ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

CHIEF JUDGE JOHN F. STROUD, JR.

DIVISION I

MARGARET HATTENHAUER, ET AL.

APPELLANTS

V.

JOHNNY COCHRAN, ET AL.

APPELLEES

CA 00-1050

October 3, 2001

APPEAL FROM THE RANDOLPH

COUNTY PROBATE COURT,

[A-00-3, E-98-231]

HONORABLE THOMAS L.

HILBURN, PROBATE JUDGE

AFFIRMED

Appellants, Margaret and Robert Hattenhauer, are the maternal grandparents of Patience Mary Hattenhauer Cochran, a minor. They appeal from the probate court's order granting the adoption of the child by appellee Wahneta Cochran.

For their sole point of appeal, appellants contend that "the lower court erred as a matter of law when it granted an adoption based on an interlocutory, temporary order, refusing to require the alleged putative father to participate in DNA testing as requested by the maternal grandparents. The lower court, in its interlocutory order, did not make a finding of the legal or biological relationship between the putative father and the minor child, only denying the maternal grandparents' request for DNA testing." We affirm.

Patience Mary Hattenhauer Cochran was born on February 16, 1991, to Melody Ann Hattenhauer, appellants' daughter. Melody was not married at the time of Patience's birth,

and the child's original birth certificate left the name of the father blank. However, Melody subsequently married appellee Johnny Cochran on May 26, 1991. On December 31, 1991, Melody was killed in an automobile accident.

In the summer of 1991, prior to Melody's death, the following documents were executed in Mississippi, where Melody and Johnny lived: 1) Affidavit for Legitimation of Birth Certificate, signed by both Melody and Johnny and dated June 28, 1991; 2) Affidavit and Affirmation of Paternity, signed by Melody and dated August 16, 1991; 3) Affidavit and Admission of Paternity, signed by Johnny and dated August 6, 1991. Each document was notarized. Although unclear from the record, it appears that the notarized documents acknowledging paternity were not submitted for filing prior to Melody's death, but after her death the child's birth certificate was amended to show Johnny Cochran as the father.

In July 1995, Johnny Cochran married appellee Wahneta Cochran, his current wife. Thereafter, Wahneta Cochran petitioned to adopt Patience, but withdrew her petition when appellants expressed their objections. Appellants subsequently filed an action in chancery court in 1998 to establish custody "or in the alternative, visitation rights of the maternal grandparents," and for an order directing correction of the child's birth certificate. As part of the chancery action, they sought the DNA testing of appellee Johnny Cochran and the child. A temporary order was entered in which the chancellor awarded visitation to the maternal grandparents, but denied their request for DNA testing. It appears to be undisputed that no further action nor any appeal was taken from the chancery case.

In September 1999, appellee Wahneta Cochran again filed a petition for adoption in probate court. Appellees notified appellants, and appellants intervened in the action to objectto the adoption. The probate judge granted the adoption but continued appellants' visitation with the child.

Appellants' point of appeal contends that the probate court based its grant of adoption "on an interlocutory, temporary order," from the chancery court action, that did not make a finding regarding the "legal or biological relationship between the putative father and the minor child, only denying the . . . request for DNA testing," and that the court erred as a matter of law in doing so. The argument section of appellants' brief consists of four pages in which an argument is never really developed. Rather, appellants recite a procedural and factual history of the case, and quote portions of the supreme court case of Bean v. Office of Child Support Enforcement, 340 Ark. 286, 9 S.W.3d 520 (2000), and of Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-342 (Repl. 1998). They do not, however, develop any convincing arguments in support of their position, and they do not cite any convincing legal authority. When it is not apparent without further research that their argument is well taken, we need not consider the merits of their point of appeal. Tyrone v. Dennis, 73 Ark. App. 209, 39 S.W.3d 800 (2001).

However, if we were to address the merits of this case, we would find no error. One significant problem with appellants' point of appeal is that the probate court in the instant case never indicated that it was granting the adoption based on the earlier temporary order in the chancery case. Moreover, whether the temporary chancery order was final and appealable is in no way controlling here because the adoption proceeding from which this appeal arises was an independent matter in a different court, probate, that had subject matterjurisdiction to hear the case. Appellants were allowed to intervene in the adoption case only because they had been granted visitation by the chancellor in the other action prior to the instant adoption petition being filed. See Thompkins v. Thompkins, 341 Ark. 949, 20 S.W.3d 385 (2000), and cases cited therein. The grandparents' focus in intervening is essentially limited to whether the proposed adoption is in the child's best interest. Id.; Quarles v. French, 272 Ark. 51, 611 S.W.2d 757 (1981). Yet, here, the "best interest" of the child was not the focus of appellants' Objection to Petition for Adoption.

Further, although appellants do not develop an argument with respect to the one case that they cite and quote, Bean v. Office of Child Support Enforcement, supra, appellees convincingly argue that the case cannot provide any support for setting aside this adoption because grandparents have no right to contest paternity, nor to request paternity testing. The right to contest paternity lies only with a biological mother, a putative father, an illegitimate child or a person for whom paternity is not presumed or established by court order, or the Office of Child Support Enforcement. See Ark. Code Ann. §§ 9-27-342 & 9-10-104 (Repl. 1998). Thus, even though Bean holds that there can be no retroactive application of the statutes that provide that paternity is established by operation of law upon signing an acknowledgment of paternity, appellants, as intervening grandparents in an adoption case, cannot rely upon Bean to challenge Johnny Cochran's paternity. Moreover, Ellis v. Bennett, 69 Ark. App. 227, 10 S.W.3d 922 (2000), is cited by appellees, and although it involves a different situation concerning grandparent visitation, it supports appellees' position that even though Patience was born out of wedlock, her mother's subsequent marriage to JohnnyCochran and acknowledgment of his paternity "legitimized" Patience. The chancellor in Ellis denied grandparental visitation because the child had been legitimized before they filed their petition for visitation. We affirmed and commented:

Id. at 230-31, 10 S.W.3d at 924.

In short, Johnny Cochran's actions made him the "legal" father of Patience, and appellants have no standing to challenge his paternity. Significantly, no other man besides Johnny Cochran has claimed to be the child's father.

Finally, although appellants make a conclusory allegation that appellee Johnny Cochran "fraudulently" had the birth certificate changed in 1992 to have him shown as the father, they in no way support their allegation with facts or argument. Without more, this allegation cannot support setting aside the adoption.

In short, the probate judge was not clearly erroneous in concluding that the adoption would be in the best interest of the child. Moreover, he allowed visitation with the biological maternal grandparents to continue, which is what they apparently most wanted to protect.

Affirmed.

Hart and Jennings, JJ., agree.