ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

JOHN MAUZY PITTMAN, JUDGE

DIVISION III

CARL ELBERT JOHNSON

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

CACR01-1024

August 28 , 2002

APPEAL FROM THE FULTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. CR-97-61]

HON. JOHN DAN KEMP, JR.,

JUDGE

AFFIRMED

The appellant in this criminal case was on probation when law enforcement officers learned of methamphetamine activity at his residence. A search of the residence revealed methamphetamine and components of a methamphetamine lab, as well as marijuana seeds in two separate containers on a dresser in appellant's bedroom. Appellant was convicted of attempted manufacture of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. This appeal followed.

For reversal, appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of attempted manufacture of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia, and that the trial court erred in denying his motion for severance of defendants. We affirm.

We first address the sufficiency of the evidence to support appellant's conviction of attempted manufacture of methamphetamine. Arkansas Code Annotated § 5-64-401(a) proscribes the unauthorized manufacture or delivery of a controlled substance such as methamphetamine. Arkansas Code Annotated § 5-3-201 provides that a person attempts to commit an offense if he, inter alia, purposely engages in conduct that constitutes a substantial step in a course of conduct intended to culminate in the commission of an offense. Therefore, the question before us is whether there is substantial evidence to support a finding that appellant purposely undertook a substantial step in a course of conduct intended to culminate in the manufacture of methamphetamine. Our standard of review is well-settled:

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, this court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the State and will affirm if there is any substantial evidence to support the finding of guilt. Substantial evidence is evidence of such force and character that it will, with reasonable and material certainty, compel a conclusion one way or the other. Circumstantial evidence may constitute substantial evidence. While circumstantial evidence must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence, this becomes a question for the factfinder to determine.

Armstrong v. State, 45 Ark. App. 72, 76, 871 S.W.2d 420, 423 (1994) (citations omitted).

Viewed in that light, the record shows that Billy Chatman had been staying at appellant's house for three weeks, and that he manufactured methamphetamine in the house during that time. The only real question is whether there was sufficient evidence to support an inference that appellant purposely engaged in conduct to help Chatman do so. There was evidence that numerous items associated with the manufacture of methamphetamine werefound in common areas of the home; that Chatman admitted that he was manufacturing methamphetamine in appellant's kitchen; that the manufacture of methamphetamine produced a strong odor; that Chatman asked for help when five police cars arrived in the driveway and ran to the back room; that appellant went to the back room with Chatman when the police arrived; that people in the back room were engaged in hiding articles involved in the manufacture of methamphetamine when the police entered the house; and that appellant tested positive for methamphetamine and marijuana use after the raid. We hold that this constitutes sufficient evidence to support findings that appellant knew that methamphetamine was being manufactured in his home, and that he aided the enterprise by allowing his premises to be used for that purpose.

With regard to the sufficiency of the evidence to support appellant's conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia, there was evidence that two containers filled with marijuana seeds, together with a roach clip, were found in plain view on a dresser in appellant's bedroom. Constructive possession can be inferred when the controlled substance is in the joint control of the accused and another, and there is some additional factor linking the accused to the contraband indicating the accused's knowledge and control of the contraband. Bridges v. State, 46 Ark. App. 198, 878 S.W.2d 781 (1994). Here, the presence of the contraband in plain view in appellant's bedroom was sufficient to show constructive possession. See id.

Finally, appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for severance of defendants. This issue is not preserved for appeal because appellant did notrenew his pretrial motion to sever at trial as required by Ark. R. Crim. P. 22.1(b) (2001). His general renewal of all motions at the conclusion of trial was inadequate because the rule requires a specific motion apprising the trial court of the grounds for severance. Wynn v. State, 316 Ark. 414, 871 S.W.2d 593 (1994).

Affirmed.

Robbins and Baker, JJ., agree.