR 99-88-2, HON. GARY M. ARNOLD, JUDGE]

MOTION FOR BELATED APPEAL TREATED AS MOTION FOR RULE ON CLERK AND DENIED

Per Curiam

On October 5, 1999, judgment was entered reflecting that Richard Terrell had been found guilty by a jury of murder in the first degree and sentenced to life imprisonment. We affirmed. Terrell v. State, 342 Ark. 208, 27 S.W.3d 423 (2000).

Terrell subsequently filed in the trial court a timely pro se petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Criminal Procedure Rule 37.1. The petition was denied on June 4, 2001, and Terrell filed a timely pro se notice of appeal on June 12, 2001. He did not tender the record to this court until July 25, 2003, which was not within ninety days of the date of the notice of appeal as required by Ark. R. App. P.-Civil 5(a).1

Now before us is Terrell's motion for belated appeal of the order. As the notice of appeal was timely, we will treat the motion as a motion for rule on clerk to lodge the record. See Johnson v. State, 342 Ark. 709, 30 S.W.3d 715 ( 2000); see also Muhammed v. State, 330 Ark. 759, 957 S.W.2d 692 (1997).

Petitioner attributes the late tender of the record to the trial court's failure to acknowledge that he was indigent and thus the appeal record should be prepared at public expense. It is the petitioner who is responsible for providing at least a partial record within the ninety-day period for lodging an appeal. Ark. R. App. P.-Civ. 5(c). This court has consistently held that all litigants, including those who proceed pro se, must bear responsibility for conforming to the rules of procedure or demonstrating a good cause for not doing so. Bragg v. State, 297 Ark. 348, 760 S.W.2d 878 (1988); Peterson v. State, 289 Ark. 452, 711 S.W.2d 830 (1986); Walker v. State, 283 Ark. 339, 676 S.W.2d 460 (1984); Thompson v. State, 280 Ark. 163, 655 S.W.2d 424 (1983). The pro se appellant receives no special consideration on appeal. See Gibson v. State, 298 Ark. 43, 764 S.W.2d 617 (1989). It is not the responsibility of the circuit judge, the circuit clerk, the court reporter, or anyone other than the pro se party desiring to appeal to perfect the appeal. See Sullivan v. State, 301 Ark. 352, 784 S.W.2d 155 (1990); Bragg, supra.

The purpose of the rule setting time limitations on lodging a record is to eliminate unnecessary delay in the docketing of appeals. We have made it abundantly clear that we expect compliance with the rule so that appeals will proceed as expeditiously as possible. Jacobs v. State, 321 Ark. 561, 906 S.W.2d 670 (1995), citing Alexander v. Beaumont, 275 Ark. 357, 629 S.W.2d 300 (1982). It was the duty of the petitioner to tender the record to this court in a timely manner. As he delayed more than two years in doing so and has not demonstrated good cause for the failure to file within the prescribed time, the motion to proceed with the appeal is denied.

Motion for belated appeal treated as motion for rule on clerk and denied.

1 The record was tendered here twenty-five and one-half months after the notice of appeal was filed.