ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
DIVISION I
CACR03-96
October 22, 2003
JAMIE C. EMBERSON, JR. AN APPEAL FROM LOGAN COUNTY
APPELLANT CIRCUIT COURT [CR01-108A]
V. HON. PAUL E. DANIELSON, JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE AFFIRMED
Wendell L. Griffen, Judge
Appellant Jamie Emberson, Jr., appeals from his convictions for the manufacture of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and the denial of his motion to suppress. Because appellant has no standing to challenge the search, and because he did not preserve his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we affirm his convictions without reaching the merits of his arguments.
Even though we do not address the merits of appellant’s arguments, a brief recitation of the facts in this case is necessary to understand why appellant does not have standing to challenge the search. Appellant was arrested at a house rented by Tammy Love and her roommate, Curtis Timmons. Appellant is Love’s boyfriend.
On December 2, 2002, less than one month after Timmons and Love moved in together, Timmons informed Officer Dudley Crossland of the Booneville Police Department that Love and appellant were processing methamphetamine at Love’s and Timmons’ home.
That same day, Crossland discovered that Love had an outstanding warrant. He and Deputy Stillwell went to Love’s house. When Love answered the door, Crossland advised her that she was under arrest. Love and Crossland entered the house, and Love called to appellant, informing him that she was being arrested, and instructing him to call her children’s babysitter to pick up Love. After Crossland and Love exited the house, Love was handcuffed and placed under arrest. Crossland asked for permission to search the house, which Love refused. Crossland called to appellant to come outside, and appellant complied. Appellant was not arrested at that time.
An officer on the scene contacted Gary Stanford, the owner of the property. Mr. Stanford informed the officer that Love and a male subject, who matched Timmons’ description, had rented the house. The officers remained outside of the house and called Timmons to come to the house and sign a written consent form to search. When Timmons arrived, he gave written consent to search the premises and outlying areas.
During the search, various items used in the manufacture of methamphetamine were located, the bulk of which were located in the southwest bedroom, which was Love’s bedroom. Appellant and Love were charged and tried as codefendants. Each filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search of the residence, alleging that the search was improper because Timmons was not authorized to give consent and because the search exceeded the scope of the consent. The trial court denied the motion to suppress on the grounds that 1) the officers had a right to secure the premises when they arrested Love; and 2) the officers had a duty to go into the home and make sure there were no children in danger.
At the close of the State’s case, appellant objected to the sufficiency of the evidence, but did not thereafter renew his motion. This appeal followed.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
We first address appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, due to double jeopardy concerns. See Atkinson v. State, 347 Ark. 336, 64 S.W.3d 259 (2002). A motion for a directed verdict is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Breedlove v. State, 62 Ark. App. 219, 970 S.W.2d 313 (1998). On appeal, we review the evidence in a light most favorable to the appellee and affirm if substantial evidence supports the jury verdict; only evidence supporting the guilty verdict need be considered. Id. Substantial evidence is evidence forceful enough to compel a conclusion one way or the other with reasonable certainty beyond mere suspicion or conjecture. Id. The fact that evidence is circumstantial does not render it insubstantial. However, where circumstantial evidence is relied upon, it must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis but the guilt of the accused. Geer v. State, 75 Ark. App. 147, 55 S.W.3d 312 (2001).
Appellant asserts that the circumstantial evidence does not support his conviction. We decline to reach the merits of appellant’s argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence because appellant: (1) failed to identify in what respect the State’s evidence was insufficient and (2) failed to renew his motion at the close of all of the evidence.
At the close of the State’s evidence, appellant moved for a directed verdict, stating, in full: “I just wanted to make my motion for directed verdict on this. They have no proof of evidence in the case.” Appellant’s statement is, at best, a general directed verdict, which is not sufficient to apprise the trial court of his objections and to preserve the argument for appellate review. Spencer v. State, 348 Ark. 230, 72 S.W.3d 461 (2002)(holding that a directed verdict motion stating only that the evidence was insufficient, but not specifying in what respect it was insufficient, was not specific enough to preserve the issue for review); Stewart v. State, 320 Ark. 75, 894 S.W.2d 930 (1995). Further, even if appellant’s motion was sufficient, his argument is barred because he failed to renew the motion at the close of all of the evidence. Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1; Proctor v. State, 349 Ark. 648, 79 S.W.3d 370 (2002) (holding that the failure to renew a directed verdict motion at the close of all of the evidence bars appellate review). Therefore, we hold that appellant’s argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence is precluded from review, and we affirm his convictions.
Motion to Suppress
Appellant argues that the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress because Timmon’s consent did not give the officers permission to search Love’s bedroom, where most of the contraband was found. We also decline to address appellant’s argument that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, because appellant has no standing to object to the search.
Appellant has failed to demonstrate that he has a privacy interest sufficient to allow him to object to the search. A person's Fourth Amendment rights are not violated by the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person's premises. Whitham v. State, 69 Ark. App. 62, 12 S.W.3d 638 (2000). A person does not have standing to object to a search simply because he is present in the area or on the premises or because an element of the offense with which he is charged is possession of the thing discovered in the search. Richard v. State, 64 Ark. App. 177 983 S.W.2d 438 (1999); Ramage v. State, 61 Ark. App. 174, 966 S.W.2d 267 (1998). That is, to demonstrate standing sufficient to allow a person to object to the constitutionality of a search, the person must show that he had a proprietary or possessory interest in the residence, that he was an overnight guest there, or that he owned, leased, or maintained control over the house. Davasher v. State, 308 Ark. 154, 823 S.W.2d 863 (1992); Richard, supra.
The pertinent inquiry regarding standing to challenge a search is whether a defendant manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the area searched and whether society is prepared to recognize that expectation as reasonable. Richard, supra. Although an overnight guest in a home may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, a person who is merely present with the homeowner’s consent may not. Whitham, supra (holding the defendant had no standing to challenge a search where he presented no evidence that he had any relationship to residents of searched apartment or had any other purpose in that apartment aside from his illegal activity).
Control over a home sufficient to confer standing has been shown where the owner testified that the defendant was babysitting in the home and was a frequent overnight guest. Starks v. State, 74 Ark. App. 366, 49 S.W.3d 122 (2001). This is not the situation in Starks, because rather than showing appellant had any control or interest in the property, the evidence demonstrates the opposite. Love testified that her relationship with appellant was “casual,” and that she had not seen him in a week. Love stated that appellant “just came that day” to see her.
Appellant testified that he called Love that day, asked if he could come over, and he asked her to cook him something to eat. He testified that he had been there approximately two to three hours before the officers arrived, and that he had his friend drop him off so that Timmons would not know he was there.
Thus, appellant did not live on the premises, was not an overnight guest, and required permission to enter the premises the very day of the search, as is evidenced by the fact that he called before he came over. Further, the fact that he acted so that Timmons would not see him belies any assertion that appellant had any control over or interest in the premises, for purposes of standing. The mere fact that he may have visited Love’s home does not give him a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises, where he did not show that he owned, leased, or maintained control over the house. Davasher, supra (holding that the fact that the defendant occasionally stayed at his mother’s home did not confer standing to object to the search). Accordingly, we hold that appellant failed to demonstrate that he has standing to object to the search, and we decline to reach the merits of his argument regarding the denial of his motion to suppress.
Affirmed.
Pittman and Hart, JJ., agree.