ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
DIVISION III

CACR02-1025

AUGUST 27, 2003

GARY GREEN AN APPEAL FROM THE JEFFERSON

APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

v. [CR-2001-63-3-5]

STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE FRED D. DAVIS III,

APPELLEE JUDGE

AFFIRMED

Olly Neal, Judge

Appellant, Gary Green, was convicted in a bench trial of battery in the first degree, a violation of Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-201 (Repl. 1997). He was sentenced to six years' imprisonment in the Arkansas Department of Correction. On appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. We affirm.

Edward Hammond testified that on the evening of January 16, 2001, he met appellant in a pool hall. Hammond said that he rode home from the pool hall with appellant, Maurice Green, and a lady from the pool hall. When the group left the pool hall, they first went to Hammond's aunt's house. Once there, Hammond decided he wanted to go to his cousin's house, which was near appellant's house; so, he accompanied the group to appellant's house. Hammond testified that as soon as he crossed the threshold into appellant's house, appellant began shooting. Hammond said that appellant shot at him twice with a .25 automatic pistol and that as a result, he sustained gunshot wounds in his side and stomach. However, Hammond later testified that he thought appellant fired at him three times. Following the shooting, Hammond ran next door and asked the homeowner to call the police. During his testimony, Hammond stated that he did not know why appellant shot him. He admitted that he knew appellant's father, but said that they never talked about appellant's father.

Detective Mike Knowlton of the Pine Bluff Police Department testified that, on January 19, 2001, Hammond identified appellant from a photo line-up as the person who shot him. Following the identification, appellant was arrested. Detective Knowlton testified that, while transporting appellant to the station, appellant asked, "Did he tell you why I shot him?" When Detective Knowlton replied "no," appellant stated that he had shot Hammond because Hammond was talking about appellant's father. Detective Knowlton testified that, at the station, he read appellant his Miranda rights and appellant signed and initialed the rights form. He said that appellant then proceeded to give a verbal statement in which appellant admitted shooting Hammond.

Appellant admitted that he gave Detective Knowlton a statement. He also acknowledged that in the statement, he asserted that he shot Hammond because Hammond said something derogatory about his father. However, appellant's version of the events that transpired on January 16, 2001, differed greatly from Hammond's version. Appellant stated that upon leaving the pool hall, he, Hammond, Maurice Green, and a girl from the pool hall, went to Hammond's aunt's house. After about ten minutes, they left to go to Maurice Green's house. Appellant said that they were at Maurice Green's house about five minutes when he and Hammond began to argue. Appellant stated that, during the argument Hammond called his father "a punk." Appellant then asked Maurice Green to "throw Hammond out of the house." This caused an argument to erupt between Hammond and Maurice Green. Appellant said, that during the melee, Hammond pushed him, causing him to fall backward. Appellant testified that, at the time, he had a gun in his pocket and that, as he fell backwards, he pulled the trigger. He stated that he only fired once. During his testimony, appellant asserted that he did not shoot with the intent to cause serious bodily harm. He also asserted that someone else must have shot Hammond because Hammond "had three holes in him."

Prior to finding appellant guilty of first-degree battery, the trial judge stated that he had a hard time believing either Hammond's or appellant's testimony. The trial judge found that some type of argument or provocation had occurred. The trial judge also found that appellant's purpose was to cause a physical injury by means of a firearm. A judgment and commitment order was subsequently entered, and from that order comes this appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence.

The test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial. Smith v. State, Ark. , 98S.W.3d 433 (2003). Substantial evidence is that which is of sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one way or the other, without resorting to speculation or conjecture. Edmond v. State, 351 Ark. 495, 95 S.W.3d 789 (2003). When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, we consider only the evidence that supports the verdict, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Taylor v. State, 77 Ark. App. 144, 72 S.W.3d 882 (2002).

A person commits battery in the first degree, "if with the purpose of causing serious physical injury to another person, he causes serious physical injury to any person by means of a deadly weapon." Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-201(a)(1) (Repl. 1997). Appellant contends that the State failed to establish intent. He asserts that the only evidence that supports a finding that he acted intentionally was Hammond's testimony and that the testimony lacked credibility.

A person acts purposely with respect to his conduct or a result thereof when it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result. Taylor v. State, supra. A criminal defendant's intent or state of mind is seldom capable of proof by direct evidence and must usually be inferred from the circumstances of the crime. Edmond v. State, supra. A presumption exists that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his acts. Taylor v. State, supra.

Although the trial court had difficulty believing the testimony of appellant or Hammond, it resolved that some type of argument or provocation had occurred. In addition, the trial court found that, due to the fact that appellant and Hammond were in close proximity to one another during their altercation, appellant intended to cause physical injury by using his gun. Furthermore, appellant admitted that he shot Hammond because Hammond made a derogatory statement about his father. The issue of witness credibility is one for the trial judge to weigh and assess. Smart v. State, Ark. , 104 S.W.3d 386 (2003). The trier of fact is free to believe all or part of any witness's testimony and may resolve questions of conflicting testimony and inconsistent evidence. Baughman v. State, Ark. App. , S.W.3d (May 1, 2003). We will disturb the trier of fact's determination only if the evidence did not meet the required standards, thereby leaving the trier of fact to speculation and conjecture in reaching its verdict. Id. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, we cannot say that the trial court resorted to speculation and conjecture in reaching its verdict. Therefore, we hold there was sufficient evidence to support appellant's conviction and affirm.

Affirmed.

Stroud, C.J., and Crabtree, J., agree.