ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

DIVISION II

TOBITHA GILL

APPELLANT

SEVIER HEALTHCARE, INC. and

CANNON COCHRAN

MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC.

APPELLEES

CA 03-329

OCTOBER 22, 2003

APPEAL FROM THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION

[NO. F013374]

AFFIRMED

John B. Robbins, Judge

Appellant Tobitha Gill, who is now sixty-five years of age, brought a workers’ compensation claim against appellee Sevier Healthcare, Inc., alleging that she slipped and fell on November 6, 2000, while working in appellee’s nursing home. Ms. Gill asserted that, as a result of the fall, she sustained injuries to her left hand, left shoulder, and right knee. The appellee accepted compensability of the claim and paid certain medical benefits. However, a dispute arose concerning Ms. Gill’s entitlement to temporary total disability benefits as well as additional medical benefits. After a hearing, the Workers’ Compensation Commission awarded additional medical benefits but denied Ms. Gill’s request for temporary total disability benefits. Ms. Gill now appeals, arguing that the Commission’s decision to deny temporary total disability benefits is not supported by substantial evidence, and that she is entitled to such benefits from November 6, 2000, through a date yet to be determined. We affirm.

The standard of review for appeals from the Workers’ Compensation Commission is well-settled. On appeal, this court will view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commission’s decision and affirm when that decision is supported by substantial evidence. Crudup v. Regal Ware, Inc., 341 Ark. 804, 20 S.W.3d 900 (2000). Where the Commission denies benefits because the claimant has failed to meet her burden of proof, the substantial evidence standard of review requires us to affirm if the Commission’s decision displays a substantial basis for the denial of relief. Id. A substantial basis exists if fair-minded persons could reach the same conclusion when considering the same facts. Id. The issue is not whether the appellate court might have reached a different result or whether the evidence would have supported a contrary finding; if reasonable minds could reach the Commission’s conclusion, then we must affirm. Green Bay Packing v. Barlett, 67 Ark. App. 332, 999 S.W.2d 692 (1999). The Commission is not required to believe the testimony of any witness, and it may accept and translate into findings of fact only those portions of the testimony that it deems worthy of belief. Holloway v. Ray White Lumber Co., 337 Ark. 524, 990 S.W.2d 526 (1999). The Commission has the authority to accept or reject medical opinion and the authority to determine its medical soundness and probative force. Green Bay Packing v. Bartlett, supra.

The hearing in this case was held on January 24, 2002, and Ms. Gill was the only witness to testify. She testified that she worked for Sevier Heathcare nursing home as a dietary aid, and her job included picking up trays in the dining room. She was performing these duties at about 6:20 p.m. on November 6, 2000, when she slipped and fell. Ms. Gill stated that when she fell, her left hand and right knee hit the floor. Ms. Gill finished her work shift, which ended at 7:30 p.m.

Ms. Gill reported for work on the day following the accident, and appellee sent her to see the company doctor, Dr. Ridlon. Dr. Ridlon noted knee and shoulder contusions and returned her to regular duty. Ms. Gill worked on November 8^th and 9^th, but stated that her shoulder was hurting and her hand would cramp. She testified that on those two days she was required to mop the bathroom and scrub the freezer in preparation for a state inspection. After that she called the nursing home and was told she would be terminated if she failed to come to work. Ms. Gill testified, “I told them I couldn’t see where I could...so I thought I was terminated.” Ms. Gill has not worked since.

Ms. Gill testified that after the accident, she was not able to lift the crate with dishes, and could not mop because should she could not squeeze out the mop. She testified that her physical condition has worsened since the accident, and within the past few weeks it feels like her left shoulder has bones rubbing together. Ms. Gill stated that she is currently unable to mop her floors, rake leaves, or wash dishes, and that her daughters have cleaned her house since the fall at work.

Ms. Gill returned to see Dr. Ridlon on only one occasion. On November 14, 2000, Dr. Ridlon reported “the patient’s knee and wrist are okay now, now she’s developed bursitis in the left shoulder.” Dr. Ridlon noted “Regular duty” and advised Ms. Gill to return to see him if her problems persisted. She did not return to Dr. Ridlon, but did visit the emergency room on December 21, 2000. On that occasion, her hand and shoulder were examined with no abnormalities detected.

On October 3, 2001, Dr. Rosenzweig conducted an independent medical examination. He reported, “The pre-existing changes of her degenerative arthritis in the base of her thumb and shoulder as well as her neck are the rate limiting steps in a full and asymptomatic recovery.” He found Ms. Gill to have no permanent impairment, and gave the opinion that she was at maximum medical improvement. However, Dr. Rosenzweig did recommend anti-inflammatory medication, as well as three to six weeks of physical therapy. As for Ms. Gill’s work capacity, Dr. Rosenzweig stated:

It is felt that Ms. Gill could probably work in a lighter job description that doesn’t require hand intensive repetition with reaching/pulling activities. She would benefit from supportive measures for her left thumb in the form of a brace with or without medical management.

On appeal, Ms. Gill argues that the Commission erred in denying her request for temporary total disability benefits. Temporary total disability is that period within the healing period in which the employee suffers a total incapacity to earn wages. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Westbrook, 77 Ark. App. 167, 72 S.W.3d 889 (2002). Ms. Gill contends that she remains in her healing period, as evidenced by Dr. Rosenzweig’s opinion that she is in need for further treatment. Ms. Gill further argues that her compensable injuries have rendered her completely unable to work, noting her testimony in this regard.

Ms. Gill essentially contends that she has been in need of treatment since the accident, but as of yet has not received it. She asserts that Dr. Ridlon spent no substantive time with her, and thus his opinion is of no consequence. She further asserts that she sought treatment after her second visit with Dr. Ridlon, but an employee of the appellee advised that the appellee would no longer assist her. Ms. Gill relies on the opinion of Dr. Rosenzweig, who stated, “Ms. Gill has not received a significant amount of care as a result of these injuries. She had a couple of doctor’s visits and she has basically been on her own since.” Ms. Gill maintains that she presented uncontroverted testimony that she has been unable to perform any work as a result of the compensable injury, and asserts that this is the result of a lack of care being provided by appellant.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commission’s decision, we hold that its decision displays a substantial basis for denying Ms. Gill’s claim for temporary total disability benefits. While Ms. Gill asserts that her testimony of incapacitation from work was uncontroverted, we disagree. The only doctor she visited in November 2000 diagnosed only minor injuries and noted she could return to regular duty. Moreover, Ms. Gill did return to work at full duty for two days following her fall. While she failed to return to Dr. Ridlon for further treatment, Ms. Gill did report to the emergency room on December 21, 2000, and the resulting report failed to document any significant abnormality.

While Dr. Rosenzweig recommended further treatment, he noted that some of Ms. Gill’s current problems are related to noncompensable pre-existing conditions. But at any rate, his conclusion was not that she is completely unable to work. Even without further treatment, Dr. Rosenzweig thought Ms. Gill could probably work a lighter job. Because substantial evidence supports the Commission’s finding that Ms. Gill failed to prove she has suffered a total incapacity to earn wages, we must affirm its denial of temporary total disability benefits.

Affirmed.

Gladwin and Bird, JJ., agree.