ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

TERRY CRABTREE, JUDGE

DIVISION II

RIDDELL FLYING SERVICE, INC.

APPELLANT

V.

REGIONS BANK, ET AL.

APPELLEE

CA 02-1282

June 11, 2003

APPEAL FROM THE PHILLIPS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. CIV01-191]

HONORABLE HARVEY LEE YATES,

JUDGE

DISMISSED

Appellant, Riddell Flying Service, Inc., brings this appeal from an order of partial summary judgment in which the trial court held that a purchase-money security interest held by appellee Regions Bank in an airplane was superior to appellant's mechanic's lien. We conclude that the order appealed from is not a final order; therefore, we must dismiss the appeal without reaching the merits of the issues raised.

On July 27, 2001, appellant filed a complaint against James and Phyllis Flanigan, d/b/a Flanigan Aviation, asserting a mechanic's lien under Ark. Code Ann. § 18-44-101 (Supp. 2001). It was alleged that appellant had made repairs to a 1990 502 Air Tractor airplane in the amount of $163,612.71 and that an unpaid balance of $70,215.42 remained due and owing. Appellee was joined as a defendant, and in the complaint appellant allegedthat its

mechanics' lien was superior to the purchase-money security interest of appellee in the plane. Appellant further alleged in the complaint that it had leased Flanigan Aviation another airplane and that there was an outstanding balance due on the lease of $33,515. Appellant asked for judgment for the unpaid balances and for a determination that its lien had priority over appellee's security interest.

Appellee answered the complaint and denied that appellant's lien was superior to its own. Appellee also filed a cross-claim against Flanigan Aviation in which it contended that Flanigan Aviation was in default on its promissory note, which was secured by the plane, and that the outstanding balance due was in the amount of $249,426.46. Appellee asked for judgment in that amount, plus interest.

Thereafter, appellee filed a motion for partial summary judgment contending that its perfected purchase-money security interest had priority over appellant's mechanic's lien. The trial court agreed with appellee and entered an order of partial summary judgment. The court ruled that appellant's lien was not established under Ark. Code Ann. § 18-44-101, as appellant had claimed, but that appellant had a mechanic's lien by virtue of Ark. Code Ann. § 18-45-201 (1987) and that appellee's lien had priority under Ark. Code Ann. § 18-45-202 (Supp. 2001). This appeal followed.

Rule 2(a)(1) of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure-Civil provides that an appeal may be taken only from a final judgment or decree entered by the trial court. Even though the question of a final order has not been raised by the parties, this is a question that relates to the subject-matter jurisdiction of this court, and we must raise the issue on ourown. City of Corning v. Cochran, 350 Ark. 12, 84 S.W.3d 439 (2002). For an order to be final, it must dismiss the parties from the court, discharge them from the action, or conclude their rights to the subject matter in controversy. Capitol Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Phelps, 72 Ark. App. 464, 37 S.W.2d 692 (2001). An order must be of such a nature as to not only decide the rights of the parties, but also to put the court's directive into execution, ending the litigation or a separable part of it. Id. An order is not final when it adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties. Eason v. Flannigan, 349 Ark. 1, 75 S.W.3d 702 (2002). Even though an issue on which the trial court renders a decision might be an important one, an appeal will be premature if the decision does not, from a practical standpoint, conclude the merits of the case. Id.

In this case, the trial court did establish the priority of the competing liens, but the amount of the liens has not been determined or reduced to judgment, nor has the appellant's claim against Flanigan Aviation on the lease been adjudicated. Consequently, the order of partial summary judgment in not a final judgment from which an appeal can be taken. Although Rule 54(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a trial court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to fewer than all claims or parties, the trial court made no such certification here. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal.

Dismissed.

Griffen and Vaught, JJ., agree.