NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

KAREN R. BAKER, JUDGE DIVISION II

FARMLAND INSURANCE COMPANY

APPELLANT

V.

WILLONIA MIKEL

APPELLEE

CA00-1431

AUGUST 29, 2001

APPEAL FROM THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION

[NO. E902268]

AFFIRMED

The insurance carrier appeals a decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission awarding appellee additional medical benefits and additional temporary total disability benefits as a result of an admittedly compensable injury to her right elbow. Appellant urged the Commission to find that appellee was involved in an independent intervening event which severed its liability for benefits. The Commission found that appellant had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that appellee was involved in an intervening event. We hold that substantial evidence supports the Commission's decision and affirm.

When reviewing a decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the findings of the Commission and affirm that decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. Broadway v. B.A.S.S., 41 Ark. App. 111, 848 S.W.2d 445 (1993). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. The issue is not whether we might have reached a different result or whether the evidence would havesupported a contrary finding; if reasonable minds could reach the Commission's conclusion, we affirm its decision. Id.

In this case, we have reviewed the Commission's decision that appellant failed to prove that appellee's condition resulted from an independent and intervening cause. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102 (4)(F)(iii) (Supp. 1999) provides that "benefits shall not be payable for a condition which results from a nonwork-related independent intervening cause following a compensable injury which causes or prolongs disability or a need for treatment. A nonwork-related independent intervening cause does not require negligence or recklessness on the part of a claimant." See also Davis v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 341 Ark. 751, 20 S.W.3d 326 (2000)(applying same analysis of independent intervening cause claims after 1993 amendment as before amendment, and relying in part on Guidry); Guidry v. J.R. Eads Constr. Co., 11 Ark. App. 219, 669 S.W.2d 483 (1984)(holding that if there is a causal connection between the primary injury and the subsequent disability, there is no independent intervening cause unless the subsequent disability was triggered by activity on the part of the claimant which was unreasonable under the circumstances).

Appellant tried to prove that appellee's present condition was the result of her attempt to throw a blender in the course of a disagreement with her husband. Appellee testified about the incident on direct examination and explained that while she and her husband were separated, they "got into a verbal disagreement about certain property and he had brought up the blender, and I told him if he wanted it, he could have it. And then he kindly got smart and had a few remarks to make and I told him he'd either take it or I'd throw it at him." She further testified that she did not throw the blender, nor did she pick it up. She stated that she is left-handed and if she were to throw a blender, she would throw it with her left hand, not her injured right hand.

On appeal, appellant's argument relies upon and expounds upon a notation in appellee'sphysical therapy records that she had "tried to throw a blender" during an altercation with her husband. Appellant insists that there can be only one reading of the notation and that appellee was under restrictions which would not have permitted the type of activity required to throw a blender. Therefore, appellant argues, the notation necessitates a finding that the activity was unreasonable under the circumstances.

In rejecting appellant's position, the Commission found that the notation is consistent with appellant's testimony that she and her husband were arguing over property and she told him that if he did not take the blender she would throw it. The Commission found that merely reaching for the blender during a heated conversation and threatening to throw it is consistent with advising the therapist that she "tried" to throw the blender. In addition, ample evidence of appellee's continuing physical condition was noted from the initial medical treatment to the present.

Questions concerning the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony are exclusively within the province of the Commission. Robinson v. Ed Williams Constr. Co., 38 Ark. App. 90, 828 S.W.2d 860 (1992). We hold that there is sufficient evidence to support the Commission's resolution of the testimony.

Accordingly, we affirm.

Bird and Roaf, JJ., agree.