ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

PER CURIAM

JANUARY 10, 2002

BRODERICK LAMBRENT JONES

Petitioner

v.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

Respondent

CR 01-1244

PRO SE MOTION FOR RULE ON CLERK TO LODGE RECORD BELATEDLY [CIRCUIT COURT OF IZARD COUNTY, NO. CR 97-54, HON. JOHN DAN KEMP, JR., JUDGE]

MOTION DENIED

Broderick Lambrent Jones, an inmate of the Arkansas Department of Correction, was found guilty by a jury of attempted capital murder, second-degree battery, and first-degree terroristic threatening arising from conduct that occurred at the facility where Jones was incarcerated. An aggregate term of 576 months' imprisonment was imposed to be served consecutively with the term of imprisonment Jones was serving when the offenses occurred. The court of appeals affirmed. Jones v. State, 72 Ark. App. 271, 35 S.W.3d 345 (2000). Jones subsequently filed in the trial court a timely pro se petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Criminal Procedure Rule 37. The petition was denied, and Jones filed a timely notice of appeal but did not tender the record to this court within ninety days of the date of the notice of appeal

as required by Ark. R. App. P.-Civil 5(a).1

Now before us is Jones's motion to file the record belatedly. Petitioner Jones contends that he should be permitted to lodge the record belatedly because he did not understand appellate procedure because he was appealing pro se.

The purpose of the rule setting time limitations on lodging a record is to eliminate unnecessary delay in the docketing of appeals. We have made it abundantly clear that we expect compliance with the rule so that appeals will proceed as expeditiously as possible. Jacobs v. State, 321 Ark. 561, 906 S.W.2d 670 (1995), citing Alexander v. Beaumont, 275 Ark. 357, 629 S.W.2d 300 (1982). A petitioner has the right to appeal a ruling on a petition for postconviction relief. Scott v. State, 281 Ark. 436, 664 S.W.2d 475 (1984). With that right, however, goes the responsibility to file a timely notice of appeal and tender the record here within the time limits set by the rules of procedure. If a petitioner fails to tender the record in a timely fashion, the burden is on the petition to make a showing of good cause for the failure to comply with proper procedure. See Garner v. State, 293 Ark. 309, 737 S.W.2d 637 (1987). The fact that a petitioner is proceeding pro se or is unfamiliar with legal procedure in itself does not constitute good cause for the failure to conform to the prevailing rules of procedure. Walker v. State, 283 Ark. 339, 676 S.W.2d 460 (1984); Thompson v. State, 280 Ark. 163, 655 S.W.2d 424 (1983); see also Sullivan v. State, 301 Ark. 352, 784 S.W.2d 155 (1990).

This court has specifically held that it is not the responsibility of the circuit clerk, circuit court, or anyone other than the appellant to perfect an appeal. See Sullivan v. State, supra; Braggv. State, 297 Ark. 348, 760 S.W.2d 878 (1988) . It was thus the petitioner's burden to tender the record here within the time allowed by Rule 5(a). In the event petitioner could not tender the full record, his course was to lodge a partial record here within within ninety days of the date of the notice of appeal as required by Rule 5(a) with a petition for writ of certiorari to complete the record. Petitioner did not pursue the course available to him and has not established that there was good cause for his failure to perfect the appeal. Accordingly, the motion to proceed with the appeal is denied.

Motion denied.

Imber, J., not participating.

1 The record was tendered here 187 days after the notice of appeal was filed.