ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

JOHN MAUZY PITTMAN, JUDGE

DIVISION IV

RENNY'S BAIL BOND CO.

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

CA00-1069

September 26, 2001

APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, SEVENTH DIVISION

[NO. CV 00-5258; CR 99-2886]

HON. JOHN B. PLEGGE,

CIRCUIT JUDGE

AFFIRMED

Appellant was the surety on two bail bonds for Telly Thompson. One bond was in a felony drug case and was for $25,000.00. The other bond was in a misdemeanor case and was for $955.00. Both bonds were initially made in the North Little Rock Municipal Court. The felony drug case was subsequently transferred to Pulaski County Circuit Court. The bondsman surrendered Thompson to the judge of the North Little Rock Municipal Court on September 15, 1999. However, Thompson failed to appear in circuit court on December 13, 1999, and the circuit judge issued an order requiring appellant to show cause as to why the $25,000.00 bond should not be forfeited. The circuit court found that appellant had not been

relieved of the $25,000.00 bond, and ordered that bond to be forfeited. From that decision, comes this appeal.

For reversal, appellant asserts that the trial court erred in ordering that the bond be forfeited because it acted in good faith and in substantial compliance with Ark. Code Ann. § 16-84-114 (Supp. 1999). We find no error, and we affirm.

Arkansas Code Annotated § 16-84-114 provides, in pertinent part, that:

(a)(1) At any time before the forfeiture of their bond, the surety may surrender the defendant or the defendant may surrender himself to the jailer of the county in which the offense was committed.

(2) However, the surrender must be accompanied by a certified copy of the bail bond to be delivered to the jailer, who must detain the defendant in custody thereon as upon a commitment and give a written acknowledgment of the surrender.

(3) The surety shall thereupon be exonerated.

It is true, as appellant notes, that the law concerning bail bond forfeiture has not always been rigidly applied. In Carter v. State, 43 Ark. 132 (1884), our supreme court held that, where the surety delivered a prisoner to a deputy, obtained a receipt noted on the bail bond by the deputy in the sheriff's own name, and the prisoner subsequently escaped, the bond would not be forfeited merely because the sheriff, following his recent re-election, had for a few days neglected to renew the deputy's appointment. The court stated that circuit judges have limited discretion to determine the validity of excuses set up by a surety, and remanded for the circuit judge to reconsider the forfeiture in light of the fact that the deputy had been acting as a de facto law enforcement officer, and that there was every reason forthe parties to believe he was one de jure. Likewise, it has been held that there was substantial compliance with the statutory provisions where the surety surrendered the prisoner to the sheriff and ex officio jailer, but where the surrender was not accompanied by a certified copy of the bond and no receipt from the sheriff was obtained. Hester v. State, 145 Ark. 347, 224 S.W. 618 (1920).

However, we are not convinced that the circumstances of those cases are analogous to those presented in the case at bar. In both of the cases cited above, the prisoner was surrendered to law enforcement officials who were ex officio jailers. See Sternberg v. State, 42 Ark. 127 (1883). In the present case, however, appellant did not surrender his prisoner to a jailer equipped to detain him securely, but instead surrendered him to the municipal judge himself. Furthermore, it is clear from the testimony of the municipal judge's clerk, and from the municipal judge's own docket notation, that appellant was not released on the $25,000.00 bond when he deposited his prisoner in municipal court. On this record, we cannot say that the circuit judge abused his discretion in ordering that bond forfeited.

Affirmed.

Stroud, C.J., and Jennings, J., agree.