ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

TERRY CRABTREE, JUDGE

DIVISION II

BEN OLAN PIERCE

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

CACR 01-1287

SEPTEMBER 4, 2002

APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. CR 2000-3412]

HONORABLE JOHN W. LANGSTON, JUDGE

AFFIRMED

Appellant, Ben Olan Pierce, was convicted at a bench trial of possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with the intent to deliver. He was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment in the Arkansas Department of Correction. Appellant argues on appeal that the State failed to offer sufficient evidence to establish constructive possession of the crack cocaine. We disagree and affirm.

On August 24, 2000, a search warrant was executed on the appellant's residence. At the time the officers entered the home, the appellant was found in the front room lying on a mattress. There were four, possibly five, other people in the residence at the time the search warrant was executed. Vincent Lewis and Tammy Guydon were in the kitchen. The appellant, Mary Alice McMonigle, and Kathy Blackwell were in the front room. One man was mentioned in the trial transcript, David Colvin, but his location in the house was never

disclosed and it was not clear if he was actually in the residence at the time of the search. Cocaine was found in the freezer in the kitchen, on the counter in the kitchen in plain view, and wrapped in a dollar bill in the middle bedroom. Although no cocaine or paraphernalia was found on the appellant's person, a crack pipe with residue was found on the floor next to the mattress on which he was lying. Another crack pipe was also found underneath the mattress. Detective Merritt of the Little Rock Police Department testified that the appellant told him that he lived at the residence, but that the other persons present "force[d] their way in [the residence to] sell dope." Detective Merritt also testified that the appellant informed him that these persons gave him crack cocaine, but he had no control over them "taking over" his home while he was there. Another Little Rock Police Officer, Detective Jackson, testified that he had previously used an informant to make a "controlled narcotics purchase" from the appellant's residence.

When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, we consider only the evidence that supports the verdict, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Young v. State, 77 Ark. App. 245, 247, 72 S.W.3d 895, 897 (2002). The test is whether there is substantial evidence to support the verdict. Substantial evidence is evidence that is forceful enough to compel a conclusion one way or the other beyond speculation or conjecture. Id. It is the responsibility of the trier of fact to determine the credibility of the witnesses. Kelley v. State, 75 Ark. App. 144, 55 S.W.3d 309 (2001).

The issue in the case at bar is whether the State offered sufficient evidence to show that the appellant was in constructive possession of the contraband. The law does not requirethe State to prove actual or physical possession in order to prove the defendant was in possession of a controlled substance. Mayo v. State, 70 Ark. App. 453, 20 S.W.3d 419 (2000). Constructive possession can be proved by showing that the defendant had control, or the right to control, the contraband. Id. This court has stated:

Constructive possession may be implied where the contraband is found in a place immediately and exclusively accessible to the defendant and subject to his control. Where there is joint occupancy of the premises where the contraband is seized, some additional factor must be found to link the accused to the contraband. In such instances, the State must prove that the accused exercised care, control, and management over the contraband and also that the accused knew that the matter possessed was contraband.

Gwatney v. State, 75 Ark. App. 331, 335, 57 S.W.3d 247, 250 (2001) (citations omitted).

Appellant admitted that the house was his residence. He also stated to detectives that he knew that the other people present were in possession of cocaine and selling it. He stated that he did not have control over their presence in his home, but he also readily admitted that he accepted crack cocaine from them. We can infer that appellant had control and knowledge from the circumstances, such as the proximity of the contraband to the accused, whether or not the contraband is in plain view, and the ownership of the property where the contraband is found. Nichols v. State, 306 Ark. 417, 420, 815 S.W.2d 382, 384 (1991).

In this case, the appellant was found right next to and on top of two crack pipes. There was cocaine or drug paraphernalia in almost every room in his home. There was cocaine found in plain view on the kitchen counter, and the appellant admitted to police that he was aware that the other people present in his home had cocaine and were selling it. Appellant also admitted to the detectives that it was his residence in which the contrabandwas located. These circumstances, including his own statements to the police, would allow the trier of fact to infer and conclude that the appellant did have control over the contraband and had the knowledge that it was contraband. Although the appellant told police that the cocaine was not his, the trial court was not required to believe his denial of ownership. See Mayo, supra at 456, 20 S.W.3d at 421. The trier of fact can accept or reject any statements made by the appellant because he has the greatest interest in the outcome of the case. Harris v. State, 72 Ark. App. 227, 232, 35 S.W.3d 819, 823 (2000). The facts and circumstances arising from the search of the appellant's residence provide substantial evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that the appellant was in constructive possession of cocaine. We affirm the appellant's conviction for possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver.

Affirmed.

Jennings and Vaught, JJ., agree.