ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

JOHN MAUZY PITTMAN, JUDGE

DIVISION II

JOHNNY PEMBERTON

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

CACR00-639

October 3, 2001

APPEAL FROM THE DREW COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. CR-98-21-2]

HON. SAMUEL B. POPE,

CIRCUIT JUDGE

AFFIRMED

After a jury trial, the appellant in this criminal case was convicted of theft by receiving of a trailer valued in excess of $500. For reversal, he contends that the evidence was insufficient to show that the value of the trailer was in excess of $500, or to show that appellant knew or should have known that the trailer was stolen. We affirm.

A motion for a directed verdict is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Ward v. State, 64 Ark. App. 120, 981 S.W.2d 96 (1998). When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal from a criminal conviction, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the State and will affirm if the finding of guilt is supported by substantial evidence. Wilson v. State, 56 Ark.

App. 47, 939 S.W.2d 313 (1997). Substantial evidence is evidence of sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one way or the other without resort to speculation or conjecture. Argo v. State, 53 Ark. App. 103, 920 S.W.2d 18 (1996).

Appellant was convicted of violating Ark. Code Ann. § 5-36-106 (Repl. 1997), which provides, in pertinent part, that:

(a) A person commits the offense of theft by receiving if he receives, retains, or disposes of stolen property of another person, knowing that it was stolen or having good reason to believe it was stolen.

(b) For purposes of this section, "receiving" means acquiring possession, control, or title or lending on the security of the property.

(c) The unexplained possession or control by a person of recently stolen property or the acquisition by a person of property for a consideration known to be far below its reasonable value shall give rise to a presumption that he knows or believes that the property was stolen.

. . . .

(2) Theft by receiving is a Class C felony if:

(A) The value of the property is less than two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) but more than five hundred dollars ($500)....

Appellant first asserts that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to show that the value of the trailer was between $500 and $2,500. Insomuch as appellant merely asserts this in a conclusory fashion, citing no authority and making no argument whatsoeverto support it, we need not address it. Barr v. State, 336 Ark. 220, 984 S.W.2d 792 (1999). We note in passing, however, that the record shows that appellant himself put on proof that the fair-market value of the trailer was actually in excess of $2,500, including evidence that he declined an offer of $4,200 for it, and a receipt purporting to show that he himself paid $3,200 to acquire it. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-36-101(11)(A) (Repl. 1997).

Appellant next asserts that the evidence was insufficient to show that appellant knew or should have known that the trailer was stolen. Although it is true that the mere receipt and possession of stolen goods does not constitute the offense, and that they must be received with knowledge that they had been stolen and with the intent to deprive the owner thereof of his property, Williams v. State, 202 Ark. 951, 154 S.W.2d 809 (1941), we think that there was clearly more than evidence of mere possession in the present case.

Here, there was evidence that the trailer in question had been painted white after it was stolen; that appellant and his wife had taken the trailer from Arkansas to Mississippi to sell at auction; that they failed to sell it, brought it back to Arkansas, and afterward asked the Mississippi auction-house manager to give them a bill of sale for the trailer even though they had not purchased the trailer from him. The auction-house manager also testified that appellant's wife told him "something about a sheriff's office saying that the trailer was stolen." Finally, we note that appellant himself gave conflicting accounts of how he acquired the trailer, first saying that he bought it with cash from the Mississippi auction house but had no receipt, and two days later producing a bill of sale to show that he had bought the trailer from a different party in Hot Springs, Arkansas. Evidence of suchevasions are indicative of knowledge of guilt, see Gregory v. State, 341 Ark. 243, 15 S.W.3d 690 (2000); Austin v. State, 26 Ark. App. 70, 760 S.W.2d 76 (1988), and we think that, when considered together with the evidence that appellant was in possession of the vehicle, there was sufficient evidence to show that he knew it was stolen. See Riddle v. State, 303 Ark. 42, 791 S.W.2d 708 (1990).

Affirmed.

Hart and Roaf, JJ., agree.