NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

JUDGE JOSEPHINE LINKER HART

DIVISION IV

CLEVELAND ODELL MAYS

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

CACR01-1088

June 19, 2002

APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. CR 2000-1772]

HONORABLE JOHN BERTRAN PLEGGE, CIRCUIT JUDGE

AFFIRMED

At a bench trial, appellant, Cleveland Odell Mays, was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and sentenced as a habitual offender with four or more convictions to twenty-five years' imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the State failed to corroborate his confession to the police that he possessed a firearm. We affirm.

At trial, Officer Calvin Martin of the Little Rock Police Department testified that on April 11, 2000, he responded to a shooting at a residence on Chester Street. The victim, who was bleeding from his right arm and right hip, ran out of a residence and flagged down the police, telling them that he had been shot. The officers found some blood inside the residence and some shotgun pellets by the door of the residence. Police also found insidethe residence a cigar box containing crack cocaine, marijuana, and $200 in cash.

Officer David Goodson of the Little Rock Police Department testified that he received

information that the suspect in the shooting was at a residence on Izard Street. Appellant was found in the residence along with ten to sixteen other people, and he was taken into custody. Goodson searched the area around the residence and discovered in the back of a car two shotguns covered by a blanket. One of the shotguns was a sixteen-gauge double-barreled shotgun.

Detective J.C. White of the Little Rock Police Department testified that he spoke with appellant regarding the shooting on Chester Street. Appellant gave a statement to White that was recorded, transcribed, and ultimately admitted into evidence at trial. Appellant told White that he went to the Chester Street residence, which he said was a crack house, to buy crack cocaine. While there, he complained to the seller of the crack cocaine about "the size of the crack" he was selling. Appellant told the seller that he would talk to the seller's boss. The seller pushed appellant, pulled a pistol, and told appellant to leave. Appellant stated that he left and went to a residence on Izard Street where he obtained a double-barreled twelve-gauge shotgun. Upon returning to the crack house, he fired the shotgun through the closed back door of the residence. After searching the residence for the seller, he hid the gun and returned to the residence on Izard Street.

Appellant argues that, setting aside his extrajudicial confession, the evidence does not demonstrate that the crime of felon in possession of a firearm was committed by someone. Our standard of review of arguments on appeal that a confession was not corroborated is asfollows:

[O]ur review is governed by Ark. Code Ann. § 16-89-111(d) (1987), which provides that "[a] confession of a defendant, unless made in open court, will not warrant a conviction, unless accompanied with other proof that the offense was committed." This requirement for other proof, sometimes referred to as the corpus delicti rule, mandates only proof that the offense occurred and nothing more. In other words, under the corpus delicti rule, the State must prove (1) the existence of an injury or harm constituting a crime and (2) that the injury or harm was caused by someone's criminal activity. It is not necessary to establish any further connection between the crime and the particular defendant.

Barnes v. State, 346 Ark. 91, 98, 55 S.W.3d 271, 276 (2001)(citations omitted).

However, basing our conclusion on the holdings of two appellate court opinions, we hold that corroboration was not necessary in this instance. In Stephens v. State, 320 Ark. 426, 430-32, 898 S.W.2d 435, 436-37 (1995), the defendant, Stephens, told an officer that he was the driver of a vehicle and had been drinking prior to driving. Stephens argued on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support his DWI conviction because the only evidence that he was driving the car was his uncorroborated confession to the officer. The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the statement was not a confession to the crime because Stephens only admitted to one element of the offense of DWI, driving the car, but did not admit to being intoxicated. Thus, the court held that corroboration was not required. In White v. State, 73 Ark. App. 264, 268-69, 42 S.W.3d 584, 587-88 (2001), we noted that White's admission to police that his license had been suspended was only one element of the offense of driving with a suspended license. We further observed that the criminal act of driving with a suspended license was established by White's admission in conjunction with the officer's testimony that White was the only person in the vehicle. Thus, we concludedthat corroboration of White's admission was not required.

Similarly, to establish the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm, the State had to prove that appellant possessed or owned a firearm and had been convicted of a felony. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-73-103(a)(1) (Supp. 2001). Here, appellant admitted to only one element of the crime: possession of a firearm. However, in order to obtain a conviction, the State was also required to prove that appellant's possession was unlawful because he was a felon, which the State did at trial. Consequently, we conclude that, based on the holdings of Stephens and White, appellant's admission was not a confession that required corroboration. We affirm appellant's conviction.

Affirmed.

Vaught and Roaf, JJ., agree.