ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
DIVISION II

SAMUEL WALTERS

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

CACR02-1252

September 10, 2003

APPEAL FROM THE JEFFERSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. CR-2002-197-1]

HON. BERLIN C. JONES,

JUDGE

AFFIRMED

John Mauzy Pittman, Judge

The appellant in this criminal case was charged with conspiracy to commit arson and filing a false report. After a bench trial, he was convicted of filing a false report, sentenced to twelve months' probation, and fined $500. From that decision, comes this appeal.

For reversal, appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict on the charge of filing a false report. We affirm.

A motion for a directed verdict is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Atkinson v. State, 347 Ark. 336, 64 S.W.3d 259 (2002). The test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial. Gamble v. State, 351 Ark. 541, 95 S.W.3d 755 (2003). Substantial evidence is evidence forceful enough to compel a conclusion one way or the other beyond suspicion or conjecture. Id. When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence convicting him, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State, and only evidence supporting the verdict will be considered. Id. Guilt can be established without eyewitness testimony, and evidence of guilt is not less because it is circumstantial. Be it direct or circumstantial, evidence must meet the requirements of substantiality, i.e., it must force the fact-finder to reach a conclusion one way or the other without resort to speculation or conjecture. Gregory v. State, 341 Ark. 243, 15 S.W.3d 690 (2000); Chism v. State, 312 Ark. 559, 853 S.W.2d 255 (1993). Where circumstantial evidence alone is relied upon, it must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis than that of guilt of the accused in order to rise to the level of substantial evidence. Gregory, supra.

A person commits the offense of filing a false report if he files a report with any law enforcement agency or prosecuting attorney's office of any alleged criminal wrongdoing on the part of another knowing that such report is false. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-122(b) (Repl. 1997). At trial, appellant moved for a directed verdict on the grounds that there was no evidence that appellant's report to the police was a report of criminal wrongdoing. On appeal, he also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to establish the element of appellant's knowledge of the falsity of his statement, and argues that the offense of filing a false report requires that the reporter identify a specific individual as the person who committed the criminal wrongdoing. Both of the latter arguments are raised for the first time on appeal, and we do not address them. See Gardner v. State, 76 Ark. App. 258, 64 S.W.3d 761 (2001); see generally McClellan v. State, ___ Ark. App. ___ ,101 S.W.3d 864 (April 2, 2003).

With respect to the sufficiency argument actually made at trial, there was evidence that appellant's vehicle was discovered burning approximately one-eighth of a mile from his residence and that, shortly afterwards, appellant telephoned the police and reported that his vehicle was missing. There was also evidence that the vehicle was fully insured; that appellant was experiencing serious financial difficulty following a divorce; that appellant asked his girlfriend the morning after the fire to provide him with an alibi by falsely stating that appellant was at her house when the fire took place; and that, shortly before the fire, appellant had asked his cousin to steal his vehicle and burn it because appellant owed money on it. Viewed in this context, and considering that vehicles generally do not wander off on their own accord, we think appellant's statement to police that his vehicle was "missing" could properly be found to be an allegation of criminal wrongdoing.

Affirmed.

Gladwin and Baker, JJ., agree.