ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

JOHN B. ROBBINS, JUDGE

DIVISION III

HAL FRANKLIN JONES

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

CACR 01-255

OCTOBER 31, 2001

APPEAL FROM THE SALINE

COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. CR 00-133-2]

HONORABLE GARY M. ARNOLD,

CIRCUIT JUDGE

AFFIRMED

Appellant Hal Franklin Jones entered a conditional guilty plea to manufacture of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia, pursuant to Rule 24.3(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure. He was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison, followed by a fifteen-year suspended imposition of sentence. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress his statement to the police because he was not competent to waive his Miranda rights prior to making the statement, and because the statement was the result of coercion. We affirm.

A custodial statement is presumed to be involuntary, and it is the State's burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a custodial statement was given voluntarily and was knowingly and intelligently made. Knight v. State, 62 Ark. App. 230, 971 S.W.2d 272 (1998). When reviewing the voluntariness of confessions, we make an independent

determination based on the totality of the circumstances, and reverse the trial court only if its decision was clearly erroneous. Id. The credibility of the witnesses who testified concerning the circumstances surrounding the defendant's custodial statement is for the trial court to determine. Williams v. State, 55 Ark. App. 156, 934 S.W.2d 931 (1996).

In the case at bar, Mr. Jones was arrested on January 9, 2000, at the scene of a mobile home containing a methamphetamine lab. The mobile home did not belong to Mr. Jones, and several others were present at the time of his arrest. On January 11, 2000, Mr. Jones gave a statement to the police, admitting to manufacturing methamphetamine and describing some of the processes involved. Mr. Jones later filed a motion to suppress his statement, and a suppression hearing was held.

Officer Kermit Gray testified at the hearing. He stated that, on January 11, 2000, Mr. Jones was taken from jail to a small room where he was interviewed. Jones had been in custody since his arrest two days earlier, but Officer Gray waited to conduct the interview because Mr. Jones appeared to be under the influence of some sort of substance at the time of his arrest. In this regard, Officer Gray stated:

Actually, when we took down the lab he was what I would describe as high and even had blood running out of his arm where he injected himself. He admitted that he had injected himself. At the time we arrested him, he was obviously high and under the influence of drugs or alcohol.

Officer Gray testified that, by the time the interrogation took place, Mr. Jones did not appear to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol and that no promises or leniency were offered in exchange for his statement.

Officer Gray testified that, prior to the interview, he advised Mr. Jones of his Miranda rights, and that Mr. Jones verbally acknowledged that he understood each right. Then, Mr. Jones read the waiver-of-rights form and initialed each right, indicating that he understood his rights and was waiving them.

Officer Marvin Hodges was also present during the questioning. He testified that no promises were made to Mr. Jones and that Mr. Jones did not express any reservations about talking to him. Officer Hodges further testified that Mr. Jones did not appear to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and "seemed to understand what was going on." On cross-examination, Officer Hodges maintained that Mr. Jones was not placed on a "CID hold" and that he has never used such a method to hold someone in jail. Officer Gray also gave testimony to this effect.

Mr. Jones testified that he was placed on what he called a "CID hold," and stated that this was why he gave a statement to the police. He explained:

When I was arrested on that Sunday, I was placed on a CID hold. They put you in Saline County Jail on a CID hold. They put you in there, they turn the phones off so nobody on either side can use the phone to contact anybody outside the jail. Every inmate in the jail wants to whip your ass because they are trying to call their folks and their loved ones, which normally when nobody is on a CID hold, they can do this, and you get put in there with a CID hold with thirty other gentlemen in there and they are mad because they can't call their family and they are ready to hurt you. Thirty on one ain't a very fair fight.

I'm sure it has a whole lot to do with the fact that you see prisoners with black eyes and bruises on every plea and arraignment day. The CID hold was to hold me incommunicado until they could talk to me. They don't want you contacting anybody outside the jail until they get you down there and run their game on you. Because of this CID hold and this intimidating atmosphere, I felt compelled to talk to them.

Mr. Jones further asserted that, "I was so high, I didn't have no [sic] idea what was goingon." He stated that he has been addicted to methamphetamine for several years, and used massive amounts on a daily basis. He indicated that his recollection of the interview was very vague because he was still high on methamphetamine.

At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial court denied Mr. Jones's motion, and announced:

Okay, the defendant at the time of the interrogation was obviously in custody; however, he was fully advised of his rights prior to questioning and after having been so advised, he voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived those rights and agreed to answer questions. He was certain[ly] lucid, coherent, and, in fact, anxious to demonstrate his expertise. As such, the motion is denied.

Mr. Jones now argues that this ruling was erroneous.

For his argument, Mr. Jones cites Addison v. State, 298 Ark. 1, 765 S.W.2d 566 (1989), where it was held that the length of detention is a factor to consider in determining whether a statement was voluntary. He notes that he was held for more than forty-eight hours in the county jail, and further asserts that he was intimidated by other prisoners and was without access to a telephone or an attorney. Mr. Jones also cites Drymon v. State, 316 Ark. 799, 875 S.W.2d 73 (1994), where our supreme court held that while intoxication alone will not invalidate a waiver of rights, it is a factor to consider. Mr. Jones submits that at the time of his confession he was still intoxicated to the point that he was incapable of effectively waiving his rights.

Only if the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation reveals both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that Miranda rights have been waived. Maupin v. State, 309 Ark. 235, 831 S.W.2d 104(1992)(citing Morgan v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986)). A pertinent factor for consideration is the vulnerability of the defendant. Rankin v. State, 338 Ark. 723, 1 S.W.3d 14 (1999). Mr. Jones contends that, under the totality of the circumstances, his statement was not voluntary because of his vulnerable state, which was the product of the coercion created by the "CID hold" and his intoxication.

Mr. Jones's argument on appeal is without merit. While he was detained in jail for two days prior to the confession, the purpose of the delay was to ensure that he was no longer under the influence of intoxicants. Significantly, the interview itself lasted only thirty-four minutes, and prior to the interview Officer Gray explained each right and Mr. Jones indicated that he understood them. Although Mr. Jones now argues that he was not afforded an attorney, at no time did he request one during the interview, and the trial court listened to the tape recording of the interview and determined that Mr. Jones was lucid and coherent.

While Mr. Jones asserts that he lacked capacity to knowingly and intelligently waive his rights due to intoxication, both of the interrogating officers testified that he did not appear to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol. He further asserts that he was coerced as a result of the so-called "CID hold," but both officers denied that any such measure was used. Officer Gray described the interview as "very friendly" and Officer Hodges stated that Mr. Jones "seemed to be in a pretty good mood," and this testimony refutes Mr. Jones's claim that his confession was coerced. It was for the trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses, see Williams v. State, supra, and the testimony of Officers Gray and Hodgesindicated that, at the time of the interview, Mr. Jones made an uncoerced and competent decision to waive his rights and make a statement.

Under the totality of the circumstances, we hold that the trial court's decision that the waiver of rights and confession were voluntary was not clearly erroneous. Therefore, we affirm its decision denying Mr. Jones's motion to suppress the statement.

Affirmed.

Baker and Roaf, JJ., agree.