ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

TERRY CRABTREE, JUDGE

DIVISION II

SHIRLEY GENTRY

APPELLANT

V.

POULAN WEED EATER

APPELLEE

CA 01-139

SEPTEMBER 19, 2001

APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION

[NO. E-890894]

AFFIRMED

The appellant, Shirley Gentry, appeals from an order of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission denying her additional benefits. On May 6, 1998, appellant was employed by the appellee, Poulan Weed Eater, when she experienced a carpal tunnel injury. Appellee accepted the injury as compensable and paid appellant a 10% impairment rating for her right hand. Appellant subsequently claimed additional benefits. Specifically, appellant requested the following: (1) temporary total disability benefits from December 1, 1999, through December 8, 1999; (2) a change of physician to Dr. James Tuberville, and further medical benefits; and (3) a permanent impairment rating to her right hand and wrist of 22%, and a permanent impairment rating of 9% to her left hand and wrist. On June 14, 2000, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") issued an opinion denying appellant's requests. The Commission affirmed and adopted the ALJ's findings. Appellant contends that theCommission's decision is not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.

When reviewing a decision of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the findings of the Commission and affirm that decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. Clark v. Peabody Testing Serv., 265 Ark. 489, 579 S.W.2d 360 (1979). Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Crossett Sch. Dist. v. Fulton, 65 Ark. App. 63, 984 S.W.2d 833 (1999). The issue is not whether this Court might have reached a different result from the Commission. Malone v. Texarkana Pub. Schs., 333 Ark. 343, 969 S.W.2d 644 (1998). If reasonable minds could reach the result found by the Commission, we must affirm the decision. Bradley v. Alumax, 50 Ark. App. 13, 899 S.W.2d 850 (1995). In making our review, we recognize that it is the function of the Commission to determine credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Stephens Truck Lines v. Millican, 58 Ark. App. 275, 950 S.W.2d 472 (1997).

First, appellant argues that the Commission erred in denying her temporary total disability benefits from December 1, 1999, through December 8, 1999. To obtain temporary total disability benefits, a claimant must show that he was totally incapacitated from earning wages, and that he was in his healing period. Arkansas State Highway & Transp. Dep't v. Breshears, 272 Ark. 244, 613 S.W.2d 392 (1981). A claimant is entitled to temporary total disability during his healing period if he shows by the preponderance of the evidence that

he had a total incapacity to earn wages. Carroll Gen. Hosp. v. Green, 54 Ark. App. 102, 923 S.W.2d 878 (1996). Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-102(12) defines the healing period "as that period for healing of an injury resulting from an accident."

The ALJ used the following information in evaluating this issue: 1) a letter from Dr. Barry Green stating that appellant reached maximum medial improvement as of December 8, 1998, and assigning a 22% permanent impairment rating to the right upper extremity; 2) a letter dated December 18, 1999, from Dr. Reginald Rutherford, who examined appellant on December 18, 1999, stating that appellant's symptoms were non-organic and assigning a 10% permanent impairment rating; 3) a letter from Dr. Bruce Safman, dated July 21, 1999, stating that appellant did not have symptoms attributable to surgery and he could not offer any further treatment; 4) a letter from Dr. Michael Moore, dated March 3, 1999, stating that appellant had reached maximum medical improvement, and assigning a permanent impairment rating of 10%; and 5) testimony by employer witnesses, Sheila Smith, plant nurse, Debbie Hughes, and David Taylor, shift supervisor, that appellant returned to work following her CTR surgery in 1998 and continued to work at light-duty jobs on and off until December 1, 1999, at which time appellant did not want to work at some of the jobs which had been offered to her, left work, and failed to return. Appellant argues that the ALJ failed to address the St. Michael's Healthcare Center examination of December 1, 1999, wherein appellant appeared with visibly swollen fingers. However, we hold that the medical evidence from Drs. Green, Rutherford, Safman, and Moore, along with the testimony of the employer witnesses, constitutes substantial evidence in denying appellant's claim fortemporary total disability benefits.

Second, appellant argues that the Commission erred in denying her a change of physician to Dr. James Tuberville, and denying her claim for additional medical treatment by Dr. Tuberville. We find no error, as appellant already had received her one change of physician, and there was no evidence that Dr. Chris Alkire had ever referred appellant to Dr. Tuberville.

Finally, appellant argues that she is entitled to a 22% impairment rating to her right upper extremity, and a 9% permanent impairment rating to her left upper extremity. Appellant was given such ratings by Dr. Barry Green. However, the ALJ relied on Drs. Rutherford and Moore in finding a 10% impairment rating to appellant's right upper extremity, and none to the left. This impairment rating had already been paid by appellees. Dr. Moore, in his letter, dated March 3, 1999, assigned appellant a 10% impairment rating to her right upper extremity. Dr. Rutherford, in his letter dated February 2, 1998, gave appellant a 10% impairment rating to her right upper extremity. Neither Dr. Moore or Dr. Rutherford gave appellant any impairment rating to her upper left extremity. It is within the Commission's province to weigh all the medical evidence and determine what is most credible. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. v. Baker, 337 Ark. 94, 989 S.W.2d 151 (1999). The Commission has the authority to accept or reject medical opinion and authority to determine its medical soundness and probative force. Oak Grove Lumber Co. v. Highfill, 62 Ark. App. 42, 968 S.W.2d 637 (1998). The interpretation given to medical evidence by the Commission has the weight and force of a jury verdict. Geo Specialty Chem. v. Clingan, 69Ark. App. 369, 13 S.W.3d 218 (2000). Based on the letters from Drs. Moore and Rutherford, we hold that there was substantial evidence to affirm the Commission's decision to award appellant only a 10% impairment rating to her upper right extremity, and no impairment rating to her upper left extremity.

Affirmed.

Jennings and Baker, JJ., agree.