ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

JOHN F. STROUD, JR., CHIEF JUDGE

DIVISION IV

WILLIE ALBERT JOHNSON

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

CACR 01-1147

September 25, 2002

APPEAL FROM THE HOT SPRING

COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[CR00-276-2]

HONORABLE PHILLIP H. SHIRRON,

CIRCUIT JUDGE

AFFIRMED

Appellant, Willie Johnson, was tried by a jury and convicted of raping, K.L., a fifteen-year-old girl, by forcible compulsion. He was sentenced to ten years in the Arkansas Department of Correction. We affirm.

Mary Mendenhall, K.L.'s aunt and guardian, testified that appellant was her nephew; that he came to Arkansas in March 2000 for K.L.'s mother's funeral; and that he remained in Arkansas after the funeral. On November 8, 2000, Mendenhall stated that she received a call from K.L. that concerned her. She said that K.L. was upset and was acting scared, and based upon statements that K.L. made concerning the appellant, Mendenhall took her to the hospital and called the police.

Dr. Shawn Purifoy testified that he performed a rape-kit examination on K.L. and that he was able to determine that she had had intercourse. He stated that he was not able todetermine at what time the intercourse occurred, and that there were no obvious signs of trauma. During the doctor's testimony, appellant's counsel stated on the record that "in order to save time, we are not challenging the fact that the defendant had sex with the alleged victim. The rape kit is not involved, we're admitting that there was sexual contact."

K.L. testified that in November 2000 she was fifteen years old. She stated that in March or April of 2000, she was at Troy Mendenhall's house because of all the "family stuff" concerning her mother's funeral. She explained that she refers to Troy Mendenhall as her dad and Mary Mendenhall as her mother even though they are not really her parents. She stated that at that time appellant was also staying at Troy's house. One night, Troy left to get her something to eat, and appellant "started feeling and stuff all over me . . . ." She stated that she pushed him away and told him to "go on"; that he held her down and told her he wanted to have sex with her; and that he told her if she told anyone, he would kill her. She said that he took her clothes off; that she continued to tell him no; that she said she was going to tell her "daddy"; and that he told her he would kill her if she did. She said that after he took off her clothes, he "had sex with me." She said that she did not tell Mary Mendenhall about this because she was scared and afraid that he would kill her.

K.L. explained that in November 2000, she arrived home from school at approximately 3:30. She said that someone knocked on the door and that she went to see who it was. She stated that it was appellant and that he told her he had come to get some pictures he had left there, so she let him in the house. She said that he acted as if he were looking for the pictures; that "he played like he was going to leave out the door"; and thathe then pushed her, shut the door, and locked it. She said that he told her "I want some, I want some"; that he pushed her on the couch and held her down; that he pulled off her clothes "and did that[, and t]hen he got up." She said that he told her if she told anyone, she knew what would happen. She said that she told him she would not tell anyone, but when he left she called Troy and Mary Mendenhall.

At the conclusion of the State's case, appellant moved for a directed verdict, contending that the only evidence presented by the State of a forcible-compulsion rape was the victim's testimony and that her testimony contained inconsistencies. The motion was denied.

Appellant testified and admitted having sex with the victim. However, he denied that he forced her to have sex. His motions for directed verdict at the close of his case and at the close of rebuttal were denied.

Appellant raises two points of appeal: 1) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting into evidence testimony of appellant's other crimes, wrongs, or acts under Rule 404(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence; 2) the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion for directed verdict. We find no error with respect to either point of appeal.

For double jeopardy reasons, we first consider appellant's contention that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Stone v. State, 348 Ark. 661, 74 S.W.3d 591 (2002). Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict because "the only evidence of a forcible rape on the victim was the testimony of the victim." A motion for a directed verdict is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Puckett v. State, 324 Ark. 81, 918 S.W.2d 707 (1996). In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, this court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and sustains the judgment of conviction if there is substantial evidence to support it. Id. Evidence is substantial if it is of sufficient force and character to compel reasonable minds to reach a conclusion and pass beyond suspicion and conjecture. Id. Only the evidence supporting the conviction need be considered. Id.

Moreover, Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-14-103 (Repl. 1997) provides in pertinent part:

"Forcible compulsion" is defined as "physical force or a threat, express or implied, of death or physical injury to or kidnapping of any person." Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-101(2) (Repl. 1997).

As our supreme court explained in Puckett v. State, supra, the testimony of the rape victim alone suffices and need not be corroborated, and to the extent there are inconsistencies in the rape victim's testimony, it is a matter of credibility for the jury to resolve. Here, the victim testified that appellant held her down and that he threatened to kill her. Her testimony alone established a sufficient show of force to meet the statutory definition of forcible compulsion, and thus there was substantial evidence to support appellant's conviction.

In arguing his remaining point of appeal, the evidence about which appellant complains is the victim's testimony concerning the April 2000 sexual encounter with him. The rape charge at issue here was based upon the November 2000 incident, not the April 2000 incident. He argues that the evidence concerning the April incident should have been excluded pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence, and that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence. We disagree.

Rule 404(b) provides:

In ruling on the matter in limine, the trial court explained that it was going to allow the proof because it showed motive, intent, and design. We find no abuse of the court's discretion in allowing this testimony.

Affirmed.

Hart and Robbins, JJ., agree.