ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

JOHN B. ROBBINS, JUDGE

DIVISION III

DAVID COPELAND

APPELLANT

V.

BALDWIN & SHELL, CONSTRUCTION, Employer, and BITUMINOUS CASUALTY CORP., Insurance Carrier

APPELLEES

CA 01-455

DECEMBER 5, 2001

APPEAL FROM THE WORKERS'

COMPENSATION COMMISSION

[NO. E708812]

AFFIRMED

Appellant David Copeland appeals the denial of benefits to him by the Workers' Compensation Commission regarding a claim arising from an injury he alleged he sustained in the course of his work as a carpenter for appellee Baldwin & Shell Construction. This is the second appeal to our court; the first was Copeland v. Baldwin & Shell Constr., CA 99-778, slip opinion (Ark. App. February 23, 2000). Copeland asserts two bases for reversal: (1) that the Commission erred in finding that the doctrine of res judicata bars his claim; and (2) that the Commission's denial of benefits for his mental injury is not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.

The relevant facts were developed in the first claim and resulting appeal. We examine them here. Copeland began work for Baldwin in 1994. Copeland completed highschool

but was a poor student. He alleged that on July 16, 1997, he was working underground pouring concrete in the Don Reynolds Media Center at the University of Arkansas campus when he became overheated, irritable, and nauseated. He was instructed to cool off, rest, and hydrate. Copeland went over to the tool shed, stood in front of an air conditioner and drank Gatorade, but he did not remember anything after that. Copeland was later found several blocks away, confused and disoriented. Paramedics were summoned, who placed cold packs on his carotid arteries and transported him to Washington Regional Medical Center for further care. Copeland was exhibiting aggressive, non-cooperative behavior and was obviously confused. Because his temperature was not elevated, and the diagnostic tests revealed normal results, Copeland was released from the hospital the next day and was referred to a neurologist, Dr. Brown, and other providers for more treatment. At the time of the hearing, September 21, 1998, Copeland claimed that he had been unable to work since the incident due to ongoing problems with his mental and physical functioning. Psychological testing indicated that Copeland had a low average I.Q. Copeland complained of chronic fatigue, a short temper, irritability, forgetfulness, imbalance, shaking episodes, depression, loss of libido, blurred vision, feelings of worthlessness, light-headedness, occasional severe headaches, and inability to concentrate. He was diagnosed with major depression. His treating physicians and therapists disagreed on whether the overheating episode caused his current problem.

In the first appeal, the administrative law judge (ALJ) and the Commission denied benefits. The Commission found the testimony of Drs. Rutherford and Ritter persuasive,who opined that Copeland did not suffer from a heat stroke and that many of his deficits were not compatible with a heat-related injury. Furthermore, the opinions supported the inference that his symptoms were psychological, not organic. There was no evidence of any neurological damage or disease in the CAT scan, the MRI, or the EEG. Therefore, the Commission found that Copeland's complaints were inconsistent with organic brain damage occasioned by a specific incident. Copeland had also argued on appeal the first time that he had an alternative theory of recovery that the Commission failed to address. That theory was that his mental injury was occasioned by a physical injury to some other part of the body, not his brain, based upon Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-113 (Repl. 1997). We held that if Copeland's arguments could be construed to assert this alternate theory, which we declined to so hold, then his failure to obtain a ruling from the Commission precluded our consideration of the matter.

Subsequent to the first appeal, Copeland proceeded to litigate the claim again, specifically asserting the existence of some other physical injury to support his mental injury as compensable. Baldwin resisted the claim on the basis of res judicata. The parties waived the right to a hearing and stipulated that the matter could be submitted on the record as compiled from the first hearing. The Commission permitted Copeland to proceed on this alternate theory, ultimately finding that he had not proven the existence of any other physical injury to support his mental injury. This appeal resulted.

Res judicata applies where there has been a final adjudication on the merits of the issue by a court of competent jurisdiction on all matters litigated and those mattersnecessarily within the issue that might have been litigated. Beliew v. Stuttgart Rice Mill, 64 Ark. App. 334, 987 S.W.2d 281 (1998); Perry v. Leisure Lodges, 19 Ark. App. 143, 718 S.W.2d 114 (1986). The doctrine of res judicata is applicable to decisions of the Commission. Harvest Foods v. Washam, 52 Ark. App. 72, 914 S.W.2d 776 (1996); Tuberville v. Int'l Paper Co., 18 Ark. App. 210, 711 S.W.2d 840 (1986). The key question regarding the application of res judicata is whether the party against whom the earlier decision is being asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in question. Cater v. Cater, 311 Ark. 627, 846 S.W.2d 173 (1993); Pine Bluff Warehouse v. Berry, 51 Ark. App. 139, 912 S.W.2d 11 (1995). We need not address whether the doctrine of res judicata acts as a complete bar to appellant's current claim because we hold that substantial evidence supports the Commission's denial of benefits, as argued in his second point for reversal.

Where the Commission denies benefits because the claimant has failed to meet his burden of proof, the substantial-evidence standard of review requires us to affirm if the Commission's decision displays a substantial basis for the denial of relief. Frances v. Gaylord Container Corp., 341 Ark. 527, 20 S.W.3d 280 (2000). This court reviews decisions of the Workers' Compensation Commission to see if they are supported by substantial evidence. Deffenbaugh Indus. v. Angus, 39 Ark. App. 24, 832 S.W.2d 869 (1992). Substantial evidence is that relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Wright v. ABC Air, Inc., 44 Ark. App. 5, 864 S.W.2d 871 (1993). The issue is not whether this Court might have reached a different result fromthat reached by the Commission, or whether the evidence would have supported a contrary finding; if reasonable minds could reach the result shown by the Commission's decision, we must affirm the decision. Bradley v. Alumax, 50 Ark. App. 13, 899 S.W.2d 850 (1995). Further, the Commission has the authority to accept or reject medical opinions, and its resolution of the medical evidence has the force and effect of a jury verdict. Estridge v. Waste Mgmt., 343 Ark. 276, 33 S.W.3d 167 (2000).

Copeland argues that the ALJ and the Commission erred when deciding that there was not sufficient evidence to support the existence of a physical injury to support the existence of a mental injury as defined in Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-113 (Repl. 1997). This statute provides in pertinent part:

The ALJ's opinion, which the Commission affirmed and adopted, stated that Copeland proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he suffered from a mental injury, major depression, diagnosed by a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist, and which met the criteria of the DSM. Copeland's failure of proof, however, pertained to the requirement that it be caused by a physical injury to the employee's body. This finding is supported by substantial evidence.

The existence and extent of an injury must be demonstrated by objective findings that cannot come under the control of the patient. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(D) (Repl. 1997). Copeland failed to prove any organic injury to the brain in his first appeal, and he cannot relitigate this issue. See Beliew, supra. That there were no objective medical findings to support a physical injury in the nature of a heat stroke is not in dispute. Copeland argues that the ALJ's acknowledgment that "something happened" to Copeland on the day he was picked up by paramedics indicates that he did have a physical injury. However, he bears the burden to prove the existence of this physical injury by demonstrating it with objective findings. See Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(D) (Repl. 1997). This he did not do. There exists a substantial basis for the denial of relief in this case. See, e.g., Amlease, Inc. v. Kugligowski, 59 Ark. App. 261, 957 S.W.2d 715 (1997); but compare Dugan v. Jerry Sweetser, Inc., 54 Ark. App. 401, 928 S.W.2d 341 (1996).

We affirm.

Neal and Crabtree, JJ., agree.