ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

JOSEPHINE LINKER HART, JUDGE

DIVISION III

ERMA REDDING

APPELLANT

V.

J. THADEUS BECK, M.D., ET AL.

APPELLEES

CA02-1138

June 11, 2003

APPEAL FROM THE WASHINGTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. CV-2002-338]

HONORABLE KIM SMITH,

CIRCUIT JUDGE

AFFIRMED

Appellant Erma Redding appeals the trial court's dismissal with prejudice of her wrongful death action. For reversal, appellant argues that the trial court erred by determining that she had no standing to bring the suit in her sole name given that she is only one of five heirs at law of her deceased husband, Glenn Redding. Appellant asserts that the court had jurisdiction to hear her complaint for medical negligence that she had commenced within the two-year statute of limitations. We affirm.

Appellant's husband, Glenn Redding, died on March 9, 2000. On February 25, 2002, appellant filed a pro se complaint seeking to disinter and to have an autopsy performed on the body of her deceased husband. Appellant's complaint also appears, among other things, to assert a wrongful death action based on the medical malpractice of certain employees for appellee, Washington Regional Medical Center (WRMC), and Drs. J. Thaddeus Beck,

Daniel S. Bradford, Malcolm L. Hayward, Patrick M. Travis, and Gary L. Templeton.

Appellee WRMC filed a motion to dismiss the complaint based on appellant's failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and further, asserted that appellant had no standing to file the suit because she was not a proper party. Drs. Beck, Bradford, Hayward, Travis, and Templeton filed a motion to dismiss the complaint asserting, in part, that the suit was not brought by the decedent's personal representative and that not all of the heirs at law and next of kin were joined in the case. Appellees, therefore, concluded that the court was without jurisdiction to hear the case. On June 25, 2002, the trial court entered an order dismissing with prejudice appellant's complaint against appellees. From that order comes this appeal.

An appellant has the burden of demonstrating reversible error and presenting a record evidencing such error. RAD-Razorback Ltd. P'hip v. B.G. Coney Co., 289 Ark. 550, 713 S.W.2d 462 (1986). "When the appellant does not cite authority or make a convincing argument, and where it is not apparent without further research that the point is well taken, we will affirm." Qualls v. Ferritor, 329 Ark. 235, 237-38, 947 S.W.2d 10, 11 (1997). Pro se litigants are held to the same requirement as attorneys. Id. In reviewing a trial court's decision on a motion to dismiss, we treat the facts alleged in the complaint as true and view them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Davenport v. Lee, 348 Ark. 148, 72 S.W.3d 85 (2002). In determining the sufficiency of a complaint on a motion to dismiss, we resolve all reasonable inferences in favor of the complaint, and construe pleadings liberally. Id.

Although it is difficult to ascertain appellant's specific argument from her brief, itdoes appear that she is appealing the court's determination that she lacked standing to file an action for the wrongful death of her husband in her sole name because she was only one of five heirs at law and was not a properly appointed representative of the estate. In her argument, she asserts that she is a real party in interest and in support of her assertion she states, "[b]eing a participating person and being one of the victims and a witness to all the conspiracy and fraud by Malcolm Hayward and his Associates and many nurses which were also used, abused, victims unto my husband's, Glenn, death and I, Erma Redding am a real party in interest to these misconducts and I am also administration [sic] his estate."

At a hearing held on June 25, 2002, appellant testified that she was the decedent's sole heir, beneficiary, and proxy. However, she also stated that she and the decedent had one daughter, three sons, ten grandchildren, and one great-grandchild. Appellant also referred to the daughter, Trudy, in her pleadings. Included in appellant's brief is a copy of a pleading filed in the circuit court, which indicates that appellant was appointed administratrix of the estate of the decedent on December 6, 2002, some six months after her wrongful death complaint was dismissed.1

The wrongful death statute, codified at Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-62-102(b) (Supp. 2001), states that "[e]very action shall be brought by and in the name of the personal representative of the deceased person. If there is no personal representative, then the action shall be brought by the heirs at law of the deceased person." In Ramirez v. WhiteCounty Circuit Court, 343 Ark. 372, 38 S.W.3d 298 (2001), our supreme court held that an individual heir at law could not bring a wrongful death action in his sole name when he is not the only heir at law or the duly appointed personal representative of the estate.

In this case, the evidence established that at the time the complaint was filed, appellant was not the personal representative of the decedent's estate. Moreover, the evidence established that the suit was brought only in the name of appellant and not all of the decedent's heirs. The law is clear that when there is no personal representative of the decedent, a wrongful death action must be brought by all of the heirs at law. Ramirez, supra. Thus, the court was without jurisdiction to hear appellant's wrongful death action. Therefore, we affirm.

Affirmed.

Bird and Roaf, JJ., agree.

1 We note that the appointment of appellant as administratrix did not relate back to the filing of the original complaint. See McKibben v. Mullis, 79 Ark. App. 382, 90 S.W.3d 442 (2002).