ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

OLLY NEAL, Judge

DIVISION I

CACR01-1378

SEPTEMBER 11, 2002

SHELBY WINKLER AN APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

v. [CR 2000-686]

STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE MARION A. HUMPHREY, APPELLEE JUDGE

REMANDED

Appellant was charged by information with an aggregate of fourteen offenses: six aggravated robbery charges, seven theft of property charges, and one aggravated assault charge. The aggravated assault charge, one count of aggravated robbery, and one count of theft of property were nolle prossed. Following a jury trial, appellant was found guilty of committing aggravated robbery against (1) Tamara Gore of Friday's Flower Shop on November 23, 1999, (2) Sara Willis of Catherine's on December 13, 1999, (3) Cyndi Holt of Sally's Beauty Supply on December 2, 1999, (4) Lori Nigor of Understatements on December 17, 1999, and (5) Carolyn Spradley of Understatements on December 17, 1999. Appellant was also found guilty of misdemeanor theft of property as to (1) Friday's Flower Shop on November 23, 1999, (2) Terri Craig on November 23, 1999, (3) Catherine's onDecember 13, 1999, (4) Sally's Beauty Supply on December 2, 1999, (5) Understatements on December 17, 1999, and (6) Carolyn Spradley on December 17, 1999. Appellant was sentenced as an habitual offender to concurrently serve sixty years on each aggravated robbery count. The misdemeanor theft of property counts were merged by application of law.

On appeal, appellant contends that the judgment and commitment order filed May 15, 2001, is incorrect in that it imposes sentences for convictions for seven counts of aggravated robbery instead of five, and shows convictions for seven counts of misdemeanor theft of property instead of six. Further, appellant contends that the order incorrectly recites that all of the offenses occurred on November 23, 1999, when only three of the eleven counts occurred on that date. Appellant requests that the case be remanded to the trial court for entry of a correct and proper judgment and commitment order. We remand so that a corrected judgment and commitment order may be entered.

Appellant was charged by information with six aggravated robbery counts, seven theft of property counts, and one aggravated assault count. The aggravated assault count, one aggravated robbery count and one theft of property count were nolle prossed before reaching the jury. The jury found appellant guilty of five counts of aggravated robbery and six counts of misdemeanor theft of property. The trial court entered a judgment and commitment order that reflected that appellant was convicted of seven counts of aggravated robbery and seven counts of misdemeanor theft of property. It also showed that two counts of aggravated assault were nolle prossed. Because the trial court erroneously entered an order thatconvicted appellant of offenses that were never before the jury, the entry of convictions on those charges was void. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-105(a) (1987). A sentence is void when the trial court lacks authority to impose it. Ashe v. State, 57 Ark. App. 99, 942 S.W.2d 267 (1997). Therefore, we remand this matter to the trial court for entry of a proper judgment and commitment order.

The judgment and commitment order further evidences that all of the offenses occurred on November 23, 1999. While it is apparent from the record that all of said offenses did not occur on the same date, appellant does not demonstrate how he has been prejudiced by the erroneous date inserted in the judgment. We do not reverse a judgment for harmless or non-prejudicial irregularities, and we consider the matter of the erroneous date to be both harmless and non-prejudicial. Hill v. State, 261 Ark. 711, 551 S.W.2d 200 (1977). Nevertheless, because we remand this matter for other reasons, the trial court may deem it appropriate to also enter the correct date for each offense.

Remanded.

Baker, J., agrees.

Bird, J., concurs.

Sam Bird, Judge, concurring. I agree with the majority to remand this case to the trial court for the correction of its obviously incorrect judgment and commitment order. This separate opinion is provided solely for the purpose of noting that there is nothing apparent from the record of this case to indicate why it was necessary for appellant's counsel to pursue an appeal to correct this obvious error rather than requesting the trial court tocorrect its order. I recognize that Winkler is not precluded from pursuing this issue on appeal, but he could have much more easily and less expensively obtained a corrected judgment and commitment order by directing his request to the trial court. See McCuen v. State, 338 Ark. 631, 999 S.W.2d 682 (1999). There is no explanation in the record as to why Winkler would have been prevented from pursuing the more cost-effective and efficient alternative of simply asking the trial court to correct its mistake. Only if the trial court had refused this request would an appeal have been necessary.