ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

JOHN MAUZY PITTMAN, JUDGE

DIVISION IV

EDDIE PARTRIDGE, ET UX.

APPELLANTS

V.

LOCHRIDGE MOBILE HOMES, INC., ET AL.

APPELLEES

CA02-1169

June 18, 2003

APPEAL FROM THE FAULKNER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. CV-99-672]

HON. MICHAEL A. MAGGIO,

JUDGE

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

The appellants purchased a mobile home in April 1996 from appellee Lochridge Mobile Homes, Inc. Lochridge assigned the installment contract and security agreement for the mobile home to Access Financial Corp. Appellants failed to make the required payments, and Lochridge repossessed the mobile home on Christmas Eve of 1996. In 1999, appellants filed a complaint alleging, inter alia, that Lochridge had converted the trailer. After a hearing, the trial court found that the contract had been assigned to Access; that no contractual relationship existed between Lochridge and appellants or between Lochridge and Access; and that there was no evidence that Access had given Lochridge any authority, express or implied, to repossess appellants' mobile home. The trial court then concluded

that Lochridge had the right to repossess appellants' mobile home, granted summary judgment in favor of Lochridge, and dismissed appellants' claim for conversion. From that decision, comes this appeal.

For reversal, appellants contend that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Lochridge on appellants' cause of action for conversion. Appellants argue that the trial court's findings of fact were correct but that its grant of summary judgment is contrary to the law. Appellees, in response, assert that the trial judge did not intend for the disputed findings of fact to be included in the order and concede that the findings of fact are erroneous, but argue that the grant of summary judgment in their favor is supported by the evidence and should be affirmed.

The parties appear to agree on one crucial point, i.e., that the trial judge's findings of fact are inconsistent with the relief that he granted. Given that the dispute in this case centers on whether the cause of this inconsistency was a mistake of law or a clerical error, and that we cannot determine the basis for the trial court's decision from the record, we remand for the trial court to clarify the basis for its decision as we did in Wrightsell v. Johnson, 77 Ark. App. 79, 72 S.W.3d 114 (2002), where we said that:

On appellate review, however, we are unable to determine the basis for the chancellor's decision that appellant is entitled to a one-tenth interest in the seventy-nine-acre tract that appellee obtained with her help. Whatever else may be disputed, it appears clear on our de novo review that appellant's contribution of her one-tenth interest in the 159-acre family parcel was equal to what appellee contributed. However, appellee also obtained financing to acquire the seventy-nine-acre tract in the settlement with Atkinson andSmith by borrowing funds in his own name. Even after appellant had relinquished her one-tenth interest in the larger parcel, appellee obtained funds from her for expenses related to the property he ultimately secured. In view of these facts, it is not clear why the chancellor did not grant her prayer to be added to the deed to the seventy-nine-acre tract, subject to appellant joining appellee on the mortgage. Thus, further proceedings are needed to allow the chancellor to fashion relief consistent with the constructive trust determination, yet more representative of appellant's contribution to the seventy-nine-acre tract now held by appellee in his own name. Because the chancellor's findings are inconsistent with the relief granted, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Wrightsell v. Johnson, supra, 77 Ark. App. at 86, 72 S.W.3d at 119-20.

Reversed and remanded for clarification.

Hart and Robbins, JJ., agree.