ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

WENDELL L. GRIFFEN, JUDGE

DIVISION I

CACR02-1056

June 25, 2003

TERRY SANDERS AN APPEAL FROM GREENE

APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[CR97-190]

V. HON. DAVID LASER, JUDGE

STATE OF ARKANSAS APPEAL DISMISSED

APPELLEE

This cases arises from a proceeding pursuant to a petition for revocation of probation. Appellant's counsel filed a motion to be relieved, accompanied by a no-merit brief, in accord with Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4-3(j)(1) (2003), and Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Appellant did not file a pro se response, and the State chose not to prepare a brief in this case. We dismiss the appeal because appellant has no right to appeal following an unconditional guilty plea.

In March of 1999, appellant entered a guilty plea to a hot check charge. In an order filed March 5, 1999, the trial court in Greene County, Arkansas, placed him on probation for three years with requirements to pay restitution, probation fees, court costs, and to participatein a one-day tour of the Arkansas Department of Correction. Appellant was to pay the sums due in $100 installments beginning April 5, 1999.

On June 28, 2000,1 the State filed a petition for revocation of appellant's probation, alleging that appellant absconded supervision and failed to pay court costs and restitution. That same date, the trial court issued a bench warrant on appellant. Apparently upon arrest, on or about July 1, 2000, the trial court set a date to appear in court on August 18, 2000. The trial court scheduled a hearing on the matter for September 22, 2000, followed by several continuations.

Finally, on March 5, 2001, the trial court filed a form document entitled "Conditions of Suspension or Probation," listing various conditions of appellant's probation. According to appellant's motion to reconsider judgment, filed on March 9, 2001, the trial court found on March 5, 2001, by a preponderance of the evidence that appellant had violated the terms and conditions of his probation by failing to report to his probation officer as ordered and by failing to pay fines, costs, etc. The trial court sentenced appellant to three years in the Department of Correction, followed by a seven-year period of suspended imposition of sentence. The trial court filed a judgment and commitment order reflecting the above on March 28, 2001.

On March 9, 2001, the trial court had before it an oral motion for the setting of bond pending the reconsideration hearing and/or appeal by appellant. The trial court set bond for appellant and determined his bond conditions. Also on March 9, 2001, appellant filed hismotion to reconsider judgment, as mentioned above. On March 16, 2001, appellant also filed a motion to reconsider sentence, petitioning the lower court to reconsider the sentence of three years' imprisonment because appellant in the meantime had satisfied his obligations in fines, fees, and costs.

A hearing on the motions to reconsider was set for April 27, 2001. That hearing resulted in an amended judgment and disposition order, filed May 25, 2001, reflecting the imposition of five years' probation, upon the additional condition that appellant serve 120 days in the Greene County Jail and that he pay the remaining balance due in previous fines and costs.

On October 9, 2001, the State filed its second petition for revocation of probation. The State alleged that appellant was ordered to serve 120 days in jail, but only served 3 ½ days, and that he was on work release and never returned. The record further reflects that the trial court issued another bench warrant for appellant on October 9, 2001, and that appellant was accordingly arrested on November 30, 2001.

The matter finally came to a hearing on June 10, 2002. At that time, the trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the petition to revoke was substantiated and sentenced appellant, following a guilty plea, to six years' imprisonment, to be followed by an additional period of four years of suspended imposition of sentence. Subsequently, attorney Grant C. DeProw was appointed to represent appellant on appeal. From this appointment stems the present motion to withdraw as attorney, pursuant to Rule 4-3(j)(1), before us.

Analysis

When counsel files a motion to withdraw on the grounds that the appeal is without merit pursuant to Anders v. California, supra, and Rule 4-3(j) of the Rules of the Arkansas Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, we review everything in the record that might arguably support an appeal. McCoy v. State, 74 Ark. App. 414, 49 S.W.3d 154 (2001). Counsel must furnish a copy of the no-merit brief to appellant and thus afford him the opportunity to file pro se points for reversal. Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-3(j)(2) (2003).

As a general rule, there exists no right of appeal from a guilty plea. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-91-101(c) (1987). A number of exceptions exist, such as a conditional plea of guilty following the denial of a motion to suppress, or issues involving the proper application of jail time credit, or where a jury set the punishment under a bifurcated procedure, separate from the actual guilty plea. Hampton v. State, 48 Ark. App. 93, 890 S.W.2d 279 (1995). Another possible exception lies within situations where post-judgment motions request the correction of an illegal sentence. Reeves v. State, 339 Ark. 304, 5 S.W.3d 41 (1999).

In the present case, we hold that appellant had no right to appeal because he entered an unconditional guilty plea. Appellant appeared at the hearing on the State's second petition to revoke probation and acknowledged all allegations brought against him. Specifically, the trial court asked appellant whether he knew and understood that he did not have to plead guilty or confess to the petition to revoke. Appellant answered that he understood. The trial court further asked appellant whether he knew and understood that entering an unconditional plea of guilty caused him to give up any right he otherwise mighthave to an appeal. Appellant indicated that he understood. In fact, appellant affirmed that he wished to plead "[g]uilty, unconditional guilty." Given this unconditional plea of guilty, and the lack of any circumstances that could bring appellant's case under one of the exceptions according to which we might have jurisdiction to hear his appeal, we conclude that he has no right to bring the present appeal. Therefore, we do not need to discuss possible adverse rulings from which an appeal might have been brought.

Appeal dismissed.

Gladwin and Bird, JJ., agree.

1 Counsel for appellant, in his no-merit brief, insinuates that this petition was filed in July 1999. From the record, this appears to be wrong.