NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

JUDGE KAREN R. BAKER

DIVISION IV

CA02-1281

June 11, 2003

KIMBLE TURNER AN APPEAL FROM POPE COUNTY

APPELLANT CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. E-2000-465]

v.

HONORABLE RICHARD E. GARDNER

LINDA DAVENPORT TURNER CIRCUIT JUDGE

APPELLEE

DISMISSED

In this divorce case, appellant Kimble Turner argues that the trial court erred in its distribution of marital property and in its award of alimony and attorney fees to appellee Linda Turner. We dismiss the appeal for lack of a final order.

The parties began living together in 1992 and were later married in 1995. They owned a home and two rental properties in Russellville. No children were born of the marriage. From 1997 through 1999, appellant worked overseas, and his paychecks were electronically transferred to the parties' bank account in Russellville. The amount of funds transferred during this time totaled approximately $288,000. Mrs. Turner, who had notworked outside the home since 1992, remained at their residence in Russellville, paid the monthly bills, and managed and collected rents on the rental properties.

At some point in 1998 while Mr. Turner was overseas, he asked his wife how they were doing financially, and she replied that they had $10,000 in the bank. According to Mr. Turner, he thought the amount should be greater; however, he continued to have his checks electronically transferred through September 1999. On May 31, 2000, Mr. Turner filed for divorce and asked that Mrs. Turner be required to account for the money he had forwarded from overseas. He would later argue that she had squandered the funds he had sent and that, before the parties' assets were divided, she should be required to reimburse him for a portion of that money.

On July 31, 2002, a trial was held before the circuit judge. At that time, the parties owned the aforementioned real property, plus household furniture, two vehicles, a checking account with a few hundred dollars in it, individual IRAs of approximately equal value, and Mr. Turner's life insurance policy with a cash value of $10,919.90. They had credit card debt of approximately $12,000, and it appears from the record that other debts remained, including amounts owed on some of the real property. Following trial, the circuit judge issued a divorce decree, finding that all property, accounts, and debts of the parties were marital. All real and personal property, except for clothing, personal effects, and jewelry, were to be auctioned and the proceeds placed into the registry of the court, to be disposed of as follows:

The court awarded each party the IRA in his or her name; awarded Mrs. Turner a pro-rata share of Mr. Turner's life insurance policy from the date of marriage to the date of the decree; and awarded Mrs. Turner alimony of $400 per month for five years and $1,500 in attorney fees. The decree made no disposition of the vehicles or of any funds that might remain after the sale of the auctioned property. As a result, the decree, as it reads, awards no assets to Mr. Turner, other than his individual IRA and an undefined share of the cash value of the life insurance policy. Mr. Turner has appealed from that decree.

For a judgment to be final, it must dismiss the parties from the court, discharge them from the action, or conclude their rights to the subject matter in controversy. See Hartwick v. Hill, 77 Ark. App. 185, 73 S.W.3d 15 (2002). The judgment must be of such a nature as to not only decide the rights of the parties but also to put the court's directive into execution, ending the litigation or a separable part of it. Id. A final judgment or decision is one that finally adjudicates the rights of the parties, putting it beyond the power of the court that made it to place the parties in their original positions; it must be such a final determination of the issues as may be enforced by execution or in some other appropriate manner. Id. Whether an order is final and appealable is a matter going to the jurisdiction of the appellate court. Id.

A final divorce decree must designate the specific real and personal property to which each party is entitled. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-12-315(a)(3)(A) (Repl. 2002). The decreeappealed from in this case does not distribute the parties' vehicles,1 does not specifically designate the real or personal property to be divided, and does not make provisions for the distribution of any funds that may be left over from the sale of the parties' assets. Further, although it awards Mrs. Turner a "pro-rata" share of Mr. Turner's life insurance policy, neither the pro-rata percentage nor the actual dollar amount of that share was calculated by the court. Additionally, we are unable to tell from either the evidence in the record or the provisions of the decree the value of the assets to be sold and the resulting amounts that the parties might realize from the sale. This is important because, in addition to being asked to review the property division, we are asked to review the trial court's alimony award; alimony and property division are complementary devices that a trial judge employs to make the dissolution of a marriage as equitable as possible. Davis v. Davis, 79 Ark. App. 178, 84 S.W.3d 447 (2002).

We have determined that the decree is incomplete and does not conclude the parties' rights to the subject matter in controversy. Under similar circumstances, where a divorce decree failed to divide part of the parties' property, we have dismissed an appeal for lack of finality. See Roberts v. Roberts, 70 Ark. App. 94, 14 S.W.3d 529 (2000). We also observe that the incomplete nature of the decree in this case could invite a subsequent appeal, which would thwart our policy to avoid piecemeal appeals. See generally French v. Brooks Sports Ctr., 57 Ark. App. 30, 940 S.W.2d 507 (1997). For example, one of the parties may disagreeas to the manner in which Mrs. Turner's share of the life-insurance policy is calculated or may disagree as to the manner in which the trial court divides the net proceeds of the sale. We note that both parties, in the argument portions of their briefs, reference pleadings or objections that have been filed since this appeal was commenced in which each party has questioned the manner in which the other has handled the property awaiting sale. In light of the foregoing, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final order. Our dismissal is without prejudice to re-file upon entry of an appealable order.

Dismissed.

Pittman and Vaught, J.J., agree.

1 The vehicles were mentioned in the trial court's letter opinion that preceded the entry of the decree, but the letter opinion was not incorporated or otherwise referred to in the decree.