ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
SAM BIRD, JUDGE
DIVISION III
BETTY (MOORE) BULLARD,
APPELLANT
V.
COVIE MOORE,
APPELLEE
CA00-1237
SEPTEMBER 19, 2001
APPEAL FROM THE INDEPENDENCE COUNTY CHANCERY COURT,
NO. E93-166-1,
HON. ROBIN MAYS, CHANCELLOR
AFFIRMED
This case involves the distribution of proceeds from the sale of real property following a divorce. Appellant contends that the chancellor erred in failing to give her credit for mortgage payments she made during the time between the parties' 1993 separation and the later sale of the properties. We find no error and affirm.
Although the parties separated in 1993, a divorce decree was not entered until May 12, 1997. In that four-year period, appellant made mortgage payments on three tracts of real property. Tract 1 had been purchased by appellant prior to marriage. The other two tracts, which were referred to below as Tracts 3 and 4 (and, for the sake of consistency, will be so referred to here), were purchased by the parties during the marriage.1
The divorce decree declared that, although Tract 1 was appellant's nonmarital
property, appellee was entitled to some interest therein. Appellant was given the choice of either paying appellee a set amount for his interest or selling the property at public auction, whereupon, after deducting appellant's equity, the costs of sale, and the mortgage indebtedness, any remaining proceeds would be equally divided.2 As for Tracts 3 and 4, the chancellor found that they were marital property and ordered them sold at public auction with the proceeds being equally divided after deduction of costs of sale, taxes, and mortgage indebtedness.
Appellant chose to sell Tract 1, and she purchased it herself for $285,000 on August 7, 1997. She also purchased Tracts 3 and 4 on January 12, 1998, for $2,500 and $38,000, respectively. In April 1998, a proposed order was prepared for the purpose of confirming the sales and distributing the proceeds. Appellant objected to the order, inter alia, on the ground that the chancellor did not have jurisdiction to enter it, due to his prior recusal from the case. Eventually, Judge Robin Mays, who ordinarily presided in the Sixth Judicial District Circuit, was assigned to the case. On April 15, 1999, she conducted a hearing to determine the manner in which the proceeds of the sales should be distributed. She concluded that the following amounts should be deducted as mortgage indebtedness on each tract: on Tract 1, $97,268.83 that was owed as of the date of the 1997 sale; on Tract 3, $11,934.55 owed as of the date of the 1997 divorce decree; and on Tract 4, $16,196.52 owed as of the date of the 1998 sale. Appellant asked the chancellor to deduct greateramounts on each tract by using the indebtedness owed as of the 1993 separation date or the 1994 initial-hearing date. She argued that, during the period between those dates and the dates of sale, she had made the mortgage payments on the tracts without assistance from appellee and should be given credit therefor. The chancellor declined her request and, as a result, determined that appellant owed appellee $8,913.59 from the sale of Tract 1 and $5,064.08 from the sale of Tracts 3 and 4. Appellant appeals from that ruling.
We review chancery cases de novo on appeal. Skokos v. Skokos, 344 Ark. 420, 40 S.W.3d 768 (2001). With respect to the division of property in a divorce case, we affirm the chancellor's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Id.
Appellant argues that she should have received credit for the mortgage payments she made pending sale of the tracts. Appellee contends that appellant is prohibited from making that argument because the 1997 divorce decree is res judicata as to that issue. We find appellee's point persuasive.
Res judicata applies where there has been a final adjudication of the merits of an issue, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction on all matters litigated or that might have been litigated. Greene v. Pack, 343 Ark. 97, 32 S.W.3d 482 (2000). The question of whether appellant should receive credit for mortgage payments made pending the sales could have been litigated in the proceedings that led to the 1997 decree. When appellant chose not to appeal from that decree, the doctrine of res judicata operated to preclude the litigation of the matter. See Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Arkansas Child Care Consultants, Inc., 318 Ark. 821, 889 S.W.2d 24 (1994); Montgomery v. Blankenship,218 Ark. 890, 239 S.W.2d 758 (1951); Magness v. Commerce Bank, 42 Ark. App. 72, 853 S.W.2d 890 (1993). We also note that the question appears to actually have been raised in the prior proceeding. In the post-decree hearing, Judge Mays and the parties referred to the former chancellor's 1996 letter opinion, in which he stated that the mortgages would be calculated at the values owed at the time of the sales. We further observe that appellant, in her objection to the 1998 proposed order of distribution, argued that the 1997 decree was res judicata for certain purposes.
We uphold the order distributing the sale proceeds because we find that the 1997 divorce decree was res judicata with respect to that issue. Although the chancellor did not refer to the doctrine of res judicata in her order, we may affirm her decision if it is correct for any reason. See Moon v. Moon Enterprises, 65 Ark. App. 246, 986 S.W.2d 134 (1999).
Appellant also argues that Judge Mays should have granted a new trial pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 63. That rule provides that, if an assigned judge is satisfied that she cannot perform her duties because she did not preside at trial or for any other reason, she may, in her discretion, grant a new trial. From our review of the record, as abstracted, it appears that, while Judge Mays had a difficult task before her in making the calculations necessary to distribute the sale proceeds, she did a commendable job with the assistance of the parties. She did not abuse her discretion in refusing to order a new trial.
Affirmed.
Robbins and Vaught, JJ., agree.
1 There were a total of nine tracts at issue below. Tract 2 and Tracts 5 through 9 are not relevant to this appeal.