ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
DIVISION I
SERGIO F. SOTO
APPELLANT
V.
KATHERINE SOTO
APPELLEE
CA03-163
October 22, 2003
APPEAL FROM THE POPE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. E-2000-194]
HON. RICHARD E. GARDNER, JR.,
CIRCUIT JUDGE
APPEAL DISMISSED
Josephine Linker Hart, Judge
Appellant, Sergio Soto, appeals the circuit court’s decision in a post-divorce contempt
proceeding. For reversal, appellant argues three points. First, he argues that the trial court clearly erred in awarding appellee, Katherine Soto, one-half of an unsecured loan repayment of $5,582 that was deducted from the sale price of an office building. Second, he argues that the trial erred in requiring appellee to pay only one-half the value of appellant’s inlaid chest. Third, he asserts that the trial court erred in finding that there was insufficient evidence to show that appellee damaged appellant’s grandfather clock. Because the order appealed from is not a final order under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), we dismiss the appeal.
Following the parties’ divorce on July 5, 2001, appellee filed a motion for contempt, alleging that appellant refused to return to her a lamp and a print to which she was entitled pursuant to the divorce decree. Appellant responded to the motion and filed a counterclaim asserting that appellee was in contempt for failing to follow the decree in not allowing him to obtain possession of a bookcase, backpack, tent, yakima racks, and other outdoor equipment that were awarded to him. Appellant specifically requested payment for the additional cost he had ultimately expended to obtain the property. After appellee responded to the counterclaim, appellant again amended his petition for contempt and included an allegation that appellee intentionally destroyed an inlaid wood chest. Appellee then filed a motion to enforce the decree of divorce, requesting that appellant pay the 2000 income tax liability as ordered and praying for all other appropriate relief. On November 5, 2001, appellant replied. Afterward, appellant filed a second amended petition for a citation of contempt and included an allegation that appellee destroyed his grandfather clock before allowing him to obtain possession. A few days later, appellant filed a third amended petition for a citation of contempt, adding an allegation that appellee intentionally damaged a marble top dresser belonging to him.
A hearing was held on the numerous motions. In an order filed on December 9, 2002, the trial court ruled as follows: (1) that the parties file an amended 2000 joint federal and state tax return pursuant to the divorce decree; (2) that appellant pay appellee $2,796.44, as reimbursement of one-half the amount of an unsecured loan to Regions Bank that was deducted from the proceeds from the sale of a jointly owned office building; (3) that appellee was in contempt with regard to the damage to the inlaid chest and marble top dresser and shall reimburse appellant one-half the value of the chest ($3,465) and the cost to repair the dresser; (4) that there was insufficient evidence as to the alleged damage to the grandfather clock; (5) that appellee is not entitled to damages for the lamp and the print; (6) that $730.67, the amount of accrued interest on the Regions Bank note in the amount of $60,000, was properly deducted from the proceeds of the sale; (7) that appellant make his alimony payments in the amount of $4,000 through the circuit clerk’s office prior to the tenth of each month; (8) that appellee pay the attorney’s fees. The court, however, did not address appellant’s claim for the bookcase and outdoor equipment and his claim for the extra cost associated with obtaining them from appellee’s possession.
Failure to comply with Rule 54(b) affects the subject-matter jurisdiction of this court, and we are obligated to raise the issue on our own. Dodge v. Lee, 350 Ark. 480, 88 S.W.3d 843 (2002). Under Rule 54(b), an order that fails to adjudicate all of the claims as to all of the parties, whether presented as claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, or third-party claims, is not a final order for the purposes of appeal. Id. As discussed above, all of appellant’s claims were not adjudicated. When the order appealed from does not dispose of all claims, the order is not a final, appealable order under Rule 54(b), and the appeal must be dismissed. Id. Thus, we dismiss the appeal without prejudice.
Appeal dismissed.
Pittman and Griffen, JJ., agree.