ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

TERRY CRABTREE, JUDGE

DIVISION III

KEVON DEQUANZO TROTTER

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

CACR 02-1098

JUNE 18, 2003

APPEAL FROM THE OUACHITA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. CR-2002-010]

HONORABLE CAROL CRAFTON ANTHONY, JUDGE

AFFIRMED

On June 3, 2002, a jury sitting in the Ouachita County Circuit Court convicted the appellant, Kevon Dequanzo Trotter, of one count of aggravated robbery, two counts of first-degree battery, and two counts of possession of firearms by certain persons. The trial court sentenced him to a total of seventy-nine years' imprisonment in the Arkansas Department of Correction. On appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on each of his convictions. We affirm.

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to direct a verdict in his favor. A motion for a directed verdict is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Miles v. State, 350 Ark. 243, 85 S.W.3d 907 (2002); Britt v. State, 344 Ark. 13, 38 S.W.3d 363 (2001). The test for such motions is whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial. Atkinson v. State, 347 Ark. 336, 64 S.W.3d 259 (2002). Substantial evidence is evidence of sufficient certainty and precision to compel a conclusion one way or another and pass beyond mere suspicion or conjecture. Id. On appeal, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee and consider only the evidence that supports the verdict. Id.

Appellant was convicted on five counts involving two victims, William Jerome Beavers and John Buffington. In Beavers' case, the jury found appellant guilty of aggravated robbery, first-degree battery, and possession of firearms by certain persons. In Buffington's case, the jury found appellant guilty of first-degree battery and possession of firearms by certain persons. The record reflects that at the close of the State's case, appellant moved for a directed verdict as follows:

At this time the defendant would move for a directed verdict as to all charges. In the case of Mr. Buffington, Mr. Buffington testified that he saw [appellant], talked to [appellant] [unintelligible] his testimony should not be relied upon for the purpose of convicting [appellant]. And there is no corroboration, as far as visual corroboration that it was [appellant] who had the weapon, or fired the weapon. As to the case involving Mr. Beavers, there was no testimony by the State that [unintelligible] I don't know if that is enough to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.

The trial court denied the motion, and defense counsel called Robert Reeder, a police investigator, to testify. After direct and cross-examination of Reeder, defense counsel rested and renewed the motion for directed verdict.

Rule 33.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure explains the procedure a criminal defendant must follow when making a proper motion for directed verdict. The rule provides:

(a) In a jury trial, if a motion for directed verdict is to be made, it shall be made at the close of the evidence offered by the prosecution and at the close of all of the evidence. A motion for directed verdict shall state the specific grounds therefor.

* * *

(c) The failure of a defendant to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence at the times and in the manner required in subsections (a) and (b) above will constitute a waiver of any question pertaining to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict or judgment. A motion for directed verdict or for dismissal based on insufficiency of the evidence must specify the respect in which the evidence is deficient. A motion merely stating that the evidence is insufficient does not preserve for appeal issues relating to a specific deficiency such as insufficient proof on the elements of the offense. A renewal at the close of all of the evidence of a previous motion for directed verdict or for dismissal preserves the issue of insufficient evidence for appeal. If for any reason a motion or a renewed motion at the close ofall of the evidence for directed verdict or for dismissal is not ruled upon, it is deemed denied for purposes of obtaining appellate review on the question of the sufficiency of the evidence.

Id. (Emphasis added.) Our state supreme court has explained that Rule 33.1 is strictly construed. Etoch v. State, 343 Ark. 361, 37 S.W.3d 186 (2001).

After reviewing the transcript, we conclude that appellant's attorney made specific arguments about the State's failure in proof in Buffington's case but failed to properly preserve its directed-verdict motion for appellate review in reference to Beavers' case. See Grady v. State, 350 Ark. 160, 85 S.W.3d 531 (2002). In order to preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellant must make a specific motion for a directed verdict that advises the trial court of the exact element of the crime that the State has failed to prove. Beavers v. State, 345 Ark. 291, 46 S.W.3d 532 (2001). The reason underlying our requirement that specific grounds be stated and that the absent proof be pinpointed is that it allows the trial court the option of either granting the motion, or, if justice requires, allowing the State to reopen its case and supply the missing proof. Webb v. State, 327 Ark. 51, 938 S.W.2d 806 (1997). A general motion that merely asserts that the State has failed to prove its case is inadequate to preserve the issue for appeal. Grady, supra; Beavers, supra.

Appellant's motion for directed verdict in Beavers' case did not comply with Rule 33.1 because the motion was general and did not inform the trial court of the specific issues in the State's case that were being challenged. For that reason, the issue is not preserved for appeal. Therefore, we only address the merits of appellant's sufficiency argument as it relates to John Buffington.

On January 23, 2002, at approximately 4:30 p.m., John Buffington was walking on Clifton Street in Camden, Arkansas. Before he reached the intersection of Spring and Cleveland Streets, Buffington saw appellant exit a house. The two men exchanged words. Buffington walked away from appellant, but appellant kept talking. After the two men exchanged more words, appellantpulled a pistol out of his pants. Appellant shot three times. The final shot hit Buffington in the back of his leg and exited above his knee.

At trial, Buffington identified appellant as the person who shot him. Buffington further testified that he stayed in the hospital for several days and had $17,000 in medical bills as a result of the injuries that appellant caused. Buffington's medical records were admitted into evidence. In addition, a stipulation by Dr. Tobe, a Ouachita County emergency-room physician, was admitted into evidence. The stipulation stated that Dr. Tobe would testify that the injuries to Buffington were "serious physical injuries." The trial court instructed the jury, as a matter of law, that appellant had previously been convicted of a felony.

We hold that sufficient evidence demonstrates that appellant committed first-degree battery and possession of firearms by certain persons in Buffington's case. A person commits first-degree battery if, "[w]ith the purpose of causing serious physical injury to another person, he causes serious physical injury to any person by means of a deadly weapon." Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-201(a)(1) (Repl. 1997). A person acts purposely with respect to his conduct or a result thereof when it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-202(a)(1) (Repl. 1997). Pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 5-73-103(a)(1) (Supp. 2001), no person who has been convicted of a felony shall possess or own any firearm.

Here, Buffington identified appellant as the person who used a firearm to cause him serious physical injury. Appellant was previously convicted of a felony, and Buffington testified that appellant used a gun to shoot him. The uncorroborated testimony of one State's witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction. Davis v. State, 284 Ark. 557, 683 S.W.2d 926 (1985). Appellant contends that the State did not prove "beyond a reasonable doubt" that he committed first-degree battery and possession of firearms by certain persons. However, the weight to be given to the State's proof isa matter of credibility, and credibility is an issue for a jury to determine. See Harshaw v. State, 348 Ark. 62, 71 S.W.3d 548 (2002). The jury was free to believe all or part of any witness's testimony and could resolve questions of conflicting testimony and inconsistent evidence by choosing to believe the State's account of the facts rather than appellant's. Turner v. State, 349 Ark. 715, 80 S.W.3d 382 (2002).

We do not believe that the trial court erred in denying appellant's motions for directed verdict as sufficient evidence supports his convictions in regard to Buffington's case.

Affirmed.

Stroud, C.J., and Neal, J., agree.