ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

PER CURIAM

JUNE 13, 2002

STEVEN SHACKLEFORD

Appellant

v.

CLIFFORD TERRY, Warden, and

LYNETTE JAMES, Records Supervisor,

Wrightsville Unit, Arkansas

Department of Correction

Appellee

02-23

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PULASKI COUNTY, CV 2001-6799, HONORABLE DAVID BOGARD, JUDGE

AFFIRMED

While on parole from aggravated robbery and criminal attempt to commit aggravated robbery convictions, appellant committed new crimes, including aggravated robbery. His parole was revoked, and he was sentenced to a cumulative prison term of thirty years, to run consecutive to his prior fifteen-year sentence. Upon his return to confinement, the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC) determined that appellant was not eligible for parole from his new sentence because it resulted from a second aggravated robbery conviction. Appellant then filed a petition for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus contending that the ADC was improperly calculating his parole eligibility. The Pulaski County Circuit Court conducted a hearing, and denied the petition. We find no error and affirm.

A petition for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus is civil in nature. Wiggins v. State, 299 Ark. 180, 181, 771 S.W.2d 759, 760 (1989). We have held that there are four requisite conditions before declaratory relief may be granted: (1) there must exist a justiciable controversy;(2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved in the controversy must be ripe for judicial determination. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Ross-Lawhon, 290 Ark. 578, 579, 721 S.W.2d 658, 658 (1986). Our declaratory judgment act was not intended to allow any question to be presented by any person; the matters must first be justiciable. Andres v. First Ark. Development Finance Corp., 230 Ark. 594, 606, 324 S.W.2d 97, 104 (1959). The declared legislative purpose is "to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations." Ark. Code Ann. § 16-111-102(a) (1987).

The purpose of a writ of mandamus is to enforce an established right or to enforce the performance of a duty. Arkansas-Democrat Gazette v. Zimmerman, 341 Ark. 771, 777, 20 S.W.3d 301, 304 (2000). A writ of mandamus is issued by this court only to compel an official or judge to take some action, and when requesting the writ, a petitioner must show a clear and certain right to the relief sought and the absence of any other remedy. Id. But a writ of mandamus will not lie to control or review matters of discretion. Id.

Appellant claims that the ADC is improperly denying him parole eligibility for his thirty-year sentence in accordance with Act 772 of 1983, codified as Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-609, which disallows parole to persons serving a sentence for a second aggravated robbery conviction. He contends that Act 772 was superceded by and conflicts with Act 825 of 1983, codified as Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-607, which was passed subsequent to Act 772 but during the same legislative session. Appellant argues that he is eligible for parole pursuant to § 16-93-607. We disagree.

The determination of parole eligibility is the province of the Department of Correction. Morris v. State, 333 Ark. 466, 468, 970 S.W.2d 210, 211 (1998). Parole eligibility is determined by the law in effect at the time the crime is committed. Boles v. Huckabee, 340 Ark. 410, 412, 12S.W.3d 201, 202 (2000); Woods v. Lockhart, 292 Ark. 37, 39-40, 727 S.W.2d 849, 850-51 (1987).

As the circuit court concluded, appellant's parole eligibility for his second aggravated robbery conviction is determined by § 16-93-609, not § 16-93-607. While § 16-93-607 creates parole eligibility for second offenders committing Class Y felonies after serving a minimum of one-half (1/2) of their sentence or one-half (1/2) of the time to which the sentence is commuted by executive clemency, with credit for good-time allowances in both cases, § 16-93-609 is more specific. At the time of appellant's second aggravated robbery conviction, § 16-93-609 stated:

Any person who commits first-degree murder, rape, or aggravated robbery subsequent to March 24, 1983, and who has previously pled guilty or nolo contendere to or been found guilty of first-degree murder, rape, or aggravated robbery, shall not be eligible for release on parole by the State Board of Pardons and Paroles.

Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-609 (1987).

This court has repeatedly held that the basic rule of statutory construction, to which all other interpretive guides must yield, is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. E.g., Burford Distributing, Inc. v. Starr, 341 Ark. 914, 916, 20 S.W.3d 363, 365 (2000). In attempting to ascertain legislative intent, this court will look to the language of the statute, the subject matter, the object to be accomplished, the purpose to be served, legislative history, and other appropriate matters that shed light on the matter. Id. It is not difficult to ascertain the legislative intent of Act 772 of 1983:

It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the existing parole law allows persons who have repeatedly committed first degree murder, rape and aggravated robbery, as well as other felonies, to be eligible for release on parole; that second and subsequent offenders of first degree murder, rape and aggravated robbery should not be eligible for release on parole; that in order to implement said policy this Act should go into effect immediately.

Acts 1983, No. 772 § 2.

The statutes at issue here complement one another rather than conflict. As appellant hasfailed to show that the ADC is miscalculating his parole eligibility date in a manner inconsistent with the law in effect at the time he again committed aggravated robbery, we affirm the circuit court's denial of his petition.

Affirmed.