ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

TERRY CRABTREE, JUDGE

DIVISION I

FREDRICK DELANEY

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

CACR 01-1199

NOVEMBER 13, 2002

APPEAL FROM THE SCOTT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. CR 2000-30]

HONORABLE PAUL EDWARD DANIELSON, JUDGE

AFFIRMED

A jury sitting in the Scott County Circuit Court found the appellant, Fredrick Delaney, guilty of possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court sentenced him to a total of six years' imprisonment in the Arkansas Department of Correction. On appeal, appellant maintains that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia. In addition, he claims that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence. We affirm.

On April 16, 2000, at approximately 1:00 p.m., Jason Kirkendoll approached Deputy Bill Black at the Scott County Jail. Mr. Kirkendoll, who lived at 645 Featherston in Waldron, Arkansas, told Deputy Black that appellant had been at his trailer for two days and had locked him out of it. Mr. Kirkendoll asked Deputy Black to remove appellant from his residence. Mr. Kirkendoll consented to a search of his trailer as part of Deputy Black's

investigation of whether someone at the trailer illegally possessed methamphetamine.

Deputy Black testified that when he arrived at the trailer, appellant was looking out the window. The deputy knew appellant because they were neighbors. Deputy Black stated that he immediately tried to open the front door, but it was locked. Deputy Black further stated that he knocked and said, "Sheriff's Office, open up." Trisha Kirkendoll, Jason's wife, opened the door and stated, "[Appellant] just went out the back door. He had some dope in his hand." Deputy Black testified that he looked down the hall and saw appellant exiting through the back door. The deputy followed appellant out of the trailer and ordered him to stop. When appellant finally stopped, Deputy Black asked him "where's the dope?" After appellant responded, "what dope?" Deputy Black told him that he would get the drug dog. Appellant asked if they could "flush [the drugs]." The deputy further testified that he again asked appellant where the contraband was, and appellant reached behind the air conditioner located next to the trailer and retrieved a plate containing 2.57 grams of methamphetamine. The plate also held a device for sniffing methamphetamine, which contained the drug's residue. The deputy immediately arrested appellant. Ms. Kirkendoll consented to Deputy Black searching the trailer, but the deputy did not find any contraband.

When they got to the county jail, appellant asked Deputy Black if he could tell "his story." After appellant signed the Miranda-rights waiver form, he gave a five-page written statement to Deputy Black. In the statement, appellant admitted that he put the methamphetamine behind the air conditioner unit and retrieved it when Deputy Black asked for it. After appellant was arrested, the Kirkendolls told Deputy Black that they wantedappellant's van removed from their property. The van was towed to the Scott County Jail, where Deputy Black seized various items of contraband pursuant to an inventory search.

Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia by specifically asserting that the State did not establish that the contraband seized from his van was drug paraphernalia. However, this was not the basis for appellant's directed-verdict motions made before the trial court. After the State rested its case in chief, appellant's counsel made the following directed-verdict motion, "Your Honor, at this time I would move for a directed verdict based on the insufficiency of the evidence. Testimony of the officer indicated that he found these items at the home of Jason and I believe Trish Kirkendoll." At the close of all of the evidence, defense counsel made the following motion:

Judge, again, I'd renew my motion and with testimony that some of the items the officer testified to that he took from [appellant's] vehicle was [sic] actually taken out of the residence. We've had two witnesses testify and identify those items and at least on the paraphernalia or some of the paraphernalia.

At trial, appellant argued that there was insufficient evidence to support the charge for possession of drug paraphernalia because the contraband was found at the Kirkendoll trailer and not in his van. Now, appellant claims that the State did not establish that the contraband he was charged with possessing was drug paraphernalia. As such, he has changed the grounds for his sufficiency challenge on appeal. It is well settled that an appellant may not change the grounds for objection on appeal; he is limited by the nature and scope of his objections and arguments below. Maxwell v. State, 73 Ark. App. 45, 41 S.W.3d 402 (2001). Consequently, we are precluded from addressing appellant's sufficiency argument.

Next, appellant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. When this court reviews a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we make an independent determination based upon the totality of the circumstances. Gilbert v. State, 341 Ark. 601, 19 S.W.3d 595 (2000). We will reverse a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress only if the ruling was clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Id. Because the determination of a preponderance of the evidence turns on questions of credibility and the weight to be given testimony, we defer to the trial judge's superior position in this regard. Lemons v. State, 310 Ark. 381, 836 S.W.2d 861 (1992).

Appellant's argument, as we understand it, is that the officer who stopped him did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him or to question him. Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.1 provides in part:

A law enforcement officer lawfully present in any place may, in the performance of his duties, stop and detain any person who he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed, or is about to commit (1) a felony, or (2) a misdemeanor involving danger of forcible injury to persons or of appropriation of or damage to property, if such action is reasonably necessary either to obtain or verify the identification of the person or to determine the lawfulness of his conduct.

Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.1 defines "reasonable suspicion" as:

a suspicion based on facts or circumstances which of themselves do not give rise to the probable cause requisite to justify a lawful arrest, but which give rise to more than a bare suspicion; that is, a suspicion that is reasonable as opposed to an imaginary or purely conjectural suspicion.

When the deputy arrived at the Kirkendoll trailer, he observed appellant looking outof the window. When Ms. Kirkendoll opened the door to the trailer she told him that appellant possessed contraband. Then, Deputy Black saw appellant exiting through the back door of the trailer. These facts gave rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary for Deputy Black to stop and detain appellant outside the trailer. Deputy Black acted lawfully when he approached appellant to ask him questions as part of his investigation.

Appellant's argument on appeal focuses on the validity of the stop by Deputy Black. We find it unpersuasive. We note that appellant did not argue in his brief that he was subjected to a custodial interrogation by Deputy Black outside the trailer. Therefore, we need not address whether appellant was entitled to Miranda warnings at that time. After reviewing the totality of the circumstances, we hold that the trial court's denial of appellant's motion to suppress was not clearly against a preponderance of the evidence.

Affirmed.

Jennings and Bird, JJ., agree.