ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
DIVISION II

FRANKIE LEE BROWN

APPELLANT

v.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

CACR02-1076

AUGUST 27, 2003

APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[CR2002-1101]

HONORABLE JOHN BERTRAN PLEGGE, CIRCUIT JUDGE

AFFIRMED

Karen R. Baker, Judge

Appellant, Frankie Lee Brown, was convicted by a jury in Pulaski County Circuit Court of commercial burglary, misdemeanor obstructing governmental relations, misdemeanor possession of instruments of crime, and misdemeanor theft of property. Appellant was sentenced as a habitual offender to twenty-five years' imprisonment for commercial burglary, and the misdemeanor offenses were merged. Appellant's only argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict regarding commercial burglary in that the State failed to introduce substantial evidence that he entered the Shiloh Seventh Day Adventist Church and School with the purpose of committing therein an offense punishable by imprisonment. We affirm.

On February 7, 2002, Officer Wright and Officer Fulton responded to an activated security system at the Shiloh Seventh Day Adventist Church and School. When they arrived, Officer Wright discovered a broken window in the girls' bathroom, which was just to the right of the main entrance to the portion of the church that was used as a school. Mr. Joe Williams, who lives at the church and is the caretaker, testified that before he retired for the night on February 7, he had not noticed anything unusual in the church or the school. The computers and desks in the school portion of the building were all in their proper places at the end of the day. He also testified that no one had permission to be in the church that evening. When he got the call from the alarm company, he waited until the police arrived and then let the officers inside.

During a search of the building, the police discovered that in the larger classroom some of the computers had been moved on to the floor and the desk appeared as if someone had searched through it. Mr. Williams stated that the computers that were found on the floor were normally on the desktops, and the drawers to the teacher's desk were not left open. One of the computers had been moved to another room and was placed on the floor near a window that faced an alley. The computer was covered with a white sheet.

Officer Fulton testified that appellant was found crouched in the corner of that same room with a coat over his head. Appellant was arrested. Officer Wright testified that appellant gave him a false name and two different dates of birth. A search of appellant's person revealed a crack pipe and a tool kit. An unopened six-pack of beer was also found in the classroom. No one other than the appellant was found in the school that evening.

Officer Stafford interviewed appellant after he was taken into custody. He spontaneously volunteered to Officer Stafford the statement that he broke into the church because he was homeless and had a drug problem. As he signed his rights form, Officer Stafford noticed a fresh cut on the top of appellant's hand.

At the close of the State's case, appellant's counsel moved for a directed verdict. The motion was denied. Once the defense rested, appellant's counsel renewed his motion. It was again denied. Appellant was ultimately convicted of commercial burglary, misdemeanor obstructing governmental relations, misdemeanor possession of instruments of crime, and misdemeanor theft of property. This appeal followed.

A motion for a directed verdict is treated as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Geer v. State, 75 Ark. App. 147, 55 S.W.3d 312 (2001). This court affirms if there is substantial evidence to support the verdict, and in making this determination we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee. Id. Substantial evidence is evidence forceful enough to compel a conclusion one way or the other beyond suspicion or conjecture. Kennedy v. State, 49 Ark. App. 20, 894 S.W.2d 952 (1995). The fact that evidence is circumstantial does not render it insubstantial. Geer, supra. Where circumstantial evidence is relied upon, however, it must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis but the guilt of the accused. Id. The question of whether it does exclude other reasonable hypotheses is usually for the fact finder to determine. Drew v. State, 8 Ark. App. 120, 648 S.W.2d 836 (1983).

A person commits commercial burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a commercial occupiable structure of another with the purpose of committing therein any offense punishable by imprisonment. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-39-201(b)(1) (Repl. 1997). A place where people assemble for the purpose of education falls within the definition of a commercial building under the statute. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-39-101(2)(B) (Repl. 1997); Oliver v. State, 14 Ark. App. 240, 687 S.W.2d 850 (1985), rev'd on other grounds, 286 Ark. 198, 691 S.W.2d 842 (1985). A criminal defendant's intent or state of mind is seldom capable of proof by direct evidence and must usually be inferred from the circumstances of the crime. Smith v. State, 346 Ark. 48, 55 S.W.3d 251 (2001).

Here, appellant's purpose to commit a theft is proven by circumstantial evidence. Upon arrival, Officer Wright had found a broken window in the girls' restroom. Shortly after Officers Wright and Fulton entered the portion of the church used as a school, they discovered a computer that had been misplaced on the floor and desk drawers that looked as if someone had searched through them. They also found another computer, which was covered with a sheet, in another room on the floor next to a window that faced an alley. Appellant was crouched in the corner of the same room with a coat over his head. A tool kit and a crack pipe were found on appellant's person. Appellant had a fresh cut on his hand. Other than appellant, no one was found on the premises. Under these circumstances, the fact finder could infer that appellant committed commercial burglary. See Rudd v. State, 308 Ark. 401, 825 S.W.2d 565 (1992) (holding that there was sufficient evidence to support appellant's burglary conviction where the evidence showed that appellant was unlawfully in the victim's home, that he was found standing and looking at a scanner sitting on a table, with a glove on his hand, that appellant gave a questionable explanation of his presence there, and that appellant had previously been convicted of theft and burglary).

Although appellant offered his own explanation as to why he was in the school on February 7, the trial court, as the finder of fact, was not obligated to believe him, as he was the person most interested in the outcome of the case. Greer, supra (citing Rankin v. State, 338 Ark. 723, 1 S.W.3d 14 (1999)).

Based on the foregoing, we hold that substantial evidence supports appellant's conviction for commercial burglary.

Vaught and Roaf, JJ., agree.