ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

KAREN R. BAKER, JUDGE

DIVISION II

AUDRIANNA GRISHAM, P.A.

APPELLANT

V.

CITY OF ENGLAND

APPELLEE

CA00-1449

SEPTEMBER 12, 2001

APPEAL FROM THE LONOKE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. CIV1999-117]

HONORABLE LANCE LAMAR HANSHAW, CIRCUIT JUDGE

REVERSED AND REMANDED

The Circuit Court of Lonoke County granted summary judgment to the City of England against Audrianna Grisham, P.A., finding that a contract calling for Ms. Grisham, as an attorney, to collect accounts receivables for the England Ambulance Service was "improper from its inception." While we understand that the nature of the contract and the surrounding circumstances could shock the conscious of the court, we hold that under the facts of this case, summary judgment was not appropriate and, accordingly, reverse and remand.

In May 1998, a document was signed by Ms. Grisham on behalf of Audrianna Grisham, P.A. and by Joyce Lemons on behalf of the England Ambulance Commission for the England Ambulance Service. The agreement identified the England Ambulance Service as the client and Ms. Grisham as the attorney. The client agreed to retain Ms. Grisham as its attorney to collect unpaid and past due accounts and to pay Ms. Grisham according to a schedule. In addition, it contained a termination clause wherein the client would pay Ms. Grisham an hourly rate of $150 an hour upon termination of the contract without just cause.

In February 1999, Ms. Lemons sent a letter to Ms. Grisham terminating the relationship and stated that the reason was that revenue generated as a result of collection efforts was not what was anticipated. At the time of termination, the Service had paid Ms. Grisham approximately $16,000 and Ms. Grisham had collected $18,427.69 for the Service. Ms. Grisham responded by demanding another approximately $62,000 based upon the termination clause rate of $150 an hour. The City refused to pay, and Ms. Grisham sued.

The City raised several issues in its defense of the suit, including the following:

(1) that it had never entered into the contract; (2) that the statutory bidding process required by Arkansas Code Annotated section 19-11-801 et.seq. was not followed; and (3) that Ms. Grisham was the daughter of the City's mayor and that City Council minutes from June 1, 1998, reflect that the Mayor advised the Council that a contract to collect accounts receivables had been entered into with "Capitol City Collection," not her daughter.

The City's motion for summary judgment emphasized these points and stressed that city regulations state that "no employee may directly supervise or be supervised by a member of his immediate family. For purposes of this rule an immediate family member includes . . . child . . ."

In response, Ms. Grisham countered that even if the contract was improperly let, that recovery on the theory of unjust enrichment or quantum meruit could be had. In addition, the response alleged ratification through inaction by the City's failure to disavow the contract and by acceptance of its benefits.

The law is well settled that summary judgment is to be granted by a trial court only when it is clear that there are no genuine issues of material fact to be litigated, and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Pugh v. Griggs, 327 Ark. 577, 940 S.W.2d 445 (1997). Once the moving party has established a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, the opposing partymust meet proof with proof and demonstrate the existence of a material issue of fact. Id. On review, this court determines if summary judgment was appropriate based on whether the evidentiary items presented by the moving party in support of the motion leave a material fact unanswered. Id. This court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was filed, resolving all doubts and inferences against the moving party. Id. Our review focuses not only on the pleadings, but also on the affidavits and other documents filed by the parties. Wallace v. Broyles, 331 Ark. 58, 961 S.W.2d 712 (1998); Angle v. Alexander, 328 Ark. 714, 945 S.W.2d 933 (1997).

The moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ark. R. Civ. P. 56 (1998); Robert D. Holloway, Inc. v. Pine Ridge Add'n Resid. Prop. Owners, 332 Ark. 450, 966 S.W.2d 241 (1998) (citing McCutchen v. Huckabee, 328 Ark. 202, 943 S.W.2d 225 (1997)).

Summary judgment is not proper where the evidence, although in no material dispute as to actuality, reveals aspects from which inconsistent hypotheses might reasonably be drawn and reasonable men might differ. Walker v. Stephens, 3 Ark. App. 205, 626 S.W.2d 200 (1981). Although the facts in this case appear to be in no material dispute, reasonable minds might differ as to the reasons for their mayor's actions or for the reasons why statutory bidding processes were not followed, or even as to why their counsel members may have been unaware of Ms. Grisham's involvement with and payment by the City. For example, the termination of the arrangement with Ms. Grisham apparently coincided with Ms. Grisham's mother no longer being the mayor of the City. Without a more developed record, it is conceivable that reasonable minds could differ as to the motives for the termination, whether those motives were more protective of the City's interest or retaliatory in nature.

As for the unjust enrichment argument, even though we cannot tell from the record before us any specifics of Ms. Grisham's work regarding the collection of accounts, we note generally that the area of collection law requires compliance with numerous federal laws and regulations, particularly when the collection involves debt related to medical services. We cannot say that as a matter of law, the City would not be enriched by work Ms. Grisham performed to ensure the City's compliance with these laws.

Accordingly, we reverse and remand.

Jennings and Crabtree, JJ., agree.