ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

SAM BIRD, JUDGE

DIVISION I

YUHANNA CLINKSCALE,

APPELLANT

v.

STATE OF ARKANSAS,

APPELLEE

CACR02-166

NOVEMBER 6, 2002

APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,

SIXTH DIVISION, NO. CR2002-3389,

HON. DAVID BOGARD, JUDGE

AFFIRMED

Yuhanna Clinkscale engaged Little Rock police officer Aaron Manning in a high-speed car chase on September 25, 2000, which resulted in the death of an innocent citizen when Clinkscale's vehicle crashed into her vehicle. Clinkscale was charged with first-degree felony murder, fleeing, failure to stop after an accident involving injury or death, theft by receiving, and driving on a suspended license. The State nol-prossed the charges of theft by receiving and driving on a suspended license. Clinkscale was tried by a jury and convicted of the lesser-included offense of manslaughter, as well as fleeing, and failing to stop after an accident involving injury or death. He contends on appeal (1) that the trial court erred by overruling his best-evidence-rule objection to Officer Manning's testimony, and (2) that the trial court erred by denying his motions for directed verdict on the charges of manslaughter and fleeing. We affirm.

A motion for directed verdict is viewed as a challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence. Dodson v. State, 341 Ark. 41, 14 S.W.3d 489 (2000). We consider the sufficiency question before we consider any trial errors and it is only if the evidence is insufficient, including the errors, that we will reverse. Davis v. State, 318 Ark. 212, 885 S.W.2d 292 (1994).

Clinkscale contends that the trial court erred in denying his motions for directed verdict on the manslaughter and fleeing charges. He argues that the State did not prove the essential element of these crimes that Officer Manning was a duly authorized law-enforcement officer. Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-54-125(a)(Repl. 1997) provides that "if a person knows that his immediate arrest or detention is being attempted by a duly authorized law enforcement officer, it is the lawful duty of such person to refrain from fleeing, either on foot or by means of any vehicle or conveyance."

Officer Manning testified that he had attended the Little Rock Police Academy, that he had received certification as a law-enforcement officer, and that he was a certified law-enforcement officer at the time of the incident in this case. This testimony provided substantial evidence of Officer Manning's status as a duly authorized law-enforcement officer at the time of the incident, the essential element that Clinkscale argues was not proven by the State. Because the jury had before it substantial evidence of this element, the trial court did not err in denying Clinkscale's motions for directed verdict.

Clinkscale's remaining point of appeal is that the trial court erred by overruling his best-evidence-rule objection to Officer Manning's testimony. Clinkscale contends that the officer should not have been allowed to testify as to his certification because the writtencertification itself was the best evidence, and thus the best evidence rule was violated by allowing the introduction of the officer's testimony rather than requiring him to produce the certificate. We disagree.

The best-evidence rule, which is Arkansas Rule of Evidence 1002, requires that "[t]o prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the original writing, recording, or photograph is required . . . ." The best-evidence rule does not prohibit a party from offering alternative evidence other than a writing, when it is not the content of the writing that is in issue. See JAG Consulting v. Eubanks, 77 Ark. App. 232, 72 S.W.3d 549 (2002). Nor does the rule apply where a party seeks to prove a fact that has an existence independent of any writing, even though the fact might have been reduced to, or is evidenced by, a writing. Id. No evidentiary rule prohibits a witness from testifying to a fact simply because the fact also can be supported by written documentation. Id.

The certificate, the testimony, or both, could have been offered as proof of the fact that Officer Manning was a duly authorized law-enforcement officer at the time that Clinkscale fled from him. The State chose only to present the officer's testimony. The content of the certificate attesting to his certification was not in issue: in issue was whether the officer was certified, which was a fact that existed independent of the written certification even though his successful completion of training and certification had been reduced to and was evidenced by a writing. Therefore, the best-evidence rule had no application in this case, and the trial court did not err in overruling Clinkscale's objection to Officer Manning's testimony.

Affirmed.

Jennings and Crabtree, JJ., agree.