ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

SAM BIRD, JUDGE

DIVISION I

CLEVELAND ALEXANDER,

APPELLANT

V.

VANESIA ALEXANDER and LINDA KAY,

APPELLEES

CA01-1246

JUNE 5, 2002

APPEAL FROM THE GARLAND COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,

NO. 98-985-III,

HON. VICKI SHAW COOK, JUDGE

REVERSED AND DISMISSED

Appellant Cleveland Alexander appeals from a divorce decree entered in Garland County, contending that the trial court erred in granting a divorce decree to appellee Vanesia Alexander because she was incompetent at the time the complaint was filed. We, however, conclude, sua sponte, that, pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-12-307(2)(b), the court lacked jurisdiction to grant the divorce decree, and we reverse and dismiss.

Cleveland and Vanesia were married in 1948. They have two adult children, a daughter, Linda Kay, who was a third-party defendant and is one of the appellees on appeal, and a son, Ricky Alexander. Linda is married and lives with her family in South Carolina, and Ricky has lived in his parents' home for most of his life.

In July 1998, a long-time family friend called Linda to inform her that something was wrong with her mother after he saw Vanesia and she appeared not to recognize him. Lindacame and took her mother to the hospital where it was determined that Vanesia had suffered

a stroke. After spending approximately one week in the hospital, Vanesia was checked out of the hospital by Linda, without the knowledge of Cleveland or Ricky. That same day, Linda took Vanesia to a lawyer's office, and subsequently a divorce complaint was filed on behalf of Vanesia on July 24, 1998. Linda then took Vanesia to South Carolina. Linda restricted communication between Cleveland and Vanesia, and eventually terminated all contact between the two.

Several hearings were held and various orders were entered by the court. On April 28, 1999, Cleveland filed a third-party complaint against Linda for her interference with her mother's return to Arkansas. In December 1999, a hearing was held in which Vanesia's mental and physical condition were questioned; thus, the court suggested that Vanesia return to Arkansas and see a physician for an evaluation. The court also found that, under the circumstances, an attorney ad litem might be necessary. Cecilia R. Dyer was appointed to the position. On December 15, the court entered an order that Vanesia was to come to Arkansas to meet with Dyer, but the meeting did not occur. An arrest warrant for Linda in Arkansas was issued on June 20, 2000, because she was held in willful contempt of the court's order by preventing Vanesia from returning to Arkansas. The record of this case indicates that on August 31, 2000, the Probate Court of Pickens County, South Carolina, found Vanesia to be incompetent and entered an order appointing Linda as Vanesia's guardian.

On January 22, 2001, a final hearing was held. Although neither Cleveland norVanesia were present at the final hearing, there is evidence that neither of them wanted to be divorced. During prior hearings, Cleveland had expressed that he did not want to divorce Vanesia, and Vanesia's testimony from the Probate Court of Pickens County, South Carolina, reflects that she felt the same way. A divorce decree was entered on April 27, 2001, setting out the court's findings.

We review de novo issues of law decided by a chancery court. Atkinson v. Atkinson, 72 Ark. App. 15, 19, 32 S.W.3d 41, 44 (2000). However, we can raise sua sponte the question of whether the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, and, if we conclude that the trial court lacked such jurisdiction, then dismissal is an appropriate disposition of the case. Tyler v. Talburt, 73 Ark. App. 260, 41 S.W.3d 431 (2001).

Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-12-307 (Repl. 2002) provides that residence in the state by either the plaintiff or defendant for sixty days before the commencement of the action must be proved in order to obtain a divorce. Furthermore, proof of residency in a divorce action is to be distinguished from other elements of proof in that the legislature has expressly provided that it may neither be waived nor established by agreement of the parties and it must be corroborated. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-12-306(c)(1) (Repl. 2002); Araneda v. Araneda, 48 Ark. App. 236, 894 S.W.2d 146 (1995); Hodges v. Hodges, 27 Ark. App. 250, 770 S.W.2d 164 (1989). Residence for the required period in this state is jurisdictional and, dealing as it does with the power and right of the trial court to act, evidence corroborating residence should not be speculative and vague in scope. Hingle v. Hingle, 264 Ark. 442, 572 S.W.2d 395 (1978); Araneda, supra. The question of residence, being jurisdictional, maybe raised at any stage of the proceeding. Araneda, supra.

In this case, there was no evidence presented that corroborated either Cleveland's or Vanesia's residence, in Arkansas for the statutory period. Although corroborating evidence may be relatively slight, Araneda, supra, there is no evidence in the case at bar to corroborate residency in Arkansas for sixty days prior to commencement of the action. Residency must be corroborated and proven in every instance. Hodges, supra.

Because Arkansas statutory law precludes a grant of divorce without corroboration of residency of one of the parties, we hold that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the divorce decree. Therefore, we must reverse and dismiss this case without prejudice. In so holding, the remaining issues argued need not be addressed.

Reversed and dismissed.

Hart and Neal, JJ., agree.