ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

JOHN MAUZY PITTMAN, JUDGE

DIVISION III

ALISON J. HAWKINS

APPELLANT

V.

FASCO INDUSTRIES, INC.

APPELLEE

CA01-1404

June 26, 2002

APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION

[NO. F903847]

AFFIRMED

The appellant in this workers' compensation case had been employed for a short period of time at Fasco Industries when she developed problems with her hands. She was diagnosed with bilateral carpel tunnel syndrome after electro-diagnostic studies conducted in February 1999 indicated that her right hand was less than moderately affected and her left hand was very mildly affected. A carpal tunnel release was performed on her right hand. Fasco accepted the right hand injury as compensable. Subsequently, appellant filed a claim for additional medical benefits for treatment of her right hand injury, and asserted that she had sustained an injury to her left hand as well that also required treatment. After a hearing, the Commission found that appellant had failed to establish a compensable injury to her left hand with objective medical evidence. This appeal followed.

For reversal, appellant contends that the Commission erred by holding that objective medical findings were necessary for the appellant to receive additional medical treatment for her right hand injury; erred in finding that her asserted left hand injury was not compensable; and erred in finding that the requested medical treatment for her asserted left hand injury was not reasonably necessary. We affirm.

Appellant, asserting that the Commission held that objective findings were a prerequisite to additional medical care once a compensable injury has been established, argues that this holding is erroneous as a matter of law. We need not discuss the merits of this argument because it is academic. A plain reading of the Commission's opinion shows that the Commission did not hold that objective medical evidence was necessary before appellant could obtain medical treatment for her admittedly-compensable right hand injury. Instead, it is clear that the Commission merely took the lack of objective medical evidence into account when determining whether appellant's complaints were credible. We find no error on this point.

Appellant next contends that the Commission erred in finding that she failed to establish a compensable left upper extremity injury. The question is the sufficiency of the evidence to support this finding, and our standard of review is well-settled:

In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings of the Workers' Compensation Commission, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commission's findings, and we will affirm if those findings are supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support aconclusion. The determination of the credibility and weight to be given a witness's testimony is within the sole province of the Commission. The Commission is not required to believe the testimony of the claimant or any other witness, but may accept and translate into findings of fact only those portions of the testimony it deems worthy of belief.

Farmers Cooperative v. Biles, 77 Ark. App. 1, 4-5, 69 S.W.3d 899, 902 (2002). Viewing the evidence, as we must, in the light most favorable to the Commission's findings, we think the Commission could properly find that appellant failed to establish her asserted left hand injury by medical evidence supported by objective findings as required by Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(D) (Repl. 2002). In its opinion the Commission noted that, although initial diagnostic studies indicated that her left hand was very mildly affected by carpel tunnel syndrome, subsequent studies showed no problem with her left hand whatsoever. The resolution of such conflicts in the medical evidence presents a fact question for the Commission, see Arkansas Wood Products v. Atchley, 21 Ark. App. 138, 729 S.W.2d 428 (1987), and we cannot say that the Commission erred in finding that the subsequent studies were more credible.

Finally, appellant argues that the Commission erred in finding that she failed to establish that the requested medical treatment for her asserted left hand injury was reasonably necessary. Given our holding that the Commission did not err in finding the asserted left hand injury was noncompensable, questions concerning the reasonableness and necessity of the proposed treatment are moot. Nevertheless, it should be noted that at leasttwo physicians who examined appellant could not explain her symptoms in light of her diagnostic results and had no treatment to offer her.

Affirmed.