ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

ANDREE LAYTON ROAF, JUDGE

DIVISION I

RONALD D. PETTY

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

CACR01-1173

April 3, 2002

AN APPEAL FROM PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

CR2000-1988

HONORABLE JOHN PLEGGE

AFFIRMED

After a trial by jury, Ronald D. Petty was found guilty of rape of his minor son pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated § 5-14-103 and was sentenced to forty years in the Arkansas Department of Correction. On appeal, Petty argues that the trial court erred in refusing to grant his motion for directed verdict as the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction absent speculation and conjecture as to the requisite element of penetration. We disagree and affirm.

Petty was the father of two minor children, a son, R., and a daughter, R. Petty's daughter told a teacher at her school that her father had engaged in inappropriate sexual activity toward herself and her brother, and the teacher subsequently called a child abuse hotline and made a report. An investigation began, which involved an Arkansas State Police investigator and members of the Pulaski County Sheriff's Department. On June 16, 2000, the Pulaski County Prosecuting Attorney's Office filed a felony information against Petty alleging a single count of rape, which was alleged to have occurred between January 1, 1993, and December 21, 1998, naming R., the son, as thevictim.

At the trial, R., who was fourteen years old at the time, testified that his father "made him--suck his penis" and that his father tied him to the bed and "sucked" him. R. further stated that his father "did that to [him] about ten or eleven times," that he was "nine, ten, eleven, when it first started happening," that it stopped when he was in the sixth grade, and that his father would tie him "upside down...and then he sucked [him] and let [him] back down." R. stated that these encounters would occur mostly at night when his mother and sister went to church. R. claimed that he did not tell anyone because he was afraid his father would hit him if he told his mother and so he eventually told his sister, R. Dale Ridge, a civilian child abuse investigator, Ed Brimage, a deputy with the Pulaski County Sheriff's Office, Rebecca Petty, the victim's mother and Petty's wife, Cody Burk, employed with the Pulaski County Sheriff's Office, all testified on behalf of the State.

Petty testified on his own behalf and stated that he and his wife had been separated since September 1999, and that he was living apart from his family from 1993 through early 1996. Petty further testified that his wife was angry because he had again left her with the children, was not providing support, and was living with another woman. He also testified that his wife had written a hot check on an account that was solely in his name shortly before the rape first was alleged in February 2000. Petty stated that he did not sexually abuse his son or his daughter, but that his son "has told me that he hates me" and "has threatened to kill me." Petty further stated that he did not know why his son would accuse him of sexually abusing him.

At the close of the State's case, Petty moved for a directed verdict on the rape charge, arguing that there had been no testimony that there was penetration, and the trial court denied the motion. Petty renewed his directed verdict motion at the close of all the evidence, and the trial court denied the motion. The case was then submitted to the jury, and the jury found Petty guilty of rapeand recommended a sentence of forty years, which the court ordered, in the Arkansas Department of Correction.

A motion for directed verdict is treated as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Johnson v. State, 71 Ark. App. 58, 25 S.W.3d 445 (2000). The test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence. Id. When this court reviews a denial of a directed-verdict motion, we will look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and will affirm if there is substantial evidence to support the verdict. Id. Substantial evidence is that evidence which is forceful enough to compel a conclusion one way or another. Id. The evidence may be direct or circumstantial, but for circumstantial evidence to support a conviction, it must be consistent with the defendant's guilt and inconsistent with any other reasonable conclusion. Bangs v. State, 338 Ark. 515, 998 S.W.2d 738 (1999).

Petty argues that the trial court erred in denying this motion for directed verdict as to rape because the testimony of the victim that Petty made him suck his penis is insufficient evidence of penetration. Specifically, Petty claims that contact or touching and "penetration" are not one and the same. The State contends that the uncorroborated testimony of the victim is sufficient to support a denial of a directed-verdict motion in a rape case and that the jury is entitled to draw any reasonable inferences from the testimony, including whether the victim's testimony established that penetration took place.

Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-14-103(a)(4) (Repl. 1997) states in pertinent part that a person commits rape if he engages in deviate sexual activity with another person who is less than fourteen years of age. "Deviate sexual activity" means any act of sexual gratification involving "the penetration, however slight, of the anus or mouth of one person by the penis of another person." Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-101(1)(A) (Repl. 1997). In Prater v. State, 307 Ark. 180, 820 S.W.2d 429(1991), the supreme court held that the testimony of a rape victim satisfies the substantial-evidence requirement in a rape case. A rape victim's testimony also need not be corroborated. See Sublett v. State, 337 Ark. 374, 989 S.W.2d 910 (1999); Puckett v. State, 324 Ark. 81, 918 S.W.2d 707 (1996). Further, the testimony of a child rape victim, showing penetration, need not be corroborated, nor is scientific evidence required. Gatlin v. State, 320 Ark. 120, 895 S.W.2d 526 (1995).

We defer to the jury's determination on the matter of witness credibility. Johnson, supra. Any inconsistencies that may have been presented in the testimony relating to the penetration element of rape are for the jury to resolve. Stewart v. State, 331 Ark. 359, 961 S.W.2d 750 (1998). The jury is entitled to draw any reasonable inference from circumstantial evidence to the same extent that it can from direct evidence, and it is the jury's sole province to accept or reject testimony as it sees fit. Chrobak v. State, 75 Ark. App. 281, 58 S.W.3d 387 (2001).

The victim, Petty's son, testified that his father made him "suck him-suck his penis, and tied me to the bed and sucked me." The victim further stated that his father did this to him about ten or eleven times. The uncorroborated testimony of a child rape victim satisfies the substantial-evidence requirement in rape cases, and as such, the victim's testimony in this case is sufficient evidence to support a finding of penetration. Consequently, the trial court did not err in denying Petty's directed-verdict motion, and we affirm.

Affirmed.

Vaught and Bird , JJ., agree.