ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

JOHN B. ROBBINS, JUDGE

DIVISION III

ERIC HOLLOWAY

APPELLANT

V.

RILEY'S OAK HILL MANOR, INC.

APPELLEE

CA 02-74

OCTOBER 9, 2002

APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS

COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT,

[NO. E-99-141]

HONORABLE F. RUSSELL ROGERS,

JUDGE

AFFIRMED

Appellee Riley's Oak Hill Manor, Inc. brought an action against appellant Eric Holloway and Hattie Holloway1 to collect a debt owed in connection with treatment received by Hattie, who is Eric's mother. After a bench trial, the trial court ruled that Riley's was entitled to judgment against both Eric Holloway and Hattie Holloway for breach of contract, as well as on the alternative theories of unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel. The trial court awarded $6,664.20, in addition to interest, court costs, and attorney's fees. For reversal, appellant argues that the evidence does not support the judgment. We affirm.

Although we review chancery cases de novo, we will not reverse a chancellor's

finding of fact unless clearly erroneous. Salem v. Lane Processing Trust, 72 Ark. App. 340, 37 S.W.3d 664 (2001). A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Norman v. Moon Enterprises, Inc., 65 Ark. App. 246, 986 S.W.2d 134 (1999).

After suffering a broken hip, Hattie Holloway resided at appellee Riley's nursing home from March 20, 1995, until July 1995. Judy Weiss worked for Riley's during that time, and she testified that the initial paperwork was not filled out prior to Ms. Holloway's admission. She stated that soon thereafter she spoke with Eric Holloway on the telephone about payment arrangements and advised him to consult the Arkansas Department of Human Services to apply for Medicaid. Because Mr. Holloway was unable to come to the nursing home during working hours, Ms. Weiss prepared the paperwork and left copies for him to sign on a weekend. Mr. Holloway signed two admission agreements in the capacity of "responsible party." Each agreement contained the following provision:

Ms. Weiss indicted that the forms contained blanks because the facility is unable to determine each resident's rate of pay without first being contacted by the Arkansas Department of Human Services. One of the admission agreements provided:

Mr. Holloway was never able to obtain any Medicaid assistance with regard to services provided by Riley's.

A document with the heading "current month statement," and dated September 13, 1995, was admitted into evidence. The document provides:

Services for HOLLOWAY, HATTIE Cust # 2653

Previous Month Balance $ 7910.00

Payments Received $ 1245.80

Balance Forward $ 6664.20

Residence Service Charges 09/01/95-9/30/95 $ 0.00

Additional Charges Since 09/01/95

Total Amount Due $ 6664.20

Underneath the "Total Amount Due" are the following handwritten calculations:

April nursing care 28 days at $70.00 = $1960.00

May nursing care 31 days at $70.00 = $2170.00

June nursing care 30 days at $70.00 = $2100.00

July nursing care 24 days at $70.00 = $1680.00

Total charges $7910.00

May social security check ($346.00)

June social security check ($346.00)

July social security check ($346.00)

August insurance reimbursement ($207.80)

Also in the record are copies of several communications from Riley's to Mr. Holloway requesting payment of the outstanding bill.

Carolyn Ferguson, officer of asset services for the Area Agency on Aging, testified for the appellant. She stated that she received a telephone call from Mr. Holloway, and that he informed her that he owed six thousand dollars to the nursing home, but that he signedsome papers without knowing what he was signing. According to Ms. Ferguson, Mr. Holloway told her that no one explained the forms to him, and she was shocked because when a person is admitted to a nursing home, "there is always someone there to explain." In her opinion, the social worker who handled the admission process was negligent because she gave no explanation as to important parts of the agreement, including rates.

Mr. Holloway testified that he signed the forms with the intent that his mother would be admitted to the nursing home. He stated that he did not know he was going to be made responsible for the bill, and thought that social security or SSI would cover it. Mr. Holloway maintained that, "My sole purpose for signing was for her to be admitted, but not for me to be responsible for any kind of bill whatsoever." He stated that he was first approached about paying the bill on July 14, 1995, when he was trying to get his mother moved from the facility. On rebuttal, a Riley's employee testified that a bill for $1635.87 was sent to Mr. Holloway on April 27, 1995.

Mr. Holloway argues that the trial court erred in granting a judgment in favor of Riley's. He submits that he never intended to make himself obligated for his mother's nursing home expenses. Because there was no "meeting of the minds" with regard to any agreement to that effect, Mr. Holloway argues that the judgment against him was erroneously entered.

