NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

OLLY NEAL, Judge

DIVISION II

CA01-1198

APRIL 10, 2002

BRANDON HARDMAN

AN APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI

APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT v. SIXTH DIVISION [CR-00-1457]

STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE DAVID BOGARD,

APPELLEE CIRCUIT JUDGE

AFFIRMED

Appellant Brandon Hardman was charged by information with capital murder on April 28, 2000. He was a juvenile at the time this offense occurred. Hardman filed a motion to transfer his case to the juvenile division of the chancery court. The Pulaski County Circuit Court denied the motion to transfer, and this interlocutory appeal followed.

Appellant's sole argument on appeal is that the Pulaski County Circuit Court erred in failing to make written findings of fact in connection with its denial of his request to transfer the capital murder charge pending against him to Pulaski County Chancery Court, Juvenile Division. We affirm.

Juvenile and circuit courts have concurrent jurisdiction over juveniles who, at the age of at least sixteen years, engage in conduct that if committed by an adult could constitute a felony. Jongewaard v. State, 71 Ark. App. 269, 29 S.W.3d 758 (2000) (citing Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(c)(1) (Supp. 1999)). Upon a motion by any party, the court where the charges are filed must conduct a hearing to decide if the court should retain jurisdiction or transfer the case to another court having jurisdiction. Id. (citing Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(e) (Supp. 1999)).

Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-318 (Repl. 2002) requires the court to make written findings and consider ten factors before deciding whether to retain or transfer a case to juvenile court. Jongewaard v. State, supra. (citing Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(g) (Supp. 1999)). Among those factors are (1) the seriousness of the alleged offense and whether the protection of society requires prosecution as an extended juvenile jurisdiction offender or in the criminal division of circuit court; (2) the previous history of the juvenile; and (3) any other factors deemed relevant by the judge. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318 (Repl. 2002). However, a circuit court does not have to give equal weight to each factor. Landrum v. State, 63 Ark. App. 12, 971 S.W.2d 278 (1998). Further, the circuit court is not required to enumerate all ten factors listed in Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(g) (Supp. 1999) in its written findings. Witherspoon v. State, 74 Ark. App. 15, 46 S.W.3d 549 (2001). On review, we do not reverse the trial court's denial of a transfer unless the decision is clearly erroneous. Beulah v. State, 344 Ark. 528, 42 S.W.3d 461 (2001).

Like any other procedural right, the right of a defendant to written findings in making a decision to retain or transfer a case to juvenile court can be waived by failing to timely object. Box v. State, 71 Ark. App. 403, 30 S.W.3d 754 (2000). Here, because appellantfailed to object to the absence of written findings, he waived his right to argue the issue on appeal. Furthermore, the record evidences numerous factors that support the denial of the motion to transfer the case to juvenile court. In denying appellant's motion to transfer, the court stated, "my question is what's best for society? And society is best served by him standing trial as an adult. The motion to transfer will be denied. We'll try him as an adult." Additionally, the State presented, without objection from appellant, evidence regarding appellant's prior juvenile adjudications. We note that appellant's age, his six adjudications as a delinquent, his failure to comply with the conditions of his probation, and his commitment to the Division of Youth Services, amply show the unlikelihood of rehabilitation through treatment of appellant as a juvenile. Witherspoon v. State, supra. (citing Jongewaard v. State, supra.)(discussing the juvenile's previous history, his likelihood of rehabilitation, and his age).

We affirm.

Pittman and Crabtree, JJ., agree.