ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

WENDELL L. GRIFFEN, JUDGE

DIVISION III

CACR01-1165

September 25, 2002

JAMES E. DAVIS AN APPEAL FROM CROSS

APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[CR00-223]

V. HON. HARVEY YATES, JUDGE

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE AFFIRMED

Appellant James E. Davis was charged with delivery of a controlled substance in violation of Ark. Code Ann. § 5-64-401 (Repl. 1997). At the conclusion of the State's presentation of evidence, defense counsel moved for a directed verdict, which the circuit court denied. A jury subsequently convicted Davis of the above charge, and he was sentenced to twenty-seven and a half years in the Arkansas Department of Correction. Davis now argues that the circuit court erred in not granting his motion for directed verdict because inconsistencies in the witnesses' testimony make for insufficient proof to sustain a conviction for delivery of crack cocaine. We affirm.

We treat a motion for a directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of theevidence. Barr v. State, 336 Ark. 220, 984 S.W.2d 792 (1999). In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and consider only the evidence that supports the guilty verdict. Burmingham v. State, 342 Ark. 95, 27 S.W.3d 351 (2000). We will affirm a conviction if there is substantial evidence to support it. Fairchild v. State, 349 Ark. 147, 76 S.W.3d 884 (2002). Substantial evidence is evidence that is of sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one way or the other, without having to resort to speculation or conjecture. Carmichael v. State, 340 Ark. 598, 12 S.W.3d 225 (2000). Circumstantial evidence may meet the substantial evidence test if it is consistent with the defendant's guilt and inconsistent with any other reasonable conclusion, which is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact. Harshaw v. State, 348 Ark. 62, 71 S.W.3d 548 (2002).

As part of the State's case, Rebecca Thompson testified that on January 21, 2000, while working as a confidential informant, she purchased crack cocaine from Davis who came to her home in a maroon Caprice or a similar automobile. Officer McGinnis testified that on January 21, 2000, he and Officer Arnold went to the home of Thompson to arrange a drug purchase between her and Davis. He performed a body search of Thompson to make sure she did not have any drugs or extra money already on her person and then wired her with a body mike and transmitter. Officer McGinnis stated that he and Officer Arnold left Thompson in the house to page Davis. Shortly thereafter, he observed an unidentifiable African-American male in a maroon Pontiac Grand Am drive up to Thompson's residenceand Thompson walk over to that vehicle. Officer McGinnis testified that he heard Thompson hand the male in the car fifty dollars in exchange for crack cocaine. When the car drove off, he and Officer Arnold followed the car so that they could positively identify the driver. Once the car entered a lit area, he saw that Davis was driving the car. Thereafter, he and Officer Arnold returned to Thompson's residence and searched her again. They retrieved three off-white rock substances. Roy Adams, a forensic drug chemist for the state crime lab, testified that his test of the three off-white substances revealed the substances to be 0.225 grams of cocaine.

Officer Arnold testified that the Wynne police department had developed Thompson as a confidential informant. Officer Arnold stated that on January 21, 2000, he and Officer McGinnis met with Thompson at which time she was instructed to page Davis and order a quantity of cocaine. Thompson was searched for money and contraband, a body mike was placed on her, and she was given money to purchase drugs. Officer Arnold stated that he knew Davis from prior contacts with him. He testified that Davis was the person who drove the maroon Pontiac Grand Am seen at the Thompson house and who sold Thompson drugs on January 21, 2000.

Davis contends that his motion for directed verdict should have been granted because the following variables raised problems with the State's evidence: Thompson was unemployed at the time of the alleged drug buy; Thompson would not have received the one hundred dollar informant's fee unless she had bought drugs that day; the officers did not record the serial numbers of the buy money; Thompson was not strip searched beforeshe allegedly bought the drugs; and the officers were not present when Thompson allegedly paged Davis. However, these arguments raise issues of credibility, not sufficiency of the evidence, and issues of credibility are to be resolved by the trier of fact. Barnett v. State, 346 Ark. 11, 53 S.W.3d 527 (2001).

Moreover, we have held that inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses do not cause proof to be insufficient as a matter of law. Rawls v. State, 327 Ark. 34, 937 S.W.2d 637 (1997). Furthermore, the unequivocal testimony of a witness identifying the accused as the offender has been considered sufficient enough evidence for presentation to the jury. Id. Here, three witnesses identified Davis as the person who sold the crack cocaine to Thompson on January 21, 2000. Clearly, when viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict of guilty of delivery of a controlled substance.

Affirmed.

Pittman and Roaf, JJ., agree.