ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

TERRY CRABTREE, JUDGE

DIVISION III

RICHARD FARROD SIMS

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

CACR 02-1168

June 25, 2003

APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. CR2001-3584]

HONORABLE DAVID BOGARD,

JUDGE

AFFIRMED; MOTION TO BE RELIEVED GRANTED

The appellant, Richard Sims, was charged with theft by receiving, a class B felony; fleeing, a class D felony; resisting arrest, a class A misdemeanor; and theft by receiving, a class C felony. It was also alleged that appellant was an habitual offender by having more than four previous felony convictions. In a jury trial, appellant was acquitted of resisting arrest but found guilty of the remaining charges. He was sentenced as an habitual offender to terms of thirty-five years for theft by receiving as a class B felony, twenty-five years for theft by receiving as a class C felony, and fifteen years for fleeing. The trial judge ordered that the sentences be served consecutively.

Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Rule 4-3(j) of the Rules of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, appellant's counsel has filed a motion to withdraw on the ground that this appeal is wholly without merit. This motion wasaccompanied by

a brief discussing all matters in the record that might arguably support an appeal, including all adverse rulings and a statement as to why counsel considers each point raised as being incapable of supporting a meritorious appeal. Appellant was provided a copy of his counsel's brief and was notified of his right to file a list of points on appeal within thirty days. Appellant has filed a list of points, and the State has filed a brief responding to appellant's list of points. The State concurs with appellant's counsel that the appeal is wholly without merit. The evidence produced at trial showed that Officers Bryan Healey and Michael Mabry of the Little Rock Police Department were on patrol on December 5, 2000. At the intersection of 17^th and Elm, they observed a 1991 Cadillac that had a broken rear-vent window, and they ascertained that the vehicle had been reported stolen. They waited for back-up to arrive and then activated their emergency lights in order to initiate a stop. The driver, who was later identified as the appellant, rolled down his window and yelled something at the officers and then continued driving at a slow rate of speed onto Interstate 630. The Cadillac, followed by the officers, exited the interstate and then picked up speed through a residential area. The officers stated that appellant's speed reached at least sixty miles an hour and that appellant ran at least ten stop signs during the pursuit, including one at a busy intersection. Eventually, the Cadillac wrecked into a garage, after which appellant fled on foot. A woman and a child were passengers in the vehicle, and the woman told the officers which direction appellant had fled. Appellant was apprehended a short time later. Linda Arnett testified that she was the owner of the Cadillac and that it had been stolen from her workplace in downtown Little Rock on December 2. She saidthat she had bought the vehicle the previous April, that it was in mint condition, and that she had paid $8,995 for it.

Little Rock Police Officer Chris Phillips testified that on August 21, 2001, he saw a 1981 Oldsmobile at a gas station that matched the description of a vehicle that was included on a "hot sheet" list of stolen vehicles. He determined that the licence plate of the vehicle matched the one on the list, and he followed the vehicle as it left the gas station. He waited for other units to arrive, and then he stopped the vehicle without incident. He identified appellant as the driver of the vehicle. He also saw that the steering column had been "punched out," and he said that this was a method used for stealing cars. There were two female passengers in the vehicle. One of them had the vehicle registration papers in her purse.

Burt Balsam testified that the 1981 Oldsmobile belonged to his wife. He said that it had been stolen from their home several days before it was recovered by the police. He believed that the vehicle was worth $2,000.

At the conclusion of the State's case, appellant moved for a directed verdict. He argued that the evidence was not sufficient to support convictions for theft by receiving because it was not proven that appellant knew or should have known that the vehicles had been stolen. Appellant further argued that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for fleeing because the State had not proven that the circumstances of his flight manifested extreme indifference to the value of human life. The trial court denied appellant's motion. Appellant then rested and renewed his motion for a directed verdict,which was again denied by the court.

It is well settled that a motion for a directed verdict is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Atkinson v. State, 347 Ark. 336, 64 S.W.3d 259 (2002). The test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence. Stanton v. State, 344 Ark. 589, 42 S.W.3d 474 (2001). Substantial evidence is evidence that is of sufficient certainty and precision to compel a conclusion one way or the other and pass beyond mere suspicion or conjecture. Branscom v. State, 345 Ark. 21, 43 S.W.3d 148 (2001). On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, considering only that evidence that supports the verdict. Id.

A person commits the offense of theft by receiving if he receives, retains, or disposes of stolen property of another person, knowing that it was stolen or having good reason to believe it was stolen. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-36-106(a) (Repl. 1997). The unexplained possession or control by a person of recently stolen property gives rise to a presumption that the person knows or believes that the property was stolen. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-36-106(b) (Repl. 1997). Theft by receiving is a class B felony if the value of the property is $2,500 or more; it is a class C felony if the value of the property is less than $2,500 but more than $500.

It is unlawful for a person to flee, either on foot or by means of any vehicle or conveyance, if the person knows that his immediate arrest or detention is being attempted by a duly authorized law enforcement officer. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-125(a) (Repl. 1997). Fleeing by means of any vehicle or conveyance is a class D felony if, under circumstancesmanifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, a person purposely operates the vehicle or conveyance in such a manner that creates a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury to another person or persons. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-129 (Repl. 1997).

Upon our review of the evidence, we cannot say that appellant's convictions are not supported by substantial evidence. Appellant's possession of the stolen vehicles was not explained. The rear-vent window of the Cadillac had been broken, and the appellant fled from the police officers. The Oldsmobile's steering column had been punched out. There was sufficient evidence that appellant knew or had good reason to believe that the vehicles had been stolen. From the officers' testimony, it was shown that appellant led them on a high-speed chase through a residential neighborhood and that he ran numerous stop-signs during his flight. It thus cannot be said that there is no substantial evidence to support the conclusion that the circumstances manifested an extreme indifference to the value of human life.

The appellant's motions for directed verdict were the only adverse rulings he received at trial. No other motions or objections were made for which appellant did not receive a favorable ruling.

In his list of points, appellant first contends that his attorney was unprofessional and gave him poor advice in recommending that he proceed before a jury instead of requesting a bench trial. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, however, cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Nichols v. State, 69 Ark. App. 212, 11 S.W.3d 19 (2000). Appellant also asks this court to reduce his prison sentences because they are excessive for the crimeshe committed. Appellant did not object at trial that his sentences were excessive, and this is not an issue that can be raised for the first time on appeal. Walker v. State, 330 Ark. 652, 955 S.W.2d 905 (1997). Even so, if a sentence is within the range of punishment set by the General Assembly, we are not free to reduce it, even if we consider the sentences to be unduly harsh. Buckley v. State, 349 Ark. 53, 76 S.W.3d 825 (2002).

Affirmed; motion to be relieved granted.

Stroud, C.J., and Neal, J., agree.