As support for his argument, Mr. Holloway cites our unpublished opinion Service Finance Corp. v. Hall, CA 86-123, which we delivered on October 22, 1986. However, pursuant to Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 5-2(d), our unpublished opinions "shall not becited, quoted or referred to by any court or in any argument, brief, or other materials presented to any court," subject to exceptions not applicable to this case. Therefore, we will not consider this case as authority and it should not have been cited in appellant's brief.

The next case cited by Mr. Holloway is St. John's Episcopal Hosp. v. McAdoo, 405 N.Y.S.2d 935 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1978). In that case, the defendant signed a contract that included an obligation to pay his estranged wife's hospital bill. However, the New York Civil Court refused to enforce the contract because, when the defendant signed it, he was convinced his wife was near death and the heading of the contract bore the heading, "ASSIGNMENT OF INSURANCE BENEFITS." Although the provisions of the contract stated that the defendant would be responsible for charges not covered by insurance, the court ruled against the hospital, announcing:

St. John's Episcopal Hosp. v. McAdoo, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 937. Mr. Holloway contends that the contract in the instant case should not be enforced against him because he was told that he had to sign the forms to keep his mother in the nursing home and had no reasonable alternative.

Finally, Mr. Holloway cites Rohrscheib v. Helena Hosp. Ass'n, 12 Ark. App. 6, 670 S.W.2d 812 (1984). In that case, appellant's sister-in-law had incurred in excess of $4000.00in medical bills, and appellant subsequently signed an admission sheet on the line marked, "Signature of Responsible Party." We reversed in favor of appellant because there was no promise on his part to pay the debt; although the admission sheet used the words "responsible party," it failed to provide what that party was responsible for. We further held that the contract was unenforceable for lack of consideration because the original debt had already been incurred, and "[t]he mere naked promise in writing to pay the existing debt of another without any consideration therefor is void." Rohrscheib v. Helena Hosp. Ass'n, 12 Ark. App. at 10, 670 S.W.2d at 815.

We hold that this case is distinguishable from those cited by Mr. Holloway, and that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that Mr. Holloway breached an enforceable contract. Although not binding on this court, the reasoning employed in St. John's Episcopal Hosp. v. McAdoo, supra, is not applicable to the facts of the instant case because in that case the contract was signed under the trauma of an emergency medical crisis, whereas in this case no such emergency existed. Moreover, Mr. Holloway testified under oath in his deposition that, unlike Mr. McAdoo, he read the forms in detail and felt like he understood everything when he signed them.

In the case at bar, the contract signed by Mr. Holloway clearly states in several different provisions that as a "responsible party" he is charged with making payments to Riley's to cover his mother's treatment. This contrasts with the facts of Rohrscheib v. Helena Hosp. Ass'n, supra, because the contract in that case failed to provide that the "responsible party" was responsible for any expenses. And while we further stated in thatcase that the contract was without sufficient consideration, such is not the case here because when Mr. Holloway signed the contract he was agreeing to be responsible for payment for future treatment of his mother, and not simply an existing debt. While a contract must be supported by consideration, the consideration does not have to flow directly to the person making the promise, but may move from the promisor to a third person. See Guinn v. Holcombe, 29 Ark. App. 206, 780 S.W.2d 30 (1989). Consequently, the holdings we announced in Rohrscheib v. Helena Hosp. Ass'n, supra, are simply of no avail to Mr. Holloway in this appeal.

Alternatively, appellant argues that the judgment was excessive because the only testimony about any specific amount owed at trial was in the form of Riley's rebuttal witness, who stated Mr. Holloway was sent a bill for $1635.87 on April 27, 1995. We reject this argument because appellant admitted in his answer that Ms. Holloway incurred charges of $7910.00, $6640.20 of which remains unpaid. Moreover, the "current month statement" admitted into evidence reflected an outstanding debt of $6640.20.

We hold that the trial court committed no error in finding a breach of contract and in awarding the appellee $6664.20 on that basis. Thus, we need not address its decision that, even in the absence of a breach, the appellee is entitled to judgment on the theories of unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel.

Affirmed.

Pittman and Bird, JJ., agree.

1 Although the transcript and appellant's brief reflect codefendant Hattie Holloway as co-appellant, there was no notice of appeal filed by her or on her behalf. Only Eric Holloway has appealed.