ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

JOHN MAUZY PITTMAN, JUDGE

DIVISION III

TRACY ANN OWEN

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

CACR01-851

September 25, 2002

APPEAL FROM THE BOONE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. CR-99-214]

HON. ROBERT MCCORKINDALE, II, JUDGE

AFFIRMED

The appellant's house was searched pursuant to a warrant. A large quantity of drugs was found. She was convicted of numerous drug-related offenses, including possession of over ten pounds of marijuana with intent to deliver, and given an aggregate sentence of sixty-seven years in the Arkansas Department of Correction. This appeal followed.

For reversal, appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for possession of more than ten pounds of marijuana with intent to deliver; that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress items seized following the search, which she asserts to have been illegal because the affidavit supporting the warrant did not establish the reliability of the informant; that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of marijuana found at the residence of other parties; and that the trial court erred in continuing the trial in appellant's absence after she fled following the first day of trial. We affirm.

With regard to the sufficiency of the evidence, appellant made a motion for a directed verdict on all charges, listing them individually and stating the grounds for the objection. With respect to the charge of possession of more than ten pounds of marijuana with intent to deliver, appellant stated, "[W]e would make - ask for a directed verdict, Your Honor, on insufficiency of any evidence that's been presented by the State in this case."

A general motion that merely asserts that the State has failed to prove its case is inadequate to preserve the issue for appeal. Gardner v. State, 76 Ark. App. 258, 64 S.W.3d 761 (2001). The objection in the present case, quite clearly, is merely a general objection to the sufficiency of the evidence that neither cites any grounds therefor nor points to any specific element of proof that is lacking. In contrast, the sufficiency argument advanced on appeal by appellant is that the State failed to prove that the quantity of marijuana possessed by appellant was in excess of ten pounds. This argument was not specifically raised below and is not preserved for appeal.

Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress items seized following the search of her home. Appellant argues that the search was illegal because the affidavit in support of the warrant did not establish the reliability of a confidential informant, and therefore failed to establish probable cause to believe that appellant was engaged in drug activity. We do not agree.

In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress, we make an independent examination of the issue based on the totality of the circumstances; we will reverse only if the trial court's ruling was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Stanton v. State, 344 Ark. 589, 42 S.W.3d 474 (2001).

When an affidavit in a search warrant is based, in whole or in part, on hearsay, the affiant must set forth particular facts bearing on the informant's reliability and shall disclose, as far as practicable, the means by which the information was obtained. Owens v. State, 325 Ark. 110, 926 S.W.2d 650 (1996); Ark. R. Crim. P. 13.1(b). In deciding whether to issue the warrant, the magistrate should make a practical, common-sense determination based on the totality of the circumstances set forth in the affidavit.

The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a "substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing] that probable cause existed.

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983) (citations omitted). A deficiency in the informant's "veracity" or "reliability" and his "basis of knowledge" "may be compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or bysome other indicia of reliability." Gates, 462 U.S. at 233; see Wyatt v. State, 75 Ark. App. 1, 54 S.W.3d 549 (2001).

Factors to be considered in determining an informant's reliability include whether the informant's statements are (1) incriminating; (2) based on personal observations of recent criminal activity; and (3) corroborated by other information. Stanton v. State, supra. Failure of the affidavit to establish the veracity and bases of knowledge of persons providing information to the affiant is not fatal to the warrant application so long as the affidavit, viewed as a whole, provides a substantial basis for a finding of reasonable cause to believe that things subject to seizure will be found in a particular place. Ark. R. Crim. P. 13.1(b).

In the present case, much of the information provided by the confidential informant was corroborated either by identical information provided by a named informant, or by independent police investigation. Viewing the affidavit in its entirety in light of the totality of the circumstances, we cannot say that the trial judge erred in denying appellant's motion to suppress.

Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of additional marijuana found at the residence of other parties. Appellant objected to the admission of marijuana found in the houses of other parties on the grounds that it had not been linked to appellant. The trial judge admitted the evidence subject to further testimony to connect the marijuana to appellant. Although this further testimony was not forthcoming before theState rested its case, appellant did not renew her objection to the introduction of the exhibit, and her earlier objection was therefore waived:

Appellant contends that his objection prior to trial was a continuous one. We disagree. The pretrial objection resulted in a preliminary or qualified ruling similar to that presented in Byrum v. State, 318 Ark. 87, 884 S.W.2d 248 (1994), where the trial court made a preliminary ruling and Byrum failed to object when the witness testified at trial. In the preliminary ruling in Byrum, the court stated, "I believe it is excited utterance based on what I have heard about it so far," Id. at 93, 252 (emphasis in original). Here, the court's statement that the testimony would be admissible "with what the court knows at this time" was clearly a preliminary or qualified ruling. To preserve the point for appeal, appellant was required to renew his objection when the testimony was elicited at trial. We will not review a matter on which the trial court has not ruled. In order to preserve a point for appellate review, a party must obtain a ruling from the trial court. Jordan v. State, 323 Ark. 628, 632, 917 S.W.2d 164, 166 (1996). The burden of obtaining a ruling is on the movant; matters left unresolved are waived and may not be raised on appeal. Parmley v. Moose, 317 Ark. 52, 57, 876 S.W.2d 243, 246 (1994).

Alexander v. State, 335 Ark. 131, 133-34, 983 S.W.2d 110, 111 (1998). Because this argument was waived at trial, we will not address it on appeal.

Finally, appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion for a new trial because, she asserts, she was not present at the second day of the trial because her attorney advised her to flee. We find no merit in this argument. First, it is within the trial court's discretion to continue a trial in absentia if the defendant is present at the beginning of trial but afterward fails to appear. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-89-103(2)(A)(i) (Supp. 2001). Second, the trial court was simply not required to believe appellant's testimony that she was compelled to flee because her attorney had given her money and directed her to do so. Third, contrary to appellant's assertion, there is nothing before us to show that appellant'sArkansas attorney was not present on the second day of trial. We find no abuse of discretion.

Affirmed.

Roaf and Griffen, JJ., agree.