ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

JOHN F. STROUD, JR., CHIEF JUDGE

DIVISION IV

DERRICK TYDELL AMOS

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

CACR 01-1325

September 18, 2002

APPEAL FROM THE HOT SPRING

COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[CR99-104-2]

HONORABLE PHILLIP

H. SHIRRON, CIRCUIT JUDGE

AFFIRMED

Derrick Tyrell Amos was found guilty by a Hot Spring County jury of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver and was sentenced to twenty years in the Arkansas Department of Correction. On appeal, Amos argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict and by admitting certain exhibits into evidence because the State failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody. We affirm.

At trial, Officer Donnie Tabor, a police officer with the Malvern Police Department, testified that on March 31, 1999, he observed a vehicle run a stop sign; he followed the vehicle, turned on his red light and siren, and attempted to pull it over. The driver did not stop; instead, he accelerated and did not stop until he ran off the road and struck a tree. The driver exited the vehicle and fled on foot, but not before he looked at Officer Tabor. After losing the driver in a foot chase, Officer Tabor returned to the vehicle, turned off the engine, and discovered two plastic bags he suspected contained rock cocaine and marijuana in plain view on the car console. The state crime lab later determined that the bags contained 7.9 grams of marijuana and 7.709 grams of cocaine base, respectively. An inventory of the car revealed a pager, an envelope with the name Dorene Luster on it, and in the glove compartment, a photograph. It was later determined that the license plate was registered to Dorene Luster.

Margaret Cothern, a Malvern Police Department radio operator and dispatcher, testified that the following day she received a telephone call from a person purporting to be Dorene Luster, and that as a result of that conversation she indicated to Officer Tabor that the person driving the vehicle the previous night might have been Derrick Amos. As a result of that information, Officer Tabor found photographs of Amos at the police station, and he positively identified Amos as the driver of the vehicle from the previous night.

On appeal, Amos argues that the only evidence presented connecting him with the crime was Officer Tabor's testimony identifying him as the person he saw "for a moment during the pursuit of the suspect," and that there was no evidence from which the jury could have rendered a guilty verdict without resorting to speculation and conjecture. A directed-verdict motion is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Ward v. State, 64 Ark. App. 120, 981 S.W.2d 96 (1998). When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, we consider only the evidence that supports the verdict, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Harris v. State, 72 Ark. App. 227, 35 S.W.3d 819 (2000). The test is whether there is substantial evidence to support the verdict, which is evidence that is ofsufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one way or another. Id. Resolution of conflicts in testimony and assessment of witness credibility are for the fact-finder. Id.

The testimony of one eyewitness is sufficient to sustain a conviction. Lenoir v. State, 77 Ark. App. 250, 72 S.W.3d 899 (2002). It is the duty of the finder of fact to weigh the evidence and credibility of the witnesses, not the duty of this court. Id. In this case, Officer Tabor testified that he was positive that Amos was the driver of the car in which he found the marijuana and rock cocaine; the jury was entitled to believe this testimony. There was sufficient evidence presented to support Amos's conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to deliver.

Amos also argues that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence State's exhibits three and four, which were the cocaine and marijuana, because the State failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody. In Guydon v. State, 344 Ark. 251, 39 S.W.3d 767 (2001), our supreme court held:

We have consistently stated that the purpose of establishing a chain of custody is to prevent the introduction of evidence that is not authentic or that has been tampered with. To prove authenticity of evidence the State must demonstrate a reasonable probability that the evidence has not been altered in any significant manner. To allow introduction of physical evidence, it is not necessary that every moment from the time the evidence comes into the possession of a law enforcement agency until it is introduced at trial be accounted for by every person who could have conceivably come in contact with the evidence during that period. Nor is it necessary that every possibility of tampering be eliminated; it is only necessary that the trial judge, in his discretion, be satisfied that the evidence presented is genuine and, in reasonable probability, has not been tampered with. On review, we will not reverse a ruling on an evidentiary matter regarding the admissibility of evidence absent an abuse of discretion because such matters are left to the sound discretion of the trial court.

344 Ark. at 255, 39 S.W.3d at 769-70 (citations omitted).

In the present case, Officer Tabor identified the exhibits as the drugs that he removed from the car driven by appellant. He testified that he placed the drugs into envelopes sealed with stickers so that no one could tamper with or open the envelopes, and he identified the writing on the envelope as his own. Officer Tabor stated that the drugs were then transported to the crime lab for analysis. Dan Hedges, the forensic chemist who tested the substances at the crime lab, testified that it was the crime lab's policy to take evidence only in a sealed condition and that the substances would had to have been sealed when he received them. He said that he cut into the sealed packages to remove the evidence for analysis and sealed the packages again after the analyses had been performed. Hedges identified the envelopes and explained that he had placed his initials on them to show that they contained the substances that he had tested. Amos has never contended, either at trial or on appeal, that the packages were tampered with or that the substances were not authentic. Given the above testimony and our standard of review, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting the two exhibits.

Affirmed.

Hart and Robbins, JJ., agree.