ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

ANDREE LAYTON ROAF, JUDGE

DIVISION I

JEFFREY WILLIS SCOTT REAVIS

APPELLANT

v.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

CACR 01-00461

NOVEMBER 28, 2001

APPEAL FROM BOONE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. CR 00-276]

HONORABLE ROBERT W. McCORKINDALE II, CIRCUIT JUDGE

AFFIRMED

Jeffrey Willis Scott Reavis was convicted by a Boone County jury of a terroristic act for shooting into a car and injuring a child. Reavis was sentenced to thirty-five years in the Arkansas Department of Correction. On appeal, Reavis argues that the trial court erred in finding that he made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights and in refusing to suppress his custodial statement. We affirm.

Reavis was visiting a friend, John Seals, at the time of the shooting incident that resulted in his conviction. Seals asked Reavis to watch his house while he was away and Reavis, who had been using methamphetamine that day, claimed that he began hearing and seeing people in the house. Reavis claimed that he grabbed a rifle, ran outside, and engaged in a running gun battle with twenty or so people. Reavis then ran onto nearby Highway 14 and tried to stop a passing car. When the car refused to stop, Reavis fired five shots at it, seriously injuring a ten-year-old boy who was a passenger in the car.

Shortly after the shooting, Reavis encountered Seals on the highway as he was returning home and was taken by Seals to a friend's house, where the police were called. When Boone County Deputy Mike Henderson arrived at the scene, Reavis told him he heard a ten-year-old boy had been shot and that he was sorry and did not mean to do it. Henderson took Reavis into custody and Mirandized him. Henderson then encountered Deputy Bergeron and mirandized Reavis again in front of Bergeron. Henderson asked Reavis how many times he had fired the rifle, and Reavis told him he had fallen and the gun had gone off a number of times. Reavis was read his Miranda rights a third time at the crime scene before Officer David Lafferty did a gun-residue test on Reavis. Reavis was then taken to the Boone County Sheriff's office. Before giving a formal statement at about 1:00 a.m. on July 10, Reavis signed a statement acknowledging that he had been given his Miranda rights. In the interview, Reavis admitted to ingesting methamphetamine, claimed that he had a gun battle with twenty people, and ran out onto Highway 14. Reavis stated that he did not remember shooting at a car, but claimed that he fell and the gun discharged. After less than an hour, Reavis invoked his right to an attorney, stating, "I think I need to talk to a lawyer. I have a lot to lose here. I'd like to donate a kidney or something for the kid." The interview was then concluded.

At a pre-trial hearing on Reavis's motion to suppress, the trial judge ruled that the statements made by Reavis at the crime scene and at the sheriff's office would not be suppressed, and that Reavis had knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Reavis was found guilty at a jury trial of a terroristic act and was sentenced to thirty-five years in the Arkansas Department of Correction.

Reavis's sole point on appeal is that the trial court erred in finding that he made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights. In this regard, the reviewing court makes an independent review of the totality of the circumstances surrounding a Miranda waiver and reversesthe trial court only if its decision was clearly erroneous. Rychtarik v. State, 334 Ark. 492, 976 S.W.2d 374 (1998). Whether the accused had sufficient capacity to waive his Miranda rights, or was too incapacitated due to drugs to make an intelligent waiver, is a question of fact to be resolved by the trial court. McDougald v. State, 295 Ark. 276, 748 S.W.2d 340 (1988). Conflicts in testimony at a suppression hearing about the circumstances surrounding a defendant's in-custody statement are also for the trial judge to resolve. Jones v. State, 344 Ark. 682, 42 S.W.3d 536 (2001).

Custodial statements are presumed to be involuntary, and the burden is on the State to prove that the statement was given voluntarily and was knowingly and intelligently made. Id. There are two separate components in determining the validity of a defendant's waiver. Smith v. State, 334 Ark. 190, 974 S.W.2d 427 (1998). First, the reviewing court examines the voluntariness of the statement, by looking at whether the statements were "the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception." Id. at 204. Second, the court examines whether the waiver was knowingly and intelligently made. Id. This examination focuses on whether the waiver was made with a "full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it," and whether the accused made the choice to waive his rights without police coercion. Id. (quoting Humphrey v. State, 327 Ark. 753, 940 S.W.2d 860 (1997)).

As the State points out, Reavis does not argue that his statements were not voluntary, in the sense that they were the product of police intimidation or coercion. There is also no evidence of any actions by officers that would render Reavis' statements involuntary. Investigator Jack Hutson testified at the suppression hearing that no threats or promises were made to Reavis in order to induce him to make a statement and this testimony was uncontradicted. Instead, Reavis argues thatthe second component, that he knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights, had not been met because he was suffering from fatigue and a methamphetamine-induced psychosis at the time he gave the statement.

Reavis argues that the trial court should have suppressed his statement made after the second reading of his Miranda rights, that he had fallen and his gun had discharged. As support for this argument, Reavis cites to the testimony of Dr. Phil Brown, a psychologist, who had performed a mental examination of Reavis. Reavis asserts that Dr. Brown testified that he had a low level of mental functioning (30 on a 0-100 scale) at the time of the statements, and that he probably could not have understood his legal rights at that time. However, Dr. Brown also testified that Reavis' statement indicated that he was functioning at a substantially higher rate than at the time of the shooting, and that his statement was "detailed, sequential, and logical." Officer Henderson testified that after he read Reavis his rights the second time and asked if he understood, Reavis responded that he did. Also, Officer Lafferty testified that he asked Reavis after he mirandized him for the third time if he was under the influence of any alcohol or drugs, and Reavis said that he was not, although he later admitted to using some drugs that day. The fact that an appellant may have been under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time of his statement does not invalidate the statement, but only goes to the weight it may be accorded. McDougald, supra. There is evidence that Reavis was read his rights three times before his formal interview and that each time he indicated he understood them. Whether Reavis was too incapacitated due to drugs to make a knowing and intelligent waiver is a question of fact for the trial court, and there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to find the waiver to be valid.

Reavis also argues that his formal statement at the Sheriff's office should have been suppressed due to his intoxication and fatigue. Although Dr. Brown testified that Reavis's mentalfunctioning was at a point where he could understand his legal rights during the interview, Reavis states that he did not give appropriate answers to some of the questions and that some of the statements he made were bizarre. However, Investigator Hutson testified that Reavis was trying to be humorous with some of his answers and that although some of the facts he recited were bizarre, most of the facts were corroborated by other evidence. Investigator Hutson, as well as Dr. Brown, testified that Reavis's statement was detailed, sequential, and logical. In Rychtarik, supra, the appellant also alleged that he was suffering delusions due to amphetamine and challenged the validity of his Miranda waiver. There was testimony that the appellant was coherent, although some of his statements were strange. He gave detailed facts that were corroborated, and he eventually exercised his Miranda rights by asking to stop the interview. The Supreme Court, in reviewing this evidence, concluded that the determination that appellant made a knowing and intelligent waiver was not clearly erroneous. Similarly, in this case, testimony established that Reavis' statement was coherent and was corroborated by other evidence. Likewise, Reavis asked for an attorney after about an hour into the interview. The trial court noted that very few defendants exercise their right to an attorney while giving a statement, and that this indicated Reavis did understand these rights. Viewing the totality of the circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court's decision denying Reavis's motion to suppress is clearly erroneous.

Affirmed.

BIRD and JENNINGS, JJ., agree